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ABSTRACT 
My dissertation focuses on what I call Aristotle’s “problem of katholou” in order to 
distinguish it from the “problem of universals” which is traditionally framed as the 
problem about the ontological status of universals. Aristotle coins the term katholou 
(traditionally rendered as “universal”) and defines it as “that which is by nature 
predicated of many things” (De Int. 17a38). Yet, the traditional focus on the ontological 
status of universals is not Aristotle’s. His positive remarks about universals remain 
neutral with regard to their ontological status and escape the standard divide of realism 
and nominalism. I start with Aristotle’s neutrality and focus on his problem concerning 
universals and particulars.  
 The problem of katholou is to explain how what is most real can also be most 
knowable. It is generated by two of Aristotle’s philosophical commitments: (i) 
particulars are most real and (ii) universals are most knowable (since knowledge is of the 
universal). My central task is as follows. I show that Aristotle’s writings reveal three 
related solutions: one that appeals to the ontological interdependence between universals 
and particulars; one that appeals to the corresponding epistemological interdependence 
(and to notions of potentiality and actuality); and one that invokes the concept of form. In 
the last chapter of the dissertation, I show that Aristotle’s commentator, Alexander of 
Aphrodisias, adopted primarily the last solution, which appeals to forms. I suggest that 
Alexander influenced the future direction of discussions about Aristotle’s problem of 
katholou and the traditional problem of universals. 
Keywords: Aristotle, universals, particulars, essentialism, ontological priority, 
substance, Alexander of Aphrodisias, the problem of universals. 
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1 
Introduction  
My dissertation focuses on the problem of how what is most real can also be most 
knowable in Aristotle. I call it the “problem of katholou” in order to distinguish it from 
the age-old, and occasionally bitter, controversy over the existence and ontological status 
of universals, which is known as the “problem of universals”. The “traditional” problem 
of universals asks whether or not universals exist – whether they exist in reality or only 
in thought. Aristotle clearly plays an important role in the evolution of the traditional 
problem. He is the first to give the concept “universal” a name, coining it to katholou. He 
is also the first to define it: “that which is by nature predicated of many things” (De Int. 
17a35-37).1 Yet, Aristotle does not formulate the problem. The traditional problem of 
universals was first raised some six centuries later by Porphyry, who near the beginning 
of his Isagoge formulates but then modestly refuses to answer three questions about the 
ontological status of universals, saying that they are too “deep” for the present 
investigation.2 These questions were made famous and bequeathed to the Middle Ages 
by Boethius through his translation of Isagoge.                                                          
1 Katholou is a contraction of the phrase kata holou, meaning “according to the whole” or perhaps “in 
respect of a whole”, or “on the whole” – although of course without the casual tone of the latter. It is 
reasonably clear that the philosophical term katholou originates with Aristotle, for although Plato uses the 
adverbial phrase kata holou (Meno 77a5-9, Rep. 392 d-e), the term katholou does not occur in a technical 
sense prior to Aristotle’s works. The English term “universal” comes from the Latin universale which is a 
contraction of unum versus alia – a Latin translation of such Greek phrases as hen epi pollôn and hen kata 
pollôn (roughly, “one over many”), which occur a number of times (in relevant connections) in Aristotle’s 
corpus (e.g. De Int. 20b12, An. Post. 77a5-9). For a further discussion of Aristotle’s terminology, see 
Sacksteder (1986). I prefer to speak about Aristotle’s problem of katholou (rather than Aristotle’s problem 
of universals) since the phrase “problem of universals” associates too easily with the traditional problem of 
universals.   
2 Porphyry, Isagoge, 1,10-14. These questions are: “Whether genera and species are real or reside in bare 
thoughts alone, whether as real they are bodies or incorporeal, and whether they are separated or are in 
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  From Porphyry and Boethius onward, generations of commentators have disputed 
over whether Aristotle’s views on universals should be classified as a form of realism or 
nominalism (or conceptualism). However, the traditional focus on the ontological status 
of universals is not Aristotle’s, and so it is little wonder that commentators have puzzled 
over his positive views, attributing to him radically different and opposing positions. In 
so far as Aristotle is concerned with opposing the Platonic separation of universals, he 
seems to be aware of the ontological problem. Nonetheless, his positive discussions of 
universals remain neutral and non-committal with regard to their ontological status and 
so escape the standard classifications of realism and nominalism.3 I will start with 
Aristotle’s neutrality and approach his concept of katholou without assuming that he is 
concerned with the problem that was raised by Porphyry.   
  I focus on Aristotle’s problem of katholou, which is to explain how what is most real 
can also be most knowable. Before discussing this problem in greater detail, I will sketch 
out some important aspects of Aristotle’s understanding and criticism of the Platonic 
theory of Forms.4 One thing that is certain about Aristotle’s universals is that they are not 
separate from particulars. Since “separation” is something that separates Aristotle from 
the Platonists, it is important to clarify what Aristotle means when he criticizes the                                                         
sensibles and have reality in connection with them”. Although the commentators disagree on details, they 
are at one in supposing that Porphyry raised “the problem” and tabulated its possible solutions. 
3 A good example is Aristotle’s definition of a universal as “that which is by nature predicated of many 
things” (De Int. 17a38). This definition does not resolve the problem about the ontological status of 
universals (see footnote 5). Further, this definition (as Aristotle’s remarks on universals in general) seems 
to escape a distinction we might draw between being a universal and being universal (which in any case 
would be much more awkward to draw in Greek since Greek does not have an indefinite article). This 
distinction might be comparable to a distinction between a human being and being human, for example. 
The talk of a universal might suggest that we are talking about some thing or entity, whereas the talk of 
universal (or being universal) might suggest that we talk about some property or feature of something. In 
my dissertation, I will flip back and forth (like Aristotle himself) between these two ways of talking about 
(a) universal, but even when I speak about a universal (or universals in plural), one should not assume that 
I am speaking about something that we would nowadays call “universal”. 
4 I will not consider here the controversial question of whether or not Aristotle’s criticism of the Platonists 
is justified, or whether Plato himself is a Platonist. 
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Platonists for separating Forms from sensible particulars. In the second part of this 
introductory chapter, I will turn to Aristotle’s formulation of an aporia in Metaphysics B 
6 concerning whether the principles of things should be regarded as universal or 
particular. I show how it invokes Aristotle’s problem of katholou and consider a well-
established understanding of this aporia. 
Separation 
Aristotle repeatedly insists that universals are not separate, not apart from or beside 
(para) the particulars, not substances (etc.). In fact, his negative remarks about universals 
are significantly clearer and less tentative than any of his positive ones. The primary 
targets of these negative remarks are evidently the Platonists who, according to Aristotle, 
separated universals from particulars and turned them into substances. As is well known, 
the central point in Aristotle’s criticism of the Platonists concerns the separation of 
Forms. We are told that separation is responsible for all the difficulties in the Platonic 
theory of Forms (e.g. Met. M 9, 1086b6). Unfortunately, however, Aristotle never 
provides a clear explanation of what he means by “separation” (chôrismos). I believe this 
becomes clearer when we consider three questions that seem to underlie his negative and 
polemical remarks about universals: 
1. Are there uninstantiated universals, i.e., universals that can exist without, or 
independently of, particular things? 
2. Are universals ontologically prior to particulars? Stated otherwise, is there an 
asymmetrical ontological dependence between universals and particulars such that 
particulars cannot exist without universals but not vice versa? 
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3. Do universals remain outside the being (ousia, essence) of the things that have 
them? 
Aristotle answers these questions negatively, whereas the Platonists (as Aristotle 
understands them) give affirmative answers. These affirmative answers, I believe, can all 
be subsumed under the title “separation of universals”. In what follows, I will consider 
Aristotle’s approach to these questions in greater detail and take as my starting point his 
characterization of a universal in De Interpretatione 7, which is a locus classicus for 
Aristotelian definitions of the “universal” and “particular”: 
Some things (pragmata) are universals (ta katholou), others are particulars (ta kath’ 
hekasta). By universal I mean that which is by nature predicated (katêgoreitai) of many 
things; by particular, what is not; human being, for instance, is a universal, Callias a 
particular. (17a35-38) 
This passage presents universals and particulars as two kinds of things, pragmata. This 
suggests, at the very least, that there are universals, i.e., they exist. Indeed, whenever 
Aristotle criticizes the Platonists for separating universals, he does not give as a reason 
that they do not exist (though if they did not exist, it would, of course, be true that they 
are not separate). Further, this passage suggests that the particular and the universal are 
correlative, interdefinable notions – universals are said of many things, particulars are 
not. The one is the negation of the other. But other than that, Aristotle’s definitions are 
rather vague. He does not tell us how universals are supposed to exist5 or what is the 
nature of their relationship to particulars (which are defined only negatively). Even a 
                                                        
5 As Lloyd says, this definition “allows at least three categories of things to be ‘said of’ or predicated of 
something: (a) linguistic entities, i.e., predicate expressions, (b) extra-linguistic entities, i.e., properties, (c) 
entities which are possibly intermediate, i.e., the ‘terms’ of his [Aristotle’s] logic” (1981, 3-4).  
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committed Platonist could find his definition of a universal acceptable since it may be 
interpreted as compatible with universals that are separate from the things of which they 
are predicated. 
  Aristotle’s ontological commitments become remarkably clearer when we combine 
his definition of a universal with what he says in the Categories, where he distinguishes 
between primary and secondary substances. He does not use the terms “universal” and 
“particular” in the Categories, but he tells us that primary substances are “not said of a 
subject” (2a14), whereas a secondary substance such as human being “is said of a 
subject, this human being” (1a21). And this conforms to his definition of the “particular” 
and “universal” in the De Interpretatione. The culmination of the Categories is 
Aristotle’s conclusion that “if the primary substances did not exist it would be impossible 
for any of the other things to exist” (2b5). I will analyze Aristotle’s arguments leading to 
this conclusion in Chapter Two, but for now suffice it to say that this is a strong 
conclusion. Aristotle insists that it is impossible for universals to exist without primary 
substances; that they cannot exist without them. Following Gail Fine (2008; 2004), I will 
call the capacity to exist without the existence of some other thing the capacity for 
independent existence with respect to that thing. So, Aristotle believes that universals 
lack the capacity for independent existence with respect to particulars. A universal 
conceived of as capable of existing on its own, independently of particulars, is an 
impossible entity – a fiction perhaps.  
 In the Categories Aristotle does not contrast his views on universals with those of the 
Platonists, but he does so in the Metaphysics where he famously argues that no universal 
is substance (Z 13-16). It is controversial whether he intends to make the strong claim 
that universals are not substances at all, or the weaker claim that they are not substances 
 6 
in the same way as particulars,6 but it is clear that he intends to deny (as he also does in 
the Categories) that universals can exist without particulars. He argues that “none of the 
universals can exist apart from particulars separately (hôris)”, whereas the Platonists 
“separate (chôrizontes) Forms” (Z 16, 1040a25-26). When Aristotle argues that no 
universal exists “separately” from particulars, he (minimally) has in mind that they 
cannot exist without, or independently of, particulars. Hence “separation” indicates the 
capacity for independent existence.7 Accordingly, the Platonic Forms are separate from 
particulars in the sense that they can exist whether or not particulars exist. In 
contemporary literature, this point is often put in terms of “instantiation” – the Platonic 
Forms (unlike Aristotelian universals) can exist without their instances. 
  Further, it seems that the Platonic Forms are not only separate from particulars, but 
also ontologically prior to them. Aristotle explains the notion of what is traditionally 
called “ontological priority”, but what he calls a priority by “nature and substance”, as 
follows:  
Some things then are called prior and posterior in this sense, others by nature and substance, 
i.e., those which can exist without (einai endechetai aneu) other things, whereas others 
cannot exist without them – a distinction which Plato used. (Met. Δ 11, 1019a1-4) 
                                                        
6 This issue is more complicated since a substance (ousia), as we will see in Chapter Four, is ambiguous. 
Aristotle speaks (i) of a thing, such as Socrates, as an ousia, but also (2) of the ousia of a thing. The 
proposal that has gained fairly widespread acceptance is that Z 13 is not making the strong claim that no 
universal is a substance, but a weaker claim that no universal is the substance of that of which it is 
predicated. See, e.g., Loux (2008, chap. 6). 
7 That Forms’ separation amounts to their capacity for independent existence is the most widespread 
interpretation, which is defended, most notably, by Fine (2008 [2003], 2004 [1993]). This interpretation is 
challenged, e.g., by Spellman (1995), who admits that Aristotle takes the Platonic Forms to be capable of 
independent existence, but denies that this is what “separation” means. On her interpretation, “separation” 
means “numerical distinctness”. See also Morrison (1985), who makes a similar suggestion. I do not think 
that “separation” needs to mean only one thing (or that the capacity for independent existence needs to 
exclude numerical distinctness), but, whatever else “separation” means, it seems clear to me that it means 
“capacity for independent existence”. 
 7 
This priority (i.e., the priority of whatever can exist without other things which in turn 
cannot exist without it) is defined in terms of the capacity for independent existence and 
attributed to Plato.8 According to this definition, universals (say) would be ontologically 
prior to particulars just in case they can exist independently of particulars, whereas 
particulars cannot exist without them. Aristotle does not explicitly identify the notions of 
separation (i.e., the capacity for independent existence) and ontological priority. 
Nonetheless, his account of the Platonic position (as well as his remark that such a 
distinction was used by Plato) suggests that in the case of Forms, separation and 
ontological priority come to much the same thing. In Metaphysics A 5, for example, 
Aristotle says that Plato held “all things are called after (para) Forms and in accordance 
(kata) with them; for it is by participation (kata methexin) that there exists the plurality of 
things called by the same name as the Forms” (987b9-11). Since particular things can 
exist only by participating in Forms, whereas Forms do not likewise depend on their 
particular instances, it follows that Forms are ontologically prior to particulars – the 
relation of ontological dependence between them is asymmetrical.   
 But why is separation a problem? Why does Aristotle object to separate universals? 
One important objection is that the Forms “make no contribution to our knowledge of 
other things, for they are not even the ousia (being, substance, essence) of these – if they 
were, they would have been in (en) them; nor do they contribute to the being (to einai) of 
other things since they do not exist in (mê enhyparchonta) the things that participate in 
them” (Met. A 9, 991a12-14).9 This suggests that Forms are separate from particulars 
also in the sense that they remain outside the being (ousia) of things that participate in                                                         
8 See Fine (2008), who argues that this sense of priority is illustrated at Eudemian Ethics A 8 in Aristotle’s 
discussion of the Form of the Good (1217b1-16). For a further discussion of Aristotle’s definition of 
ontological priority, see Chapter Two. 
9 See also Met. Z 8 (1033b27), M 12 (1079b37). 
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them; they are not any essential part of those things. The force of this objection will 
become clearer in the following chapters. For now, it is enough to point out that Aristotle 
thinks that, on the Platonic account, the definition of human being, for example, applies 
to Socrates not because of something he is (to wit, a human being) but only because of 
something he has or participates in (namely, the Form of human being). So, as Aristotle 
sees it, the Platonists distinguish between universals and particulars in so harsh a manner 
that a universal cannot possibly contribute to the being or knowledge of particular things. 
The Platonic theory of Forms thus involves a radical bifurcation of reality, with 
particulars and universals as irreducibly distinct types of things.  
  Further, Aristotle holds that the Platonists not only make Forms entirely distinct 
from particulars, but turn them into separate substances. No universal, however, can be a 
separate substance, which is tantamount to saying that no universal can be a particular. 
Aristotle develops this objection in greatest detail in Metaphysics M 9, which also 
contains his most detailed account of the origin of separate Forms: 
For they [the Platonists] treat Forms both as universal and again as separate (chôristas) 
and particular (tôn kath’ hekaston). But it has been argued before that it is impossible. 
The reason why those who say that the substances are universals combined these 
[universals and particulars] in one is that they did not make them [the substances] the 
same with sensible things (aisthêtois). They thought that sensibles were in a state of flux 
and that none of them remained, but that the universal was apart from (para) these things 
and different (heteron) from them. Socrates gave the impulse to this [view], as we said 
before, by means of his definitions; but he did not separate (echôrise) them [universals] 
from the particulars. And he was right not to separate them. This is clear from the results. 
For it is not possible to get knowledge without the universal, but separating (chôrizein) is 
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the cause of the difficulties arising about the Forms. Since the Platonists, on the 
assumption that any substance besides the sensible and flowing ones had to be separate 
(chôristas), had no others, they set apart universally predicated substances, so that it 
followed that universals and particulars were almost the same sort of thing. This in itself, 
then, would be one difficulty for the view discussed. (1086a31-b11) 
According to this passage, the separation of Forms is a consequence of the Socratic view 
of knowledge, the Heracleitean view about sensible things, and the assumption that 
Forms as substances should be universal. Aristotle tells us that Socrates gave the impulse 
to the theory of Forms through his attempt to define universals. He “sought the universal 
in moral things and was the first to turn his thought to definition” (Met. A 1, 987a31; M 
4, 1078b18-19). However, Socrates did not separate universals, and Aristotle sides with 
him on this issue, saying that without the universal one cannot attain knowledge but 
separation is responsible for all the difficulties concerning Forms. Platonists agreed that 
knowledge and definition are of universals. But since they also accepted the Heracleitean 
view that “all sensible things are always in flux and there is no knowledge of them” (Met. 
A 6, 987a31; M 4, 1079b13), they conceived that the subjects of Socratic definitions 
must be different and apart from (para)10 sensible particulars. The above passage 
suggests that the Platonists’ move from the flux of sensibles to the separation of Forms is 
mediated by the assumption that if there are any substances besides the sensible flowing 
ones, they must be separate. Since the Platonists “had no others”, they assigned separate 
existence to substances that are “predicated universally” (katholou legomenas).  
                                                        
10 “Para” can but need not indicate separation (it can also indicate mere difference). See Fine (2008, 266), 
Cherniss (1962, n. 56). 
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  Aristotle does not challenge the assumption that substances must be separate; he 
rather endorses separation as a criterion of substantiality. In Metaphysics Z 16, he says 
that the Platonists are “right in one respect by separating Forms, if indeed they are 
substances” (1040b27-29). The problem Aristotle sees with the Platonists is that they 
“did not make them [separate substances] the same with sensible things” (1086a36) but 
identified them with universals. In other words, the mistake of the Platonists is to think 
that the Form considered as a separate substance should be universal. Thus, it seems that 
although the Heracleitean view of flux motivates the Platonists to separate Forms (it 
explains why they did not make substances the same as sensible particulars), the notion 
of the separate Form does not follow directly from the Heracleitean view, but rather 
from the mistake of considering the separate substance to be universal.11  
  Aristotle holds this mistake to have the absurd consequence that “universals and 
particulars were almost the same sort of thing” (1086b11). I agree with Fine (2008) that 
this objection relies on the assumption that separability implies particularity. Indeed, in 
Metaphysics M 10 Aristotle says, “if one does not suppose the substance to be separated, 
and in the way in which particular existing things (kath’ hekasta tôn ontôn) are said to be 
separate, one will destroy substance as we wish to speak of it” (1086b16-19). 
Accordingly, if Forms are separate from particulars, they cannot be universals but must 
themselves be particulars. Hence, the Platonists put (according to Aristotle) incompatible 
requirements on their substances. In so far as Forms are universals, they must have 
instances; but in so far as they are separate substances, they are particulars and 
                                                        
11 Similar interpretation is developed by Cherniss (1962) and Fine (2008). I will not consider the question 
of whether Aristotle is right to understand Plato (or Platonists) the way he does. For a further discussion of 
this issue, see Mabbott (1926), Irwin (1977), Devereux (2008). 
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particulars cannot have instances. In other words, the Platonists, in treating universals as 
separate substances, treat them as particulars beyond their particular instances.  
  Although Aristotle criticizes the Platonists for turning universals into separate (and 
hence particular) substances, he does not challenge the main motivation for this theory, 
viz., the position that knowledge and definition are of universals. He shares with Plato the 
Socratic insight that knowledge is concerned with definitions, and definitions are of 
universals. Aristotle repeatedly claims that knowledge (epistêmê) is of the universal, and 
he frequently contrasts universals as objects of knowledge with particulars as objects of 
sense perception.12 In presenting the “greatest” problem in Metaphysics B 6, Aristotle 
says: 
Connected with these is a problem (aporia), greatest of all and the most necessary to 
examine. If there is nothing apart from particulars (para ta kath’ hekasta), and these are 
infinite (apeira), how is it possible to get knowledge (epistêmê) of things that are 
infinite? For in every case we know things just in so far as they are something one and 
the same and in so far as something universal belongs to them (katholou ti hyparchei) … 
Well, then, if there is nothing apart from particulars, nothing will be intelligible (noêton), 
and there will be no knowledge, unless one calls sense perception (aisthêsin) knowledge. 
(999a26-b3) 
Aristotle asks us to consider two alternatives: either (i) there is something beside or apart 
from (para) particulars, or (ii) there is not. The above passage focuses on (ii), arguing 
that if there were nothing apart from particulars, there would be no knowledge of 
particulars. He offers as a reason for why particulars cannot be known in the absence of                                                         
12 See, e.g., An. Post. A 8, A 24 (86a29), A 31 (87b29-38), B 12 (97b28-31); Met. A 1 (981a12-28), Z 15; 
NE Z 3, Γ 8 (1142a23-31).  
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universals that particulars are “infinite” (apeira, lit. “without limits”), where “infinite” is 
most naturally understood as indicating numerical infinity. However, it seems to me that 
the real problem is not that the number of particulars is actually infinite or even that it is 
very large. The real problem is the lack of something universal, something that is 
common to many particulars. For everything we know, Aristotle says, we know in so far 
as some one and the same thing, some universal belongs to it (999a28-29). It seems that 
even a finite plurality of particulars would be unknowable without something belonging 
to them in common. Thus, the point of this “greatest” problem seems to be that it is 
impossible to have knowledge of particulars in themselves in the absence of universals. 
That is to say, it is impossible to know them in all their particularity – as such, they are 
accessible only to sense perception. So, if only particulars existed (if there were no 
universals) then there would be no knowledge, unless we call sense perception 
knowledge. 
  On the other hand, if we assume that (i) there is something apart from particulars in 
the way Platonic Forms are apart from particulars, then various other problems arise, 
some of which I have discussed above. Aristotle argues that Forms that exist separately 
from particulars cannot contribute to our knowledge of a given particular, because 
knowing a Form would not be knowing this particular (Met. A 9, 991a12-13). Further, it 
is not even clear how there could be knowledge of Forms themselves. Since separation 
turns Forms into particular substances, it would appear that they are as unknowable and 
indefinable as sensible particulars (Met. Z 15).13 Aristotle thus seems to admit that the 
demand for separate Forms is the strongest when we consider that the sensible particulars 
are unsuitable for being the objects of knowledge. And although he denies that such                                                         
13 I consider Aristotle’s argument for the indefinablity of Forms (in Z 15) in Chapter Four. 
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Forms exist (or are necessary for knowledge), he concedes that the possibility of 
knowledge requires there to be something common to many sensible particulars.14  
  Aristotle is thus very much concerned with opposing the Platonists’ attempt to 
promote universals to the status of separate substances. For Aristotle, no universal can be 
a separate substance. Nonetheless, he accepts the Socratic-Platonic claim that knowledge 
and definition are of universals. Aristotle seems to be aware that these commitments (no 
universal is a substance; knowledge is of the universal) involve a certain tension, which 
he expresses most clearly near the end of Metaphysics B. There he formulates an aporia 
concerning whether the first principles are universal15 or “what we call particulars”. In 
what follows, I will analyze this aporia, and show how it leads to Aristotle’s problem of 
katholou, i.e., the problem of showing how what is most real can also be most knowable. 
Aristotle’s Problem of Katholou 
In the first lines of Metaphysics B, Aristotle argues that any progress in philosophy 
hinges on working through problems, aporiai – and he devotes the whole of B to 
drawing up these problems. An aporia indicates a puzzle (problem, impasse) in inquiry 
or the corresponding mental state of puzzlement, especially one arising from arguments 
for conflicting conclusions. Aristotle compares an aporia to a knot and the corresponding 
state of puzzlement to being tied up by a particular knot or problem in inquiry: “in so far                                                         
14 See Peri Ideôn (79, 15-19; cf. 81, 8-10), where Aristotle argues the Platonic “arguments from the 
sciences” do not prove that there are separate Forms, but they do prove that there are “common things” (ta 
koina) that are objects of knowledge. 
15 The ambiguity in the term “universal” (see footnote 3) becomes especially obvious when we move to 
Aristotle’s positive discussions of universals. For it is more problematic to talk about Aristotle’s first 
principles as universals than to talk about Platonic Forms as universals, since such talk creates the 
impression that we are talking about some sort of things (in the strong sense of the word). Although my 
aim is to explore Aristotle’s concept of katholou without settling the controversy over the ontological 
status of his universals, I typically translate katholou as an adjectival expression (without always 
pluralizing it). 
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as one is in a state of aporia, one resembles people who are tied, since one cannot move 
forward either way” (995a33).16 An aporia (in the sense of a particular puzzle or 
problem) is not just any old question, but a question that takes the form of a dilemma 
(e.g. whether the principles are universal or particular). A genuine aporia arises because 
there are good arguments and considerations on both sides of an issue, pulling us in 
apparently opposite and conflicting directions and making us unable to “move forward 
either way”.  
 Aristotle seems to think that working through aporiai is conducive to making 
progress (euporein) for at least three reasons. Firstly, going through aporiai provides an 
awareness of the problem. There cannot be a resolution or untying of a knot unless we 
first recognize that there is a knot to be untied: “it is not possible for those who are 
unaware of a knot to untie (luein) it” (995a29). Secondly, Aristotle says that those who 
inquire without first going through problems are like people who do not know where 
they have to go, what their goal is, or whether the goal has been reached (995a34-b2). 
Thus, going through aporiai provides a direction and goal for an inquiry, giving us 
(presumably) a clearer idea of where we need to be going (for our inquiry needs to aim in 
some direction rather than being aimless), and whether or not we have found the 
solution. Thirdly, Aristotle says that one is in a better position to judge when one has 
heard all the conflicting arguments, like opposing parties in court (995a1-2). Thus, going 
through aporiai gives us a better grasp of the relevant evidence (as opposed to a one-
sided grasp of the evidence).  
                                                        
16 See also Top. Z 6 (145b4-20), where Aristotle distinguishes between two senses of aporia, claiming that 
an aporia indicates an “equality of contrary reasonings”, and then specifies the contrary reasonings are 
what produce the aporia in the thought. 
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 The majority of Metaphysics B’s aporiai are concerned with the principles (archai, 
sources) of things. As Aristotle explains in Metaphysics Δ, it is common to all principles 
“to be the first point from which a thing either is or comes to be or is known” (1013a17-
18). Nowadays we are in a habit of distinguishing between ontological principles 
(principles of being) and epistemic principles (principles of knowledge), but Aristotle 
would not draw a sharp contrast between them. He assumes the correlation of being and 
knowing familiar from Parmenides and Plato17: what is real is knowable, and what is 
knowable is real. In other words, he assumes that there must be a close relationship or 
correspondence between the order of being and the order of knowledge. In Metaphysics 
M 10 (1087a10-12), he argues that the statement “all knowledge is of the universal” 
presents the “greatest problem” since it has as a consequence that the principles of things 
(tas tôn ontôn archai) and hence all existing things themselves are universal (and this 
conflicts with the notion of substance as something separate and particular). This 
argument clearly relies on the assumption that knowledge is of what is real and shows 
that Aristotle is committed to what we might today call a “realist” conception of 
knowledge and reality.18 
 Altogether Aristotle presents in Metaphysics B some five or six aporiai that discuss 
universals (either directly or indirectly).19 The most important of them for my purposes is 
the last aporia of book B (commonly distinguished as aporia 15), which asks whether 
the principles are universal or “what we call particulars”:20  
                                                        
17 See DK 28 B 3; Rep. 477b, Parm. 134a. 
18 See also Cat. 12 (14b11-23); An. Post. B 7; Met. Γ 6 (1011b26-28), Z 9 (1034b20-2). For a further 
discussion of Aristotle’s commitment to a metaphysical realism conception of knowledge and reality, see 
Irwin (2002, 5-7). 
19 For a well-written discussion of these aporiai, see Madigan (1999). 
20 This aporia is also stated in Metaphysics K 2 (1060b20-24) and M 10 (1086b20-1087a35).   
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We must not only raise these problems about the principles, but also ask whether they are 
universal or what we call particulars (kath’ hekasta). If they are universal, they will not 
be substances (ousiai). For nothing that is common indicates a this something (tode ti), 
but rather a such (toionde); but substance is a this something. But, if we can set up that 
which is predicated in common as a this something and one thing, then Socrates will be 
many animals – himself, the human, and the animal, if each of these indicates a this 
something and one thing. So, then, if principles are universal, these things follow. If, on 
the other hand, they are not universal, but rather like particulars, they will not be 
knowable, for knowledge of all things is universal. Therefore, if there is going to be 
knowledge of the principles, there will be other principles, prior to them, which are 
predicated universally of them. (1003a5-17) 
In the formulation of this aporia Aristotle clearly assumes that the principles of things 
must be either particular or universal. Thus the aporia is a dilemma, one horn of which 
casts doubt on the claim that the principles are universal, and the other horn raises the 
problem of how there can be knowledge if the principles are not universal.  
 Taking the first horn of the dilemma, Aristotle argues that no universal is a substance 
because no universal indicates a “this something” (tode ti) and a substance is a “this 
something”.21 Aristotle is not clear about what he means by “this something”, but he 
frequently contrasts tode ti with “such” (in the above passage toionde, elsewhere poion ti 
or toiouton). Since he insists that a universal signifies a “such”, rather than a “this 
                                                        
21 Although scholars often translate tode ti as a “particular”, I will understand the phrase literally to mean 
“this something”, where tode is demonstrative and ti picks out a certain sort of thing. As we will see in 
Chapter Two, this understanding has implications for Aristotle’s conception of particularity and for his 
solution of the problem of katholou (in particular, I will argue that this phrase indicates that particular 
substances are not completely unique but share features with other particulars of the same species or kind). 
However, the above passage remains non-committal about the ontological character of tode ti, and, 
accordingly, I will not attempt to read these implications into his formulation of the problem.  
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something”, it seems to follow (given the assumption that principles must be either 
universal or “what we call particulars”) that a “this something” is a particular substance, 
e.g. Socrates.22 Indeed, it seems that the most obvious way to defend the premise that no 
universal is a substance would be to argue that no universal is a particular. So, to treat 
universals as “this somethings” is equivalent to treating them as particulars (to give them 
names say). Aristotle thinks that this was precisely the mistake of the Platonists, who in 
separating universals promoted them to the status of particular things.23 However, in the 
above passage Aristotle appeals to a slightly different line of thought. He argues that if 
universals themselves were “this somethings”, then a particular substance like Socrates 
would turn out to be a bundle of substances, “many animals”, one for each universal 
predicated of him. 
 So, universal principles cannot be “this somethings” and hence they cannot be 
substances. However, if principles are not universal, they will not be knowable, for 
“knowledge of all things is universal” (katholou gar hê epistêmê pantôn). Aristotle 
argues that particular principles could only be known through prior universal principles, 
each of them predicated of a number of particular principles. And this is problematic, 
since it would cancel out the assumption that all principles are particular (and hence the 
assumption that principles are either universal or particular), and/or it would lead to the 
problematic position that non-substances (universal principles) are prior to substances 
(particular principles of which universal principles are predicated). 
                                                        
22 See, esp., Cat. 5 (3b10-12), where Aristotle argues that tode ti indicates a primary substance or, more 
generally, whatever is “one in number and indivisible”, whereas a secondary substance signifies not a tode 
ti but a “such” (poion ti).  
23 Aristotle seems to think that the Platonic Third Man Argument results from treating the Form of human 
being as if human being were a tode ti (see Met. Z 13). 
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 In summary, the dilemma is this: if the principles are universal, it appears that they 
are not substances, but if the principles are particular, there is a danger of having to 
conclude that (although they are substances) no knowledge of them is possible. So, the 
premise that a substance is a “this something” (or that no universal is a particular) pulls 
us toward the conclusion that principles are particular, whereas the premise that 
knowledge is of the universal pulls us towards the conclusion that principles are 
universal. In order for these premises to produce a real conflict and genuine puzzlement, 
Aristotle must be relying on the following two assumptions.  
 Firstly, this aporia is formulated within a dichotomy between the particular and the 
universal. According to Aristotle, particular principles will not be knowable and 
universal principles will not be real (or substantial). Thus, the formulation of an aporia 
relies on the assumption that there is no obvious correlation between particulars and 
knowability, on the one hand, and the substantiality and universals, on the other. In light 
of these considerations one could express the dichotomy between the particular and the 
universal as a contrast between what is real (or substantial) and what is knowable. 
Nonetheless, this would not be the most obvious way of putting Aristotle’s point. For 
when we contrast what is real with what is knowable, then it is not evident why the 
substantiality of particulars should conflict with the knowability of universals. One 
could easily argue that particulars as substances are knowable (though perhaps less 
knowable than universals) and/or universals as objects of knowledge are real (though not 
as real as particulars). Indeed, in the above passage Aristotle says that particular 
principles can be known only through prior universal principles (and hence they are 
knowable somehow); but he does not think that this avoids the problem. This suggests 
that the contrast Aristotle wants to draw is the contrast between what is most real and 
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what is most knowable. That is to say, Aristotle’s formulation relies on the assumption 
that particulars (not universals) are most real and universals (not particulars) are most 
knowable (since knowledge is of the universal).  
 Secondly, in order for the premises of the aporia to produce a real conflict, Aristotle 
must be assuming that the principles that are most real will also be most knowable. For 
one could supposedly accept both the premise that particulars are most real and the 
premise that universals are most knowable (and leave it like that). Why assume that those 
premises generate an aporia? It seems that these premises lead to an aporia precisely 
because Aristotle does not distinguish the order of being from the order of knowledge. 
He assumes that whatever is most real must also be most knowable. This assumption 
creates a problem because it is not obvious how knowability and substantiality could 
apply to one and the same thing. The problem of explaining how what is most real can 
also be most knowable is what I call Aristotle’s problem of katholou.  
  I believe that the problem of katholou is indeed Aristotle’s problem. He formulates it 
in terms of principles and commits himself to the premises that generate this aporia. He 
remains committed throughout his writings to the position that no universal indicates a 
“this something” and that substance is a “this something”. And he repeatedly says that 
knowledge is of the universal. Nonetheless, it is not easy to determine how serious 
Aristotle takes this problem to be.24 As I have suggested above, the formulation of the 
aporia relies on a dichotomy between the particular and universal. The aporia is 
generated on the assumption that the particular and the universal are two entirely distinct 
things, which leaves it hard to see how knowablity and substantiality could apply to one                                                         
24 Alexander of Aphrodisias, for example, does not seem to think that the aporiai of book B express serious 
problems for Aristotle. At least he nowhere in his commentary on book B suggests that Aristotle himself is 
seriously perplexed. Several modern scholars, however, have taken the opposite view; for an overview of 
modern scholars’ views, see Madigan (1999, xxii-xxvii).  
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and the same thing. This assumption, however, is characteristically Platonic. According 
to Aristotle, the Platonists distinguish universal Forms sharply from particulars, ascribing 
to Forms independent existence and ontological priority over concrete particulars. 
Platonism is thus a dualist view that distinguishes between two things, the one of which 
can exist apart from the other.  
 My view on this issue (as will become clearer) is that Aristotle solves the problem 
by minimizing the distinction between particulars and universals. Since the universal and 
the particular are not entirely distinct things, there is no deep or insoluble problem of 
how what is most real can also be most knowable. However, this does not mean that 
there is for him no problem at all. I think he is aware that the premises of the problem 
(substances are “this something” and knowledge is of the universal) involve a tension. 
This tension is real. As we will see, it will not be easy to develop and conceptualize a 
middle position that does justice to both sides of this aporia.  
 It seems to me that the seriousness of the problem is generated to a large extent by 
later tradition. The first author who draws attention to the problem is Eduard Zeller, 
claiming that “it only remains, then, to recognize in this point, not merely a lacuna, but a 
deep contradiction (Widerspruch) in the philosophy of Aristotle” (1862, 234). Since then, 
the difficulty has often been explained as an inconsistency between three positions (or 
“pillars”, as Zeller calls them) to which Aristotle is committed: 
(i) Substance is particular (substance is what is most real); 
(ii) knowledge is of what is most real; 
(iii) knowledge is of the universal (universal is what is most knowable). 
Harold Cherniss (1962) claims that these commitments of Aristotle lead to “a 
discrepancy between the real and the intelligible” (p. 340), that is to say, a failure to 
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reconcile the requirements of his ontology with the requirements of his epistemology 
(and logic). Cherniss’ phrase is now widely used by scholars who think that Aristotle’s 
commitments form an inconsistent triad. Virtually all scholars working on Aristotle’s 
ontology and epistemology recognize the problem, and many of them regard it as 
insoluble on Aristotelian assumptions.25 For example, George Brakas (1988), one of the 
very few authors to devote a whole book to Aristotle’s concept of the universal, claims 
that such a discrepancy constitutes for Aristotle an “impossible dilemma”, since he needs 
to give up either knowledge or substances (p. 104). More recently, C. D. C. Reeve (2000) 
has termed this dilemma the “Primacy Dilemma”, claiming that “Aristotle’s attempt to 
solve it is the central project of his entire epistemology and metaphysics” (p. xiii). 
 As I have indicated earlier, the seriousness of Aristotle’s problem of katholou 
depends on how sharp and exhaustive we take the distinction between the universal and 
the particular to be. If the particular and the universal were two distinct things, so that 
their distinction is exhaustive, then the discrepancy between the real and the knowable 
would indeed be serious and unavoidable. Now, it seems that the interpreters of Aristotle 
who think this aporia constitutes a serious, if not insoluble, problem regard the 
distinction between the particular and the universal as sharp and exhaustive. The 
widespread understanding of this problem appears thus to be grounded on some 
predominantly Platonic presuppositions. A similar point is made by Walter Leszl (1972), 
who says: 
It would seem that interpreters believe that there is some reason why the difficulty arises, 
or is particularly worrying, in the context of Aristotle’s own philosophical system. On 
                                                        
25 See Leszl (1972) and Heinaman (1981) for the traditional formulation of the problem, as well as for a list 
of authors who think these propositions form an inconsistent set. 
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their account the individual coincides with the real or substantial while the universal is 
not such, or anyhow is “less real” than particular substances. This involves the adoption 
of an ontological dualism between the individual and the universal, which differs from 
the Platonic dualism only in that the individual has ontological priority, while the 
universal maintains its logical and epistemological priority – a discrepancy which is 
sufficient, however, to make a conflict unavoidable. (1972, 282) 
Indeed, Aristotle’s philosophical commitments (particulars are most real, and knowledge 
is of the universal) would generate a serious problem or an “impossible dilemma” if it is 
assumed that Aristotle, like Plato, is committed to a dualism of particulars and 
universals. And since commentators typically think that Aristotle’s commitments 
generate a serious (or perhaps insoluble) problem, they seem to attribute to Aristotle 
(whether explicitly or implicitly) a Platonic dualism between the particular and 
universal.26  
 On a popular line of interpretation, Aristotle introduces this problem in his early 
works, especially in the Categories, where he appears to treat universals and particulars 
as distinct types of things. As Michael Wedin (2005) puts it, “that the Categories pursues 
a policy of ontological liberality is virtually an article of faith among commentators” (p. 
86). At first glance, there seems to be good evidence for the view that Aristotle regards 
them as distinct types of things. Firstly, Aristotle subsumes both particulars and 
universals under the title “substance” (ousia). This might suggest that he treats universals 
as fully-fledged entities, thus extending a kind of irreducible ontological status to them.                                                         
26 “Platonic dualism” is a much-used concept in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. When I talk 
about “Platonic dualism”, I have in mind primarily the metaphysical doctrine (sometimes called simply 
“realism” or “Platonism”) that distinguishes between two irreducibly distinct types of things, holding that 
one type of things can exist apart from (or independently of) the other.    
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Secondly, according to a traditional interpretation, Aristotle believes that particulars 
enjoy ontological priority over universals, i.e., particulars can exist independently of 
universals predicated of them, while universals depend for their existence on particulars. 
This also suggests that Aristotle commits himself to an ontological dualism of particulars 
and universals, which differs from the Platonic dualism only in that Aristotle attributes 
an ontological priority to particulars.  
 Since the problem of katholou goes back to the Categories, I will in Chapter Two 
consider Aristotle’s position there. I will show that there is essentialism at work in the 
Categories which undermines the traditional view according to which Aristotle assigns 
an unqualified ontological priority to particulars over universals. According to my 
essentialist interpretation, particulars and universals are, for Aristotle, ontologically 
interdependent. It is no more possible for particulars to exist without universals than it is 
for universals to exist without particulars. Since they are ontologically interdependent, 
there cannot be any sharp dualism and hence any sharp discrepancy between the real and 
the knowable.  
 In the Categories Aristotle does not say much about knowledge, but the statement 
that knowledge is of the universal seems to be the kernel of the problem. Indeed, he says 
in Metaphysics 10 that this statement constitutes the “greatest problem” since it would 
follow (on the assumption that knowledge is of what is real) that only universals are real. 
However, Aristotle is evidently not willing to give up the position that substances are 
particular, and hence faces the problem of explaining how there can be knowledge of 
particular substances when knowledge must be universal.  
 I will devote Chapter Three to considering the problem of katholou from an 
epistemological point of view. My primary focus will be on the Posterior Analytics, 
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which contains Aristotle’s most sustained and detailed discussion of scientific 
knowledge. But I also consider Metaphysics M 10, where Aristotle gives his most 
explicit solution to the problem he formulates in B 6 (his solution consists in modifying 
the statement that all knowledge is of the universal). 
 Aristotle’s account of scientific knowledge raises two related questions concerning 
knowledge of particulars. First, does scientific knowledge in the strict and unqualified 
sense exclude the possibility of knowing particulars? Second, does Aristotle allow 
statements about particulars to be part of any kind of scientific knowledge? I will argue 
in Chapter Three that Aristotle answers these questions affirmatively. He distinguishes 
between unqualified scientific knowledge, which is of the universal, and qualified 
scientific knowledge, which is of the particular. Since particulars can be known in the 
qualified sense, the statements about them are part of scientific knowledge. Further, 
unqualified scientific knowledge does not exclude (but rather implies) knowledge of 
particulars – knowledge of the universal is (as Aristotle puts it) potential knowledge of 
particulars. I will discuss also Posterior Analytics B 19, which suggests that the 
knowledge of universals is acquired from the perception of particulars. According to my 
interpretation, there is (corresponding to an ontological interdependence) an 
epistemological interdependence between particulars and universals – particulars cannot 
be scientifically known without universals under which they fall, and universals cannot 
be scientifically known without particulars (since our scientific knowledge of universals 
begins with the perception of particulars). Consequently, Aristotle’s claim that 
knowledge is of the universal does not necessitate a divorce of epistemology from 
ontology.  
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 Aristotle’s so-called logical works (including the Categories and the Posterior 
Analytics) are innocent of the matter-form distinction. Admittedly, this distinction 
complicates the picture that emerges from the Categories and Posterior Analytics. In the 
central books of the Metaphysics Aristotle regards form as a primary substance, which 
immediately invokes the controversial question of whether his forms are supposed to be 
particular or universal. If they are universal, then it appears that they will not be 
substances, but if they are particular, then it will be hard to see how there can be 
knowledge of them. 
 Indeed, most scholarly discussions of the problem of katholou centre on Aristotle’s 
account of substance and form in Metaphysics Z. The question about the status of forms 
has received so much scholarly attention in recent decades that some commentators have 
coined a separate phrase to refer to this problem. They call it the “Zeta Problem”,27 
which can be summarized in terms of three of Aristotle’s putative commitments which, 
again, form an inconsistent triad:  
(i) Substance is form; 
(ii) no universal is substance; 
(iii) form is universal. 
I will discuss the “Zeta Problem” in Chapter Four, where I sketch out four possible 
solutions to the puzzle concerning the status of form, and analyze in greater detail the 
view that particular forms are instances of universals. I take this to be the best solution to 
the problem. My interpretation suggests that Aristotle remains committed to the position 
of the Categories, namely that a particular (whether concrete particular like Socrates or 
                                                        
27 See, e.g., Kirby (2008, chap. 4). 
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the particular form of Socrates) cannot exist without being a particular of a certain kind, 
and the universal cannot exist without being instantiated (or “particularized”).  
 In the final chapter, I consider briefly the solution that emerges from the writings of 
Alexander of Aphrodiasias to the problem of how what is most real can also be most 
knowable. Alexander’s account of universals became very influential in the later 
tradition (Porphyry, Boethius, Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas all picked up Alexander’s 
take on the problem). It would not be an exaggeration to say that he influenced the future 
direction of both the discussions of Aristotle’s problem of katholou and of the traditional 
problem of universals. Alexander seems to be the first post-Aristotelian author who 
explicitly defends the distinction between being a form and being a universal. I suggest 
that this distinction (while it may appear to offer a more satisfactory solution than the one 
I have defended in earlier chapters) eventually raises more problems than it solves. It 
forces to the surface the underlying ambiguities in Aristotle’s position and invokes the 
traditional problem about the ontological status of universals. I will conclude by 
returning to the traditional problem of the ontological status of universals, and discuss 
Aristotle’s neutrality with regard to the ontological status of universals.  
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2 
Essentialism and Ontological Interdependence in 
Aristotle’s Categories* 
The aim of this chapter is to develop an essentialist interpretation of Aristotle’s 
Categories, according to which particulars (“primary substances”, prôtai ousiai) and 
universals (“secondary substances”, deuterai ousiai) are ontologically interdependent, 
i.e., their ontological dependence is not asymmetrical but mutual. This interpretation 
challenges three long-standing and deep-seated views about Aristotle’s Categories. 
Firstly, Aristotle believes that particulars enjoy ontological priority over universals in the 
sense that particulars can exist independently of universals, whereas universals depend 
on particulars for their existence. Indeed, according to what could plausibly be called a 
traditional interpretation, the relation of ontological dependence between particulars and 
universals has been seen as asymmetrical. Such asymmetry has been regarded as the 
“lynchpin of Aristotelian metaphysics”28. Secondly, in treating particulars as 
ontologically independent from universals, Aristotle commits himself to an ontological 
dualism of particulars and universals, which does not seem to be much different from 
Platonic dualism. The only difference, though of course not a small difference, is that 
Aristotle attributes ontological priority to particulars and denies that universals could 
exist without particulars instantiating them. Thirdly, in assigning ontological priority to 
particulars, rather than to Platonic Forms or anything resembling them, Aristotle turns 
the Platonic picture “upside down”. The Platonic dualism implies that universals – that is                                                         
* A version of this chapter is submitted for publication in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy. 
28 I take this expression from Corkum’s (2008, 65) characterization of the traditional position. 
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to say, Forms – are ontologically prior, while particulars have being only in so far as they 
participate in such Forms. 
  My essentialist interpretation suggests that Aristotle does not attribute to particulars 
any unqualified ontological priority, and hence he is not committed to any robust 
dualism. Thus my interpretation minimizes the apparent seriousness of Aristotle’s 
problem of katholou, i.e., the problem of how what is most real can also be most 
knowable. Since particulars and universals (primary and secondary substances) are 
ontologically interdependent, there is no sharp discrepancy between the real and the 
knowable. 
  I begin by explaining the notions of the particular and the universal, and examine the 
argument that is supposed to lead to the ontological priority of particulars. Then I 
develop the essentialist interpretation of the Categories, and conclude by examining the 
consequences of my interpretation for Aristotle’s alleged anti-Platonism, and for 
Aristotle’s problem of katholou.  
Particulars and Universals  
Aristotle does not use his standard terms for “universal” and “particular” – katholou and 
kath’ hekaston29 – in the Categories. Instead, he relies on two phrases: “being said of a 
subject” (legesthai kath’ hypokeimenou) and “being [present] in a subject” (en 
hypokeimenôi einai).30 Although the language Aristotle uses might suggest otherwise, 
these two phrases do not merely express linguistic relations, but above all they express 
ontological relations. More precisely, we will see that Aristotle construes them as 
                                                        
29 The term kath’ hekaston occurs once (at 2b3). 
30 Aristotle introduces these relations, somewhat abruptly, in chapter two of the Categories, and relies on 
them in his discussion of primary and secondary substances in Chapter Five.  
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relations of ontological dependence – both things that are “said of” and those that are 
“present in” a subject depend on the subject for their being.  
  The traditional position31 holds, and I think correctly, that the “present in” relation 
(often called inherence) distinguishes substances from quantities, qualities, and other 
categories that the tradition has lumped together as “accidents”, and what we would 
today call “accidental properties”. Accidents are always present in a subject (they are 
always accidents of something), while substances (neither primary nor secondary ones) 
do not inhere in anything further (they cannot be said to be of anything in a similar 
manner). The “said of” relation (often called predication), on the other hand, is held to 
distinguish particulars from universals – universals are said or predicated of a subject, 
particulars are not. This position relies on Aristotle’s “standard” definition of the 
“particular” and “universal” in the De Interpretatione: “I call universal (katholou) that 
which is by nature predicated (katêgoreisthai) of many things, and particular (kath’ 
hekaston) that which is not” (17a38). 
  Thus, these two relations distinguish substances from accidents, on the one hand, 
and particulars from universals, on the other. But Aristotle, at least in the Categories, 
does not see these distinctions as coinciding. Rather, they cut across each other, giving 
rise to the so-called fourfold division of “of things that are” (tôn ontôn, “of beings”) 
which is presented in chapter two of the Categories: 
Of things that are: (i) some are said of a subject but are not in any subject. For example, 
human being is said of a subject, this human being, but is not in any subject. (ii) Some 
are in a subject but are not said of any subject. (By “in a subject” I mean what is in                                                         
31 See Ackrill (2002 [1963], 74). Since the publication of Ackrill’s translation and commentary on the 
Categories (1963), the traditional position is usually equated with his view. But see also Granger (1980), 
who offers a well-written overview and defense of the traditional position. 
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something, not as a part, and cannot exist separately from what it is in.) For example, this 
knowledge of grammar (hê tis grammatikê) is in a subject, the soul, but is not said of any 
subject; and this white (to ti leukon) is in a subject, the body (for all colour is in a body), 
but is not said of any subject. (iii) Some are both said of a subject and in a subject. For 
example, knowledge is in a subject, the soul, and is also said of a subject, knowledge-of-
grammar. (iv) Some are neither in a subject nor said of a subject, for example, this 
human being (ho tis anthrôpos) and this horse (ho tis hippos) – for nothing of this sort is 
either in a subject or said of a subject. (1a20-1b4).32 
The combination of the “present in” and “said of” relations thus yields a distinction 
between two types of particulars (i.e., (ii) and (iv)) and two types of universals (i.e., (i) 
and (iii)). The former distinction has been the main focus of recent literature on the 
Categories. In particular, there has been a fierce dispute over the precise nature of these 
things that are present in but not said of a subject (whether they are recurrent or non-
recurrent properties).33 It is not important for my present purposes to take sides in this 
issue, and I shall be content to agree with the traditional position that Aristotle is                                                         
32 Here and in what follows I rely on Ackrill’s translation of the Categories (2002 [1963]). However, I do 
not follow Ackrill in all the details, and translate some of the expressions differently, e.g. while Ackrill 
translates ho tis anthrôpos as “the individual man”, I translate it more literally as “this human being”.  
33 According to one view, Aristotle’s reference to “this white” picks out a determinate property, e.g. a 
determinate shade of white, rather than a particular property unique to its possessor. The salient feature of 
this view is that, according to it, nothing prevents particular properties from being recurrent and repeatable. 
This view was originated by Owen (1965), and has been defended, most notably, by Frede (1987). But see 
also Dancy (1975), Furth (1988), Loux (2008 [1991]). According to another and more widespread view, 
Aristotle’s reference to “this white” picks out a non-recurrent property, i.e., a property that is peculiar to 
the particular to which it belongs. On this view, each white thing has its own, entirely distinct, property of 
whiteness (we might call such properties “tropes”). Owen calls this view “dogma” and equates it with 
Ackrill’s (2002 [1963]) view. See also (for a criticism of Owen) Moravcsik (1967), Allen (1969), Hartman 
(1977), Granger (1980), Heinaman (1981), Wedin (2005). According to a third view (which is a version of 
Ackrill’s view), defended by Matthews (2009), particular properties are non-repeatable instances of 
universal properties. This view emphasizes that although each white thing has its own property of 
whiteness, these particular properties themselves are instances of the universal property of whiteness (we 
might call this view “tropes plus universals”). As we will see, my interpretation offers indirect support to 
the latter type of view. I will argue that particular things (primary substances) are instances of universals, 
and hence it is reasonable to think that particular properties are likewise instances of universals.  
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referring here to particulars in categories other than substance. I will focus on those 
things that are neither said of nor present in a subject – these are the ones Aristotle calls 
in chapter five of the Categories “primary substances”, such as “this human being” and 
“this horse” (2a11-14). It is generally agreed that when Aristotle speaks about primary 
substances, he has in mind concrete particulars, and, above all, naturally existing 
particulars (humans and horses). 
  What is important for present purposes is the distinction between two types of 
universals: those that are both said of and present in a subject (e.g. knowledge, white), 
and those that are said of but not present in a subject (e.g. human being). The first type 
indicates universals in categories other than substance, whereas the second type 
corresponds to what Aristotle calls in chapter five “secondary substances” (2a14-19). 
Secondary substances include the species and genera under which primary substances 
fall, e.g. human being, animal, etc. This distinction is important because it can and has 
been interpreted as Aristotle’s (perhaps first) attempt to distinguish between essential and 
accidental predication: what is said of but not present in a subject is essential to its being 
what it is, whereas what is both said of and present in is accidental to its being what it 
is.34 In order to make referring to these types of universals easier, I will reserve the term 
“universal” for secondary substances, i.e., species and genera under which primary 
substances fall. When I want to refer to universals in other categories, I will use the term 
                                                        
34  See Duerlinger (1970), who suggests that the predication-inherence distinction represents Aristotle’s 
“first attempt” to distinguish essential and accidental predication: “Aristotle does not exactly say that he is 
trying to distinguish what is essential from what is incidental to the nature of an individual thing, but his 
examples and statements strongly suggest that the attempt is being made” (p. 181). See also Loux (2008), 
who argues that all parties to the dispute over the precise nature of particular properties agree that “a 
distinction between two forms of metaphysical predication (what have been called strong or essential 
predication and weak or accidental predication) is operative in the Categories” (p. 21).  
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“accidents”. Now I will turn to Aristotle’s argument – sometimes called the “priority 
claim” – that is supposed to establish the ontological priority of particulars. 
Priority Claim 
Aristotle begins his account of primary and secondary substances in chapter five of the 
Categories with the claim that “a substance (ousia) – that which is called a substance 
most strictly, primarily (prôtôs), and most of all – is that which is neither said of a 
subject nor present in a subject” (2a11-13). Aristotle appeals to our linguistic intuitions 
about predication to tell us what the primary substances are. In a linguistic predication, 
there is a subject of predication and that which is predicated of a subject. But, to forestall 
a possible source of confusion: predication, as Aristotle conceives of it, is not merely a 
linguistic matter but also a matter of ontology. He thinks that when we predicate 
something of something (i.e., when we form subject-predicate sentences), we reveal 
(dêloi) something about something. More precisely, we reveal that something belongs 
(hyparchein) to something.35 So language is not a mere instrument for Aristotle – it 
reveals something about the way things are in the world. This suggests that there must be 
some sort of corresponding structure between the language we use and the way things are 
in the world.36  
  Now, in saying that primary substances are neither said of nor present in a subject, 
Aristotle identifies them with subjects themselves (hypokeimenon, lit. “that which stands 
                                                        
35 See De Interpretatione 4 and 5 (esp. 17a15 ff.). 
36 Although it is reasonable to suggest that Aristotle (in so far as he insists that language or logos is 
revealing) is committed to the position that there exists an isomorphism between language and the world, it 
is important to notice that his commitment to such a position is not uncritical. As I will argue in the next 
section, Aristotle is well aware that the so-called subject criterion might not be the best guide for 
discovering primary substances. Thus, he seems to be aware that language is not a completely reliable 
guide to ontology. 
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under”).37 However, the fact that primary substances function as subjects does not yet 
distinguish them from universals because Aristotle claims that secondary substances can 
likewise function as subjects: “As the primary substances stand to everything else, so the 
species and genera of the primary substances stand to all the rest: all the rest are 
predicated of these” (3a1-6; 2b17-20). Indeed, if it is insisted, for example, that a species 
(e.g. human being) can function only as predicate, not as subject, then in the very act of 
insisting on this one makes the species a subject of predication. 
  All Aristotelian commentators agree that the distinction between primary and 
secondary substances does not lie in the fact that primary substances are subjects 
simpliciter, but rather in the fact that they are primary or ultimate or basic subjects. The 
idea that primary substances are ultimate subjects is in scholarly literature often called 
the “subject criterion”.38 Aristotle himself does not express this point explicitly, but he 
does seem to think that primary substances are called substances most strictly because 
“all the other things” are predicated of them, while they are not predicated of anything 
more basic. So primary substances are the only subjects in the ontology of the Categories 
of which it is correct to assert that nothing stands under them. This seems to be the core 
insight that leads Aristotle to his famous position that “all the other things” require 
primary substances as basic subjects for their existence: 
All the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or in them as 
subjects. This is clear from an examination of cases. For example, animal is predicated of 
human being and therefore also the particular human being (tinos anthrôpou); for were it                                                         
37 The subjecthood of the primary substances helps to explain why Tertullian and Augustine, and then 
Boethius and the medieval tradition following him chose to render ousia with substantia, rather than with 
essentia (which is what the morphology of Greek and Latin would suggest) – the role of the primary 
substance is to stand under (ld. substare) everything else. 
38 See, e.g., Loux (2008, 23), Lewis (1991, chap. 2), Mann (2000, 24).  
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predicated of none of the particular human beings it would not be predicated of human 
being at all. Again, colour is in body and therefore also in a particular body; for were it 
not in any of the particulars (kath’ hekasta) it would not be in body at all. Thus all the 
other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects. 
So if the primary substances did not exist it would be impossible for any of the other 
things to exist (mê ousôn oun tôn proton ousiôn adynaton tôn allôn ti einai). (2a34-2b6)  
Aristotle begins by claiming that everything which is not a primary substance is either 
said of and/or present in a primary substance. He tries to justify this claim on a case-by-
case basis and argues that to predicate animal of human being is, ultimately, to predicate 
it of particular human beings for “were it predicated of none of the particular human 
beings it would not be predicated of human being at all”. From this Aristotle draws a 
famous conclusion that if the primary substances did not exist, then neither would 
anything else. This is a strong conclusion. Aristotle is claiming that the existence of 
everything other than primary substances would be impossible were there no primary 
substances. From this it would follow that the world of uninstantiated universals in the 
absence of primary substances is a fiction.  
  This conclusion is evidently intended to show that universals (both those that are 
present in a primary substance, and those that are not) are ontologically dependent on 
particulars, that they cannot exist independently of particulars. The question becomes 
whether or not this conclusion also implies that particulars can exist independently of 
universals. If so, it would turn out that particulars are ontologically prior to all the other 
things. The traditional answer to this question is “yes”. Traditionally, the relationship of 
ontological dependence between particulars and universals is seen as asymmetrical: 
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particulars can exist without universals, but not vice versa, and hence they enjoy 
ontological priority over universals.  
  The notion of ontological priority is traditionally identified with what Aristotle calls 
priority “by nature and substance”. In Metaphysics Δ 11, Aristotle states: “Some things 
then are called prior and posterior (protera kai hystera) ... by nature and substance, 
namely all things which can exist without (einai endechetai aneu) other things, whereas 
others cannot exist without them – a distinction which was used by Plato” (1019a1-4). 
There are at least three things worth noticing about this statement of priority. Firstly, 
ontological priority amounts to the capacity for independent existence, and is expressed 
in modal terms: A is ontologically prior to B if A can exist without B while B cannot 
exist without A. The conclusion of the above passage is presented in similar modal terms 
– universals cannot exist without particulars.39 Secondly, ontological priority implies that 
the relation of ontological dependence is asymmetrical: A is ontologically prior to B just 
in case A can exist without, independently of, B but B cannot exist without A, i.e., the 
dependence is only one way.40 Thirdly, this notion of priority was, as Aristotle says, used 
by Plato. It is not overly surprising to find Aristotle endorsing what he takes to be a 
Platonic criterion for what is prior by nature and substance, given that Aristotle often 
uses the ideas of his predecessors for his own purposes. On the traditional interpretation,                                                         
39 Aristotle discusses a similar form of priority also in chapter twelve of the Categories: “What does not 
reciprocate as to implication of being [is called prior]” (14a30). Cleary (1988) argues that the priority “by 
nature and substance” and the priority as to the implication of being come to much the same thing – both 
“use the test of non-reciprocity on two related things in order to determine which of them is prior by 
nature” (p. 45). 
40 Wedin (2005) claims that “virtually all commentators assume that the Categories brand of ontological 
dependence is asymmetric” (p. 81). Corkum (2008) summarizes the prevalent understanding of the 
Categories in the following way: “Aristotle holds that individual substances are ontologically independent 
from non-substances and universal substances but that non-substances and universal substances are 
ontologically dependent on substances. There is then an asymmetry between individual substances and 
other kinds of being with respect to ontological dependence. Under what could plausibly be called the 
standard interpretation, the ontological independence ascribed to individual substances and denied of non-
substances and universal substances is a capacity for independent existence” (p. 65). 
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Aristotle uses this Platonic criterion of priority in a fairly radical manner, viz., he uses it 
to overturn the Platonic position. 
  Nonetheless, it is important to notice that the above passage establishes only the 
ontological dependence of universals and accidents on particulars. It does not establish 
the ontological independence of particulars. In fact, nothing in the above passage 
excludes the possibility that the relation between particulars and universals is one of 
mutual ontological dependence. Why, then, does the traditional interpretation maintain 
that Aristotle is committed to the ontological priority of particulars? 
  I believe that the traditional interpretation relies on two assumptions. The first 
assumption is that the relation of predication expresses ontological dependence – what is 
said of a subject is dependent on this subject for its being. The second and more 
important assumption is that the relationship between a subject of a predication and its 
predicate is irreducibly asymmetrical (i.e., predicates are predicated of subjects but not 
vice versa).41 Given these assumptions, it is clearly tempting to conclude that the 
relationship of ontological dependence between particulars and universals must likewise 
be asymmetrical. A further motivation behind the traditional interpretation might be 
Aristotle’s terminology. After all, Aristotle calls primary substances “primary” which 
might suggest that he attributes to them ontological primacy over universals.42 Finally, 
some43 contend that the conclusion of the above passage – “if the primary substances did 
not exist it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist” – would simply be 
pointless unless it is implied that the dependence is asymmetrical. However, there are 
                                                        
41 This assumption has persisted successfully in the history of philosophy, and has been challenged 
seriously only recently. One of the first authors who vigorously denies it is Ramsey (1925); he argues that 
there is no fundamental antithesis between subjects and predicates, and hence no irreducible asymmetry. 
42 See, e.g., Corkum (2008, 70).  
43 See Moravcsik (1967, 93). 
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reasons to doubt that Aristotle would be committed to this implication. The critical 
consideration here is the reason Aristotle gives for calling species and genera 
“substances”, which leads us to his essentialism. 
Essentialism 
It is well known that “secondary substances” are never mentioned, at least by name, in 
the Aristotelian corpus outside the Categories. So why does Aristotle call species and 
genera “substances”? There are authors, who think that genera and species of primary 
substances are substances because they can function as subjects, although not as primary 
subjects.44 But this is not the reason Aristotle himself gives for calling species and genera 
substances. Rather, he says the following: 
It is reasonable that, after the primary substances, their species and genera should be the 
only other things called substances. For only they, of things predicated (tôn 
kategoroumenôn), reveal (dêloi) primary substance. For if one is to say of the particular 
human being (tina anthrôpon) what he is (ti esti), he’ll do so appropriately (oikeiôs) by 
giving the species or the genus (though more informative is to give human being than 
animal); but to give any of the other things would be out of place – for example, to say 
“white” or “runs” or anything like that. So it is reasonable that these should be the only 
other things called substances. (2b30-37) 
The species and genera of primary substances are called substances, because only they, 
of the “things predicated”, answer the question “What is it?” It is Aristotle’s settled 
position that the answer to this question is a definition that reveals the essence (ti esti, to                                                         
44 See Kohl (2008), Moravcsik (1967), but also Lewis (1991) and Wedin (2005), who develop what Kohl 
(2008) calls “reductive accounts of subjecthood”. That is, they attempt to show that the subjecthood of 
secondary substances can be entirely reduced to that of primary substances.  
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ti ên einai, ousia) of a thing.45 So we may contend that only species and genera reveal the 
essence of a primary substance.46 Aristotle thus draws a distinction between two sorts of 
universals: genera and species, on the one hand, and all the other “things predicated”, on 
the other. It is reasonably clear that this corresponds to the distinction between those 
universals that are said of but not present in a subject, e.g. human being, and those that 
are both said of and present in a subject, e.g. white (pale). These remain Aristotle’s stock 
examples. Practically all commentators agree that these distinctions correspond to those 
of essential and accidental predication.47 But even though it is generally acknowledged 
that Aristotle is, in the Categories, committed to such a distinction (to a position that can 
be labeled “essentialism”), it is not clear what this distinction amounts to.  
  Aristotle himself explains the distinction between secondary substances, e.g. human 
being, and accidents, e.g. white, in the following manner (2 a19-33; 3a10-20). He says 
that things are present in a subject when their definition is not predicated of the subject, 
although their name may be predicated of the subject. “For example, white, which is in a 
subject (the body), is predicated of the subject; for a body is called white. But the                                                         
45 The definition (horismos) is described as “logos tês ousias” in the Topics (101b37, cf. 101b21, 103b9-
10), and as “logos of what something is” (tou ti esti) in Posterior Analytics (93b30). Aristotle also links 
essence (to ti ên einai, lit. “the what it was to be” for a thing) with definition and a certain sort of essential 
predication in Metaphysics Z 4, and argues that the essence of something is what the thing is “in virtue of 
itself” (kath’ hauto), or, more precisely, “just what a this something is” (hoper tode ti).  
46 I ignore here the difficulties surrounding differentia, and what category to put it in (whether it is 
substance, quality or something else). Considering that differentiae of primary substances are part of their 
definition and essence, and that Aristotle insists that differentiae, like substances, cannot be present in a 
subject (3a21), they have to be, or so it seems, substances. On the other hand, however, some of Aristotle’s 
remarks seem to point in other directions (e.g. he says that differentiae admit of more and less, while 
substances do not, cf. 4a8-9). See, e.g., Irwin (2002 [1988], 64-66), who has a good discussion of the 
“anomaly of differentiae”.  
47 That is, it is assumed that these distinctions correspond to the distinction which is most frequently 
marked by Aristotle by the terms “kath’ hauto” and “kata symbebêkos” (see, e.g., An. Post. A 4, 73a34-
73b16, Met. Δ V 7, 18). The only author (to my knowledge) who denies that Aristotle is distinguishing in 
the Categories accidental from essential predication is Moravcsik (1976). His main argument is that if this 
distinction holds, then “the priority claim on behalf of substances becomes absurd” (p. 91). He does not 
argue for this position, and near the end of the article he contends that “we must set aside the thorny 
question whether Aristotle really means to draw an asymmetrical dependency claim between secondary 
and primary substances and to what extent” (p. 95).  
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definition of white will never be predicated of the body” (2a31-33). Thus, accidents 
might share the same name with their subjects, but never the same definition and 
essence.48 Now, things are said of a subject when both their name and definition are 
predicated of it. “For example, human being is said of a subject, and the name is of 
course predicated (since you will be predicating human being of the particular human 
being), and also the definition of human being will be predicated of the particular human 
being (since the particular human being is also a human being)” (2a20-24). Thus, 
secondary substances share both their name and their definition with their subjects. On 
Aristotle’s account (3a35-b1), this makes this human being (e.g. Socrates) and the 
species human being “synonyms” (synonyma), i.e., things that share the same name 
(onoma) and the same “definition of essence” (logos tês ousias).  
  This explanation suggests that although accidents are present in a subject, they are 
not part of the essence of the subject. When we predicate an accident, we are predicating 
a property that attaches to the subject from outside, so to speak. But when we predicate a 
secondary substance, we are not just predicating a property of a subject.49 Rather, the 
predication reveals what the subject itself is. This implies that the subject of such a 
predication has to be that very thing that is predicated of it. For example, the subject of 
which human being is predicated has to be that very thing, a human being.50 Hence, the 
                                                        
48 This claim might be confusing, since we can evidently say that “white is a penetrative color” or “white is 
a color penetrative of sight” (this is how Aristotle defines white in the Topics, see 119a30, 158a38-b1). 
Aristotle’s point seems to be that in such predications the subject is something that is white. So to speak 
about “white” is a shorthand way of speaking about whatever happens to be white (e.g. Socrates, or, more 
precisely, his body). Evidently, we cannot say that “Socrates is a penetrative color”. 
49 This raises the difficult issue of how we are supposed to understand the ontological character of 
secondary substances. Should we regard them as some sort of class, collections of particulars, or rather as 
some sort of property? For a further discussion of this issue, see Irwin (2002, 78-80, 264-265) and Code 
(1986). It is clear, however, that Aristotle does not regard secondary substances as properties like white, 
i.e., properties that attach to the thing from outside.   
50 Aristotle makes this point very clear in the Posterior Analytics, where he claims that predicates which 
signify the substance (ta men ousian sêmainonta) signify the very things (hoper ekeino) they are predicated 
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predication is not one in which a property is predicated of some independently existing 
subject; Socrates is essentially human. If the essence of Socrates is being human, then 
Socrates cannot be without being human – Socrates will be human as long as he exists. 
So the anti-essentialist suggestion that Socrates could exist without (or independently of) 
being human would, on Aristotle’s view, take Socrates out of being.   
  What, then, does this explanation say about Aristotle’s essentialism? According to 
anyone’s essentialism, some of the predicates or properties are essential to the thing, 
whereas others are not. Although this characterization is usually associated with 
Aristotle,51 it is potentially misleading. For it might suggest that there are some 
independently existing things that have some properties essentially (or “permanently”) 
attached to them, and some not. However, the picture that emerges from the Categories 
is that particulars are not things that can exist independently of their species and genera. 
Rather, particulars are things whose very essence (and being) is determined by their 
species and genera.  
  Further support for this interpretation can be found near the end of chapter five, 
where Aristotle introduces yet another important distinction between substances and 
predicates: 
It seems most distinctive of substance that being the same and one in number (tauton kai 
hen arithmôi), it can admit contraries. In no other case could one bring forward anything, 
numerically one, which is able to receive contraries… A substance, however, the same                                                         
of, whereas accidental predicates are always predicated of something different (heteron ti), for example,  
white is predicated of a human being (see A 22, 83a24-35).  
51 See Quine, who argues that “[Aristotelian essentialism] is the doctrine that some of the attributes of a 
thing (quite independently of the language in which the thing is referred to, if at all) may be essential to the 
thing and other accidental” (1966, 173-174; cf. 1960, 199-200). Quine is definitely responsible for the 
revival of interest in Aristotelian essentialism (despite, or perhaps because of, his rejection of it). For 
discussions of Aristotle’s views in relation to contemporary versions of essentialism, see Witt (1989, chap. 
6), White (1972), Cohen (1978), Matthews (1990). 
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and one in number, is able to receive contraries. For example, this human being, being 
one and the same, becomes pale and dark, and hot and cold, and bad and good. Nothing 
like this is to be seen in any other case. (4a10-21) 
Although Aristotle does not explicitly speak about change in the above passage (nor does 
he do so anywhere in the Categories), it is reasonably clear that what he takes to be the 
most distinctive feature of substances is their ability to survive accidental change. For 
Aristotle is obviously not claiming that a substance is both pale and dark, or good and 
bad, at the same time. The claim is rather that a substance can admit contraries at 
different times, while remaining the same substance. But that is just to say that 
substances can change while remaining the same. At first it may seem surprising that 
Aristotle makes the ability to survive accidental change distinctive of substances in 
general, while the most natural understanding of the above passage would suggest that it 
is a feature of primary substances alone. What, then, counts as a substance that persists 
through change? The answer seems to be that it is a primary substance that falls under 
species and genera. For it seems that a particular cannot receive accidental properties 
unless it is something essentially, unless it falls under species and genera. For example, 
this human being, say Socrates, may be pale at one time and tanned at another, but he 
remains a human being. The fact that he is, essentially, a human being is what makes 
Socrates the same over time. Thus, Socrates is not the kind of thing that can exist, or 
continue to exist, independently of species and genera that are predicated of him. Rather, 
Socrates continues to be what he is as long as he belongs to species and genera, whatever 
other changes may come upon him.  
  Aristotle’s essentialism thus appears to rely on his firm belief (at least at the time of 
writing the Categories) that every primary substance must belong to or exist in 
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(hyparchein en52) a species and genera (2a14, 16). Aristotle does not justify this belief, 
but treats a particular’s belonging to species and genera as a primitive or unanalyzable 
fact.53 Montgomery Furth points out that even though in the Categories Aristotle never 
actually says that “a substantial individual has to belong to a substantial kind” (1978, 
628, my emphasis), it is clearly intended. For otherwise it would follow that substantial 
individuals would be “capable of retaining their numerical identities through arbitrary 
migrations between substantial kinds or out of the kinds altogether” (Furth 1978, 628). In 
other words, it would be possible for one and the same thing to have at one time, one 
thing essentially predicated of it, and at another time, something else, or that nothing is 
predicated of it at all. But Aristotle would hardly accept that Socrates need not be a 
human being, or, even worse, that he could be human at one time and artichoke at 
another. So a thing’s species is, for it, a “migration barrier”. Aristotle does not explicitly 
express this view in the Categories, but in works from roughly the same time we find 
him denying that one and the same thing could migrate between species. In the Topics, 
for instance, he says that “it is impossible for the same thing to continue yet entirely 
change its species; the same animal, for instance, cannot be a human being at one time 
but not another” (125b37-39, cf. 145a3-12).54                                                          
52 The word “hyparchein” is usually rendered “to belong to/in” or “to exist/be in”. Nonetheless, 
commentators tend to ignore the existential implication of the word in the Categories, saying that the 
primary substances are “contained” or “included” in their species (see, e.g., the Loeb translation).  
53 See Loux (2008, 4; 34-36), who argues that in the Categories Aristotle is committed to the 
“Unanalyzability Thesis”, i.e., the idea that the primary substance’s belonging to a species is an 
unanalyzable fact. This thesis emerges when we consider that if the primary substance’s belonging to a 
kind (e.g. Socrates’ being the man he is) is analyzable in terms of some prior case of one thing’s being said 
of or present in another (these two relations exhaust the tools Aristotle has at his disposal in the Categories 
for ontological analysis or reduction), then Socrates cannot be a primary substance, but the more 
fundamental subject would have a better claim to this status. 
54 This citation expresses the position that is traditionally attributed to Aristotle (esp. in his early writings). 
The traditional understanding of Aristotle’s position has been challenged in recent decades by scholars 
working on Aristotle’s biological writings, who have argued that Aristotle’s views on species (esp. in this 
biological writings) are more relaxed and compatible with evolutionary theories. See, e.g., Franklin (1986), 
Lennox (1987). The difficulty of determining whether or not Aristotle intends to rule out the possibility of 
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  Although it is not unambiguously clear whether Aristotle is committed in the 
Categories to the view that denies the possibility of migration between species, he is 
definitely committed to the (weaker) view that a particular cannot migrate out of species 
altogether, to have nothing essentially predicated of it. There is every indication that 
Aristotle would not admit that talk of primary substances as basic subjects leads us to 
what John Locke calls “something I know not what” or what contemporary philosophers 
call “bare particulars” or “bare substrata” (i.e., things that are essentially no kinds of 
things at all, that have nothing essentially predicated of them).55 A primary substance is 
presented in the Categories not simply as a “this” but as “this something”, tode ti (cf. 
3b10-13), where “something” (ti) picks out a certain kind of thing.56 Accordingly, I 
sympathize with Michael Loux (2008) who argues that “we better capture the point of 
the “this something” epithet if we understand it as a kind of schema, where the term 
“something” functions as a placeholder for predicates expressing the species under which 
primary ousiai fall” (p. 29). Hence this epithet emphasizes that every particular must 
belong to a species. This does not seem to imply anything stronger (or more “technical”) 
than that every particular must be of a certain kind. Further, Aristotle’s only examples of 
primary substances are “this human being” and “this horse”. Verity Harte (2010) has 
pointed out that although Aristotle very often uses personal names in his examples, his 
                                                        
arbitrary migration between species lies in the fact that in the Categories Aristotle does not seem to be 
concerned with, much less explicitly address, issues involving change and persistence. In fact, Aristotle 
discusses change only in so far as he claims in the passage cited above that substances are able to “admit 
contraries”. This seems to imply that in order to persist through accidental changes a substance must 
belong to the same species (and thus cannot change its species), but Aristotle does not state it expressis 
verbis. On the other hand, however, there is nothing in the Categories supporting the opposite suggestion 
that he does not intend to rule out the arbitrary migration. Hence, I am inclined to agree with Furth (and the 
traditional interpretation) that Aristotle is in the Categories committed to the same position as in the Topics 
and holds that particulars must belong to their proper species.  
55 For the characterization of the bare particular view, see Loux (2006, chap. 3). 
56 “Tode ti” is usually translated as a “particular” or an “individual” but its literal translation is “this 
something”. See Smith (1921). 
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talk of primary substances in the Categories is not such an occasion.57 Rather, he uses the 
grammatical formula which combines the article, indefinite pronoun and sortal term: ho 
tis anthrôpos, ho tis hippos. I agree with Harte that Aristotle uses such formulae to refer 
to any particular human or any particular horse when he does not mean to refer to any of 
them in particular.58 Again, the force of this formula is to emphasize that particulars are 
instances of universals under which they fall. 
  Accordingly, to identify a primary substance is to identify things that belong to 
certain species, that are of a certain kind (e.g. particulars-as-humans or particulars-as-
horses). A primary substance, e.g. this human being, is already something, a human 
being – the secondary substances provide the “something” that the thing is. Thus the 
assumption underlying Aristotle’s discussions in the Categories seems to be that for a 
particular thing to be it has to be something, and what a thing is, is determined by genera 
and species.59 Since the existence of a particular thing is dependent on its being                                                         
57 It is very common among scholars to give names to one’s examples of primary substances. Although I 
have followed this common practice (and sometimes used Socrates as an example), it is important to notice 
that this is not Aristotle’s own practice in the Categories. 
58 Harte (2010) argues that the difference that is made by the use of the expression ho tis anthrôpos rather 
than a proper name is its deliberate indefiniteness: the expression ignores what may be distinctive or 
special about any one particular individual. She suggests that such an expression is used in a similar 
manner by Sophocles and by Aristotle in the De Interpretatione 7 (17b37-18a7).  
59 See Loux (2008, 26-33) and Jones (1972, 1975), who both locate the essentialist reading of “to be” as 
early as the Categories. One consideration that supports this reading is Aristotle’s claim that each primary 
substance is “one in number” (Cat. 4a10-13). Both Loux and Jones argue that Aristotle denies that there is 
anything that counts as just being one thing (Met I, 1-2). Rather, to say that the primary substances are one 
in number is to say that they fall under universals that provide us with measures for counting their 
instances. As Jones (1972) puts it: “Since what is one is specified with reference to its being something 
other than merely one, to be able to point to something and say “That is one” entails having the ability to 
apply some count noun, or sortal to it. If it is one, then it is one something, one man or horse or geranium” 
(p. 159). Another, related consideration is that Aristotle denies that there is anything that counts as just 
being (to on, “existent”). Aristotle does not express this point explicitly in the Categories, but in works 
from roughly the same time, we find him denying that “being is a genus”, i.e., everything that is/exists 
must be something other than merely being/existent (e.g. De Soph. El. 172a37-39, Top. 127a26-35, An. 
Post. 92b13-14). Loux argues that there is strong evidence that, even in the Categories, Aristotle took the 
categories “to provide the parameters for disambiguating the term” (p. 27-28). See also Matthews (2009), 
who argues that Aristotle is committed to a principle (he calls it “Aristotle’s Principle”) that everything 
that exists is a something or other. The essentialist interpretation of “to be” implies that we cannot, in case 
of primary substances, distinguish between essential and existential dependence (we cannot argue, for 
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something, i.e., dependent on a universal’s being said of it, it follows that particulars 
cannot exist without their universals. In other words, Aristotle’s commitment to 
essentialism in the Categories, and his rejection of the notion of the bare particular, 
entails that particulars are ontologically dependent on universals. 
  Before drawing out the consequences of my interpretation for Aristotle’s anti-
Platonism and for his “problem of katholou”, I would like to spend more time analyzing 
the bare particular view as an alternative to essentialism. In fact, it seems to be the only 
feasible alternative available to those who believe (as Aristotle does) that ontologically 
privileged entities must function as subjects. Why does Aristotle find the notion of a bare 
particular philosophically repugnant? We cannot simply say that he fails to see as far as 
bare particulars: he occasionally flirts with the idea of a bare substratum in his 
Metaphysics. In Metaphysics Z 3, he includes basic subject (hypokeimenon eschaton) on 
his list of possible candidates for the title of substance, and uses a thought experiment to 
discover what sort of thing the basic subject is. Aristotle argues that when we abstract 
from a concrete substance everything that could be predicated of it, we are left with 
matter “which in itself is neither a something (ti) nor a quantity nor otherwise 
determined” (1029a25). Although it is not obvious what conclusion Aristotle wants us to 
draw from this thought experiment, it is clear that he does not accept the conclusion that 
bare matter, as basic subject, is a substance. He rejects this as an impossible result on the 
grounds that matter is nothing determinate, but a substance must be something 
determinate – a substance, he claims, must be a “this something” (tode ti, 1029a28). So 
Aristotle seems to be aware that the “subject criterion” (when pushed to its limits) leads 
                                                        
instance, that primary substances depend on secondary ones for their essence but not for their being) – their 
essential dependence implies existential dependence. 
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us to bare substrata, and remains anxious to hold on to the idea that something of which 
nothing is essentially predicated cannot be a substance; it cannot be a “this something”. 
  Paul Vincent Spade (1999) calls the bare particular view a “Platonic view of things”. 
On this view, we have an object or thing, which has certain properties or features that are 
somehow (by participation, say) attached to it, but by itself, all on its own, the object has 
no properties. In light of Spade’s interpretation we might regard Aristotle’s reluctance to 
adopt the notion of a bare particular as a reaction to the Platonic approach.60 But what 
precisely is wrong with the bare particular view? Spade argues that on the bare particular 
view there are pressures from two different directions. On the one hand, the bare 
particular view runs into trouble with the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles.61 
Since the bare particulars do not have any features of their own, there seems to be 
nothing to distinguish them. So we are pushed toward the view that there is really just 
one substratum. On the other hand, if there really is just one substratum underlying bare 
particulars, then we seem to run into trouble with the Law of Non-Contradiction, because 
this one underlying something will have contrary properties at the same time. So Spade 
contends that “the Identity of Indiscernibles would lead us to say that there is only one 
such object. On the other hand, the Law of Non-Contradiction would lead us to say there 
are several “bare particulars” that play this role. Neither alternative solves the problem 
once and for all” (1999, 5). 
                                                        
60 Similar suggestion is made by Mann (2000), who agues that Aristotle challenges the Platonic view which 
treats all predication in the sensible world as accidental predication. I shall not consider the question 
whether such an understanding of Plato is justified, but see Code (1986), who discusses Plato’s position in 
the Phaedo, although he also emphasizes that he examines Plato “through Aristotle’s eyes”. Code argues 
(and this, I believe, is a widely accepted view) that Aristotle holds that sensible particulars are endowed 
with essential natures, whereas Plato holds that “the inhabitants of the sensible realm Are not the natures in 
which they participate”, e.g. “Socrates merely Has, or participates in, man, without Being man” (p. 428).  
61 This principle states that if two or more things share all their properties/features, they are the same thing. 
That is, things are really the same thing unless there is some feature to distinguish them.  
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  On Aristotle’s view, primary substances have – in virtue of belonging to their 
species and genera – internal features of their own. A primary substance is something 
(human being, say) all by itself or in its own right. And since primary substances can be 
distinguished from one another by their own internal features, the problem with the 
Identity of Indiscernibles disappears. Also the worry about the Law of Non-
Contradiction is lessened – if there are many subjects then we do not need to worry about 
one and the same thing having contrary properties at the same time.62 Further, the fact 
that primary substances belong to their species and genera also explains why they can 
have contrary properties at different times. This comparison with the bare particular view 
suggests that secondary substances make the primary substance something determinate, 
something that can be distinguished from other substances, something that can underlie 
accidental changes – this might be the reason why Aristotle believes that primary 
substances must exist in, or fall under, secondary substances.63  
  By now it should be obvious that there is a kind of essentialism at work in the 
Categories and that this essentialism is not merely epistemological. That is, secondary 
substances do not merely give us knowledge of primary substances but determine the 
very being of those substances.64 Aristotle’s commitment to essentialism has major                                                         
62 In fact, in Met. Γ 4 (1007a33 ff.) Aristotle argues that to obliterate the distinction between essence and 
accident (to reduce all predication to accidental one) is to obliterate the Principle of Non-Contradiction, 
and with it the possibility of meaningful discourse on any subject. 
63 This interpretation suggests that Aristotle of the Categories (which is innocent of the matter-form 
distinction) has a hold of the phenomenon we would nowadays call individuative universals or sortal 
universals, etc. So, Aristotle of the Categories might agree with Strawson, who argues that “a sortal 
universal supplies a principle for distinguishing and counting individual particulars which it collects” 
(1964, 168). Loux (2006) argues that on such a view there is no “special problem of explaining the 
particularity of concrete objects. Just in virtue of instantiating its proper kind a concerete object is marked 
out as a particular… Furthermore, the multiple instantiation of the kind is, by itself, sufficient to secure the 
existence of numerically different particulars” (p.112). The idea that Aristotle of the Categories has a hold 
on the notion of individuative predication is developed also by Furth (1988).  
64 Practically all authors, who believe that Aristotle introduces the discrepancy between the real and the 
knowable in the Categories, seem to think that particulars are ontologically prior, while universals enjoy 
some sort of epistemological priority. (See Letszl (1972, 279) for the list of these authors.) I agree that the 
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consequences for the traditional view which attributes to Aristotle the position that 
particulars are ontologically prior to universals, i.e., the relation of ontological 
dependence between them is asymmetrical. 
  I believe that the required asymmetry can be defended with respect to the 
relationship between primary substances and accidents. Aristotle might be able to show 
that things present in a subject are ontologically dependent on primary substances as their 
subjects, whereas primary substances do not in the same way depend on them. The 
reason for this is that accidents are not essential to primary substances – a particular 
human being would still be what she is, regardless of whether or not she is pale. 
Nonetheless, the details of this account are messy and complicated. For it seems that if a 
particular human being is to exist she must be of some colour, of some weight, and so on 
(she cannot exist without all the so-called determinable accidents, like being coloured). 
But I believe that it is possible to develop an account which makes plausible the idea that 
the relationship here is asymmetrical. One possible account of asymmetry, in rough 
terms, is the following. The claim that a primary substance can exist without those 
accidents that inhere in it does not imply that the substance might be lacking in accidents 
altogether, but only that it is capable of possessing different accidents from the ones it 
actually has. The accidents, on the other hand, cannot exist unless substances also exist, 
i.e., unless they are instantiated by substances. So humans, for instance, can exist without 
                                                        
distinction between essential and accidental predication might be based on epistemological considerations. 
But I do not agree that secondary substances merely give us knowledge of primary substances. Rather, they 
determine, so to speak, the conditions for the existence of primary substances. They are, as Furth puts it, 
“something constitutive or even causal, required for the continuity of the substantial individuals across 
time” (1978, 631).  
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exhibiting a given quality, such as being pale or being bald, but pallor or baldness cannot 
exist without some particular human having it.65 
  However, the relevant sort of asymmetry does not obtain in the relationship between 
primary and secondary substances. It is Aristotle’s view that there would not be a species 
such as human being without there being particular human beings, but it is not the case 
that a particular human being could exist without belonging to the species human being, 
that is, without being human. Thus, the essentialist interpretation suggests that in addition 
to the dependence of “all other things” on primary substances, there is also a reverse 
dependence that primary substances have on secondary substances. Stated otherwise, to 
be a particular is to be a particular of a certain sort, i.e., to be an instance of a universal 
under which a given particular falls, while to be a universal is to be instantiated by 
particulars that fall under it. In what follows, I consider the consequences that my 
interpretation has for Aristotle’s alleged anti-Platonism and for his “problem of 
katholou”.  
                                                        
65 We are now in a position to discuss briefly my earlier remark (footnote 33) that my interpretation offers 
indirect support to the view that Aristotle’s reference to “this white” picks out an unrepeatable instance of a 
universal accident white. On my interpretation, primary substances (e.g. this human being) are instances of 
secondary substance (e.g. human being). Hence we may suppose that particular accidents (e.g. this white) 
are likewise instances of universal accidents (e.g. white) – both this human being and this white are “this 
somethings”. What is the role of particular accidents? I believe that they mediate the dependence that 
universal accidents have on primary substances. That is to say, for the universal, human being, to exist is 
merely for there to be particular humans. But for the accident, white, to exist is for there to be instances of 
whiteness in particular humans. (A convincing account of this kind of two-step dependence is developed 
and defended by Deurlinger (1970).) So we can say that white depends on this human being because this 
white depends on the particular human being (Socrates say) in which it exists. This raises the question of 
why universal, human being, is dependent on this human being (Socrates say, rather than Callias). Aristotle 
avoids this question because he does not use proper names but indefinite formulas such as “this human 
being”. I suggested earlier that Aristotle uses this formula to refer to any particular humans when he does 
not mean to refer to any of them in particular. Hence it is safe to say that human being is dependent on this 
human being, for it cannot exist without some human beings, even though it is not dependent on any of 
them in particular. For a further discussion of these complications, see Corkum (2008). 
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Consequences  
The possibility of interpreting Aristotle’s position in a way that makes particulars 
ontologically dependent on universals has not gone completely unnoticed by scholars. 
Martin Tweedale (1993), Montgomery Furth (1978, 1988), and Michael Loux (2008 
[1991]), in particular, have taken this interpretation seriously. 
  Tweedale thinks that the ontological interdependence, as I have called it, between 
universals and particulars indicates a “definite tension, if not outright contradiction” 
(1993, 78) right at the heart of Aristotle’s ontology. Loux and Furth, who focus more 
specifically on the Categories, see the dependence that particulars have on species as a 
problem that motivates or inspires Aristotle’s discussion of substance in his later 
writings. Furth thinks that Aristotle is well aware that this dependence “must 
immediately begin to erode their ultimacy as subjects” (1978, 631). This, he believes, is 
the reason why Aristotle did not definitely settle the matter by making their dependence 
explicit. So the omission of the clear statement of this position is not an oversight on 
Aristotle’s part, but “the author, seeing plainly the edge of abyss and knowing that it 
could not possibly be plumbed within the scope of the work in hand, deliberately, silently 
drew back. He hoped, perhaps, that no one would notice, and hardly anyone did” (p. 
631).  
  But why should we see the ontological interdependence as a problem in the first 
place? It seems that it constitutes a problem on the assumption that Aristotle intends the 
subject criterion to establish an unqualified ontological priority of particulars (i.e., a 
priority over universals and accidents), which, then, enables him to turn the Platonic 
picture “upside down”. But there does not seem to be enough evidence to show that 
Aristotle wants to overturn the Platonic position rather than change it. This leads us to 
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the question of what precisely are the consequences of the essentialist interpretation for 
Aristotle’s alleged anti-Platonism. 
  According to the traditional interpretation, Aristotle’s famous conclusion that “if the 
primary substances did not exist, it would be impossible for any of the other things to 
exist” commits Aristotle to an unqualified ontological priority of particulars. This 
position may be regarded as the prime example of Aristotle’s anti-Platonism, for in 
assigning ontological priority to particulars, rather than to universals, he turns the 
Platonic picture upside down. According to the essentialist interpretation, his position is 
more nuanced. On this interpretation, Aristotle is not committed to the ontological 
priority of particulars over secondary substances (or else he needs to give up the 
assumption that particulars are “this somethings” and embrace the notion of a bare 
particular). Rather, we could say that Aristotle equalizes the status of primary and 
secondary substances. It is no more possible for universals to exist without particulars 
than it is for particulars to exist without universals. But even on the essentialist 
interpretation there is a sense in which particulars as “this somethings” remain 
ontologically prior, viz., they are prior to accidents that belong to them. Accordingly, the 
answer to the question of whether particulars are ontologically prior is in a sense “yes”, 
and in a sense “no”. It is “yes” if by universals we mean accidents, and it is “no” if by 
universals we mean secondary substances. The interpretation according to which 
particulars as “this somethings” are ontologically prior to accidents gives us also a 
possible explanation for why Aristotle subsumes both particulars and universals under 
the label “substances”, viz., he does so to distinguish them from accidents which lack the 
independence that “this somethings” have.66                                                          
66 Further support for the view that Aristotle is committed to the ontological priority of substances over 
accidents is found in the Metaphysics. As I have suggested in the previous chapter, Aristotle often uses 
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  Nonetheless, even if we agree that ontological priority distinguishes substances from 
accidents, there still remains the question of why Aristotle uses the labels “primary 
substance” and “secondary substance”. It might seem that the essentialist interpretation, 
according to which primary and secondary substances are ontologically interdependent, 
leaves mysterious the point of using such labels. Loux, for instance, worries that the 
essentialist interpretation “leads us to wonder just why should we say that substance-
species or whatever it is that makes basic subjects be what they are are only derivatively 
or secondarily ousiai. Do they not have as much right to the title ‘primary ousia’ as the 
basic subjects themselves?” (2008, 48). This worry seems to rest on the assumption that 
the criterion for being a substance is ontological priority. This assumption is adopted by 
the traditional interpretation which maintains that the subject criterion is used to establish 
not only the ontological dependence of secondary substances on primary ones, but – by 
implication – the ontological independence of primary substances. The essentialist 
interpretation challenges this implication, but there is a sense in which it does not 
challenge the subject criterion itself, i.e., the idea that primary substances are ultimate 
subjects of which everything else is predicated but which themselves are not predicated 
of anything more basic. On the essentialist interpretation, primary substances cannot 
exist independently of universals predicated of them. Nevertheless, they remain primary 
in the sense of not being ontologically dependent on any further subjects. Stated 
                                                        
separation terminology (chôris, etc.) to refer to ontological priority. In the opening chapter of Metaphysics 
Z, he uses the term “separate” to express the ontological asymmetry between substances and accidents. 
This chapter clearly suggests that the relevant “somethings” from which substances are separate are 
accidents (while the relevant “somethings” from which the Platonic Forms are separate are sensible 
particulars). Since Aristotle seems to be committed to the ontological priority of substances over accidents 
in the Metaphysics, it is not unreasonable to suggest that he is committed to this position already in the 
Categories. 
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otherwise, particulars are instances of universals, but particulars themselves do not have 
instances.  
  The essentialist interpretation is thus compatible with what could plausibly be called 
the weak reading of the subject criterion. This reading agrees with the traditional view 
that secondary substances depend for their existence on primary substances as their 
subjects. But it differs from the traditional reading in that it does not draw the conclusion 
that primary substances can therefore exist independently of secondary substances. The 
minimum reading only draws the conclusion that primary substances exist independently 
of further subjects; they do not need to be instantiated in order to exist. Thus primary 
substances retain a sort of primacy and independence, but their primacy is a weak one – 
it does not imply the capacity to exist independently from universals predicated of 
them.67 In so far as this reading of the subject criterion does not establish any strong 
independence of particulars, it might not appear to be wholly satisfactory. But it provides 
a possible answer to the question of why Aristotle uses the labels “primary” and 
“secondary”. Namely, secondary substances are “secondary” because they are always 
instantiated by primary substances, whereas primary substances remain “primary” in the 
sense of not having instances.68  
                                                        
67 A somewhat similar suggestion is advanced by Corkum (2008), who challenges the traditional 
understanding of the notion of ontological independence, and proposes to weaken the notion of ontological 
independence from a capacity for independent existence to the possession of a certain ontological status. 
He leaves open the question of what precisely this ontological status amounts to as a subject for further 
research. My interpretation differs from Corkum’s in that I do not challenge the traditional understanding 
of the notion of ontological independence as a capacity for independent existence. I only challenge the idea 
that primary substances can exist independently of universals. On my interpretation, primary substances 
are primary because they can exist independently of further subjects (because they are not predicated of 
anything further), not because they can exist independently of universals predicated of them. 
68 The fact that this criterion admits of different readings (a weaker and a stronger one) might well be the 
reason why Aristotle complains in Metaphysics Z 3 that this criterion is “not only obscure (adêlon), but 
makes matter substance” (1029a11). The weaker reading gives us only a weak sort of independence. The 
stronger reading establishes an ontological priority over universals. This, however, is too strong, since 
particulars cannot exist without universals predicated of them. As Aristotle argues in Metaphysics Z, when 
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  So, the essentialist interpretation suggests that Aristotle does not require primary 
substances to be capable of existing independently of universals, and hence he does not 
overturn the Platonic position. But Aristotle definitely changes it, and he changes it in a 
more radical manner than is usually thought. The traditional interpretation holds that 
particulars can exist independently from universals, thereby committing Aristotle to an 
ontological dualism of particulars and universals. The essentialist interpretation, on the 
other hand, holds that particulars and universals are ontologically interdependent, and 
their ontological interdependence implies that “primary” and “secondary” cannot be 
labels for irreducibly distinct types of entity. Hence, this interpretation does not commit 
Aristotle to any robust dualism.   
  Nonetheless, the question of what precisely is the positive view that emerges out of 
this interpretation is not an easy one to answer. On the one hand, the notion of 
ontological interdependence does not imply that particulars and universals are irreducibly 
distinct types of things, complete entities in their own right, that are somehow dependent 
on each other. On the other hand, to say that their ontological interdependence amounts 
to identity seems also to go beyond what Aristotle has in mind in the Categories. The 
notion of identity is nowadays usually equated with the principle which can here be 
loosely expressed by saying that if A and B are identical, then whatever is true of the one 
is true of another.69 But it does not seem to be the case that whatever is true of a primary 
substance is true of a secondary substance, and vice versa. Firstly, secondary substances 
are predicated of a subject, whereas primary substances are not. Secondly, in addition to                                                         
we eliminate everything that that is predicated of a subject, we do not end up with a substance and “this 
something” but with an indeterminate matter. 
69 Aristotle seems to formulate something that looks like this principle (“Leibniz’s Law”, as it is usually 
called) in Topics H (152b25-29). For a further discussion, see White (1971), who argues that the Topics is 
the only work of Aristotle which reveals a “relatively firm grasp of something like the notion of identity” 
(p. 177).  
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essential predications, we can also make accidental predications of a primary substance: 
for example, “Socrates is white”. This predication is true of Socrates but is no part of his 
essence. So it seems that there are more things true of Socrates than are stated in a 
definition expressing his essence. Hence, it does not seem to be the case that primary and 
secondary substances are strictly identical. These considerations suggest that Aristotle, in 
the Categories, is interested in some sort of a middle position between robust dualism 
and strict identity. And here we are at the beginning of a very long and complicated 
story, which, to borrow from Porphyry, is too deep for the present investigation.70 
  For the present purpose, suffice it to say that Aristotle is clearly committed to the 
existence of particular things of a certain sort, “this somethings”. In so far as “this 
somethings” are neither purely or “barely” particular nor purely universal, we can, 
alternatively, characterize them as “universalized particulars” or “particularized 
universals”.71 In other words, Aristotle does not think that when considering “things that 
are” or “substances”, we can pick out full-fledged entities such as universals and full-
fledged entities such as particulars. Rather, he seems to think that there are particulars, 
but to be a particular is to be an instance of a universal (particulars are always 
“universalized”), and that there are universals, but to be a universal is to be instantiated 
by particulars (universals are always “particularized”). So universality or particularity 
are, one could say, inseparable aspects of all existence; every existing particular is a 
particular something or other. 
                                                        
70 Porphyry famously formulates three questions concerning the ontological status of species and genera 
but refuses to answer them, saying they are too “deep” (Isagoge, 1, 10-14). For a further discussion of the 
ontological status of Aristotle’s universals, see chapter 5. 
71 These expressions are not my own, but I take them from Wallace (1882), who attributes to Aristotle the 
view that every real thing is “either an individual universalized by the relations in which it exists or an 
universal individualized through the particular conditions which determinate existence imposes on it” 
(1882, xli). 
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  This minimizes the seriousness of the problem of how what is most real can also be 
most knowable. On a popular line of interpretation, Aristotle introduces this problem in 
his early writings, especially in the Categories, where he attributes to concrete particulars 
unqualified ontological priority over universals and “pursues a policy of ontological 
liberality”72 in treating particulars and universals as irreducibly distinct types of entities. 
This “ontological liberality” leaves it hard to see how substantiality and knowability can 
apply to one and the same thing. Although Aristotle does not speak about knowledge 
(epistêmê) in the Categories, it seems that “this something” would qualify as something 
that is both real and knowable. In so far as “this something” is an ultimate subject of all 
predication, it is most real. And in so far as it falls under species and genera, which 
answer most appropriately the “What is it?” question, it is knowable. Hence, there is no 
sharp discrepancy or “impossible dilemma” between knowability and substantiality.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
72 This expression is taken from Wedin: “…that the Categories pursues a policy of ontological liberality is 
virtually an article of faith among commentators” (2005, 86). 
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3 
Aristotle’s Epistemology and Knowledge of 
Particulars 
This chapter focuses on Aristotle’s problem of katholou from an epistemological point of 
view. In the previous chapter I discussed this problem primarily from an ontological 
point of view and developed an essentialist interpretation of the Categories. According to 
this interpretation, particulars (“primary substances”) and universals (“secondary 
substances”) are ontologically interdependent, and hence there cannot be any sharp 
discrepancy between the real and the knowable. Thus, on my interpretation, the 
Categories can be understood as presenting a possible solution to the problem (rather 
than introducing the problem). Nonetheless, the account of substance put forward in the 
Categories included almost nothing about knowledge, and from this aspect the proposed 
solution to the problem of katholou is vulnerable. 
  Aristotle’s often repeated statement that knowledge (epistêmê) is of the universal73 
seems to be the main source of the problem. He says in Metaphysics M 10 (1087a10-11) 
that the statement that all knowledge is of the universal presents the “greatest problem”, 
since it would follow (on the assumption that knowledge is of what is real) that only 
universals are real. However, Aristotle is evidently not willing to give up the position 
that particulars are most real, and hence he faces the problem of explaining how there 
can be knowledge of particulars when knowledge must be universal. Also Aristotelian 
commentators agree that the statement that knowledge is of the universal is primarily                                                         
73 See, e.g., Post. An. A 24 (86a6-7), B 19 (100a6-9); Met. A 1 (981a5-12), B 4 (999a24-29), K 2 
(1060b20-21), M 10 (1086b32-37); EN Z 6 (1140b31-32). 
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responsible for the discrepancy between Aristotle’s ontology and epistemology. For 
example, George Brakas states, characteristically enough, that “the premise that 
knowledge is of the universal has to cause the most fundamental problems for Aristotle’s 
epistemology, for, by appropriating knowledge to those objects, it leaves us without 
knowledge of the individuals which make up the world in which we live” (1988, 108).  
 At first glance, however, it is not clear why this statement is particularly worrisome 
in the context of Aristotle’s philosophy. It is not clear, for example, why it is more 
problematic for Aristotle than for any philosopher who believes that knowledge proceeds 
through terms having general application. But it is clear that the position that knowledge 
is of the universal becomes a source of the problem if it is taken to imply that (i) there is 
no knowledge of the particulars and/or (ii) universals as objects of knowledge are 
separate from particulars (so that knowledge of the universal does not contribute to 
knowing particulars). If so, then it is indeed difficult to see how what is most real can 
also be knowable, or, as Michael Novak (1964) puts it, “how we can have science about 
the world of our experience and, if we cannot, how the world of our experience can be 
real” (p. 5).  
  My aim in this chapter is to show that (i) there is a way in which knowledge, though 
universal, has the particular as its object, and that (ii) Aristotle does not separate 
universals as objects of knowledge from particulars. My interpretation suggests that 
corresponding to the ontological interdependence there is also an epistemological 
interdependence between particulars and universals. Particulars cannot be scientifically 
known without universals under which they fall, and universals cannot be scientifically 
known without particulars, since we acquire knowledge of universals by having 
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perceptions of particulars. Consequently, Aristotle’s claim that knowledge is of the 
universal does not necessitate a divorce of epistemology from ontology. 
Particulars and Knowledge 
In the following sections, I consider whether (and to what extent) Aristotle’s account of 
knowledge and its requirements excludes the possibility of knowing particulars. There 
are passages in Aristotle’s writings that invite skepticism about this possibility. Among 
these are passages, in which Aristotle contrasts universals as objects of knowledge with 
particulars as objects of perception,74 and passages, which appear to exclude the 
possibility of knowing particulars under any condition. The latter include, most notably, 
Metaphysics Z 15, where he emphatically states there is no demonstration or knowledge 
of particular substances, since they “have matter whose nature is such that they are 
capable both of being and of not being, for which reason all particular substances are 
perishable” (1039b29-31), and Posterior Analytics A 8, where he argues that there is no 
unqualified scientific knowledge of perishable things.75  
  But to begin with, it should be pointed out that the answer to the question of whether 
there can be knowledge of particulars depends, first of all, on what we mean by a 
particular (kath’ hekaston). The picture that emerges from Aristotle’s writings is, in 
rough terms, the following. Particulars can be considered either in respect of their 
particularity, in what does not make them members of certain species (e.g. Socrates qua 
Socrates), or insofar as they belong to their species and genera (e.g. Socrates qua human 
                                                        
74 See, e.g., An. Post. A 24 (86a29), A 31 (87b29-38), B 12 (97b28-31); Met. A 1 (981a12-28).  
75 See also NE Z 3 and Γ 8 (1142a23-31). I will examine An. Post. A 8 in the following section, but the 
treatment of Met. Z 15 has to wait until the following chapter, which focuses on Book Z of Metaphysics. 
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being), or insofar as they have certain qualities, quantities or other accidents (e.g. 
Socrates qua sitting or white).  
  Secondly, the answer to the above question depends on what we mean by 
knowledge.76 One clear instance of knowing is knowing what the thing is (ti estin), i.e., 
knowing its essence. Although Aristotle does not speak about knowledge in the 
Categories, we may assume that secondary substances, by revealing what a primary 
substance is (2b33), give us knowledge of primary substances. At least he says that “if 
one is to say of the particular human being what he is, he’ll do so appropriately by giving 
the species or the genus” (2b34). The idea that to know best is to know what something 
is occurs frequently in the Metaphysics. For example, Aristotle says in Z 1 that “we know 
each thing best (malista), when we know what human being or fire is – rather than its 
quantity, quality or position” (1028a25-b1).77 Since we can ask and answer the “What is 
it?” question (not only about universals but also) about particulars, they are knowable. 
However, they are not knowable in all their particularity. The answers Aristotle mainly 
has in mind are those that give the species or genus of the subject. For example, when we 
ask what the particular human is we get an answer such as “(a) human being” or “(an) 
animal”. The answer tells us what kind of thing our subject is and, as such, is not unique 
to a given particular. 
                                                        
76 An initial question about Aristotle’s epistemology concerns terminology. The central components in his 
vocabulary of knowledge are the verb epistasthai and the cognate noun epistêmê. Epistasthai is an ordinary 
Greek word for “know” and epistêmê ordinarily means “knowledge”. Although Aristotle sometimes uses 
these words in the ordinary or neutral sense, it is clear that in the Posterior Analytics he intends to use 
these ordinary words in an “unordinarily restricted way”, as McKirahan puts it (1992, 22). Epistêmê can 
refer either to the cognitive state of the knowing person or to a body of knowledge, a science.  My 
translation of these words depends upon the context. In some contexts it is more perspicuous to translate 
epistêmê as “knowledge”, in others as “scientific knowledge” or “science”.  
77 See also Met. B 1 (996b15-18), Z 6 (1032b2). 
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  A complete answer to the “What is it?” question is, according to Aristotle, a 
definition, which is typically given by genus and differentia.78 Again, definition does not 
capture the particular thing in all its uniqueness and particularity, but the species under 
which the particular falls. However, when we define the species, we also give all there is 
to the definition of the particular belonging to that species. As Aristotle puts it in the 
Categories, species and its members are “synonyms”, things that share the same 
definition of essence. Thus, Aristotle’s denial that knowledge and definition is of 
particulars qua particulars does not imply that particulars are not knowable at all. Rather, 
his point seems to be that particulars are knowable sub specie universalitatis, as falling 
under universals. This point relies on the recognition that particulars are not completely 
unique but are capable of falling under species and genera. Thus, Socrates is not 
knowable qua Socrates, and to know him as being white or ugly is to know him 
unreliably (or inappropriately), but he is knowable qua human being – to know him as 
human being is to know him as what he is and must be throughout his existence.  
  Nonetheless, although the answer to the question “What is it?” would count as 
knowledge, one might be skeptical over whether such knowledge about particulars would 
measure up to the requirements for knowledge presented in the Posterior Analytics, 
which contains Aristotle’s most sustained and detailed (and one could add, obscure) 
discussion of scientific knowledge. In order to consider Aristotle’s position concerning 
knowledge of particulars in the Posterior Analytics, I begin by sketching out some 
important aspects of his account of epistêmê.                                                         
78 That definitions will be in the form of genus and differentia is assumed throughout the Organon as well 
as in other writings. See, e.g., Top. A 3 (153a15-18); An. Post. B 13; Met. Z 12 (1037b28-1038a3). But see 
also PA (A 3), where his theory of definition is more subtle than elsewhere – Aristotle rejects the 
requirement that corresponding to each kind (species or genus) there be a single differentia that sets the 
kind off from others, and recognizes that often it is necessary for the definition to contain a conjunction of 
differentiae. 
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Unqualified and Qualified Knowledge in the Posterior Analytics 
The Posterior Analytics is concerned primarily with what Aristotle calls “unqualified 
knowledge” (epistêmê haplôs). This unusual expression is presumably intended to signal 
his concern with epistêmê in the restricted and strict sense. What kind of knowledge 
counts as unqualified knowledge? Firstly, Aristotle states in Posterior Analytics A 2 that 
unqualified knowledge arises through demonstration (apodeixis), a special sort of 
syllogism consisting of premises (principles, archai) and a conclusion.79 Secondly, 
Aristotle defines unqualified knowledge in A 2 in terms of explanation and necessity: to 
know something in an unqualified sense is to know its explanation (aition) as being its 
explanation, and that it cannot be otherwise (71b9-12). This definition has consequences 
for Aristotle’s account of demonstrations through which we obtain unqualified 
knowledge. It requires demonstrations to be explanations – a demonstration must not just 
show that its conclusion holds, but must show why.80 Further, it requires the conclusion, 
and a fortiori the premises, of a demonstration to be necessary, for without necessary 
premises we cannot know why the conclusion holds and is necessary, and so we will lack 
unqualified knowledge of what cannot be otherwise.81  
  Of these two conditions for having unqualified knowledge, I will focus on necessity, 
which seems to be the most restrictive requirement for demonstrative knowledge.82 
Aristotle holds that the demonstrative premise is necessary if the predicate and subject 
                                                        
79 As we will see, demonstration is not the only way of obtaining knowledge. Aristotle holds that 
demonstration depends on premises, or principles, that must be known beforehand in the way that does not 
depend on demonstration. But although demonstrative knowledge is not the only type of knowledge there 
is, it is safe to say that Aristotle’s main concern in the Posterior Analytics is with demonstrative knowledge 
(apodeiktikê epistêmê). 
80 See An. Post. A 2 (71b9-19), B 2 (89b35-90a5).  
81 See An. Post. A 6 (74b26-32). 
82 See NE Z 3 (1139b19-21). 
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terms are related by essential (kath’ hauto, literally “in itself”) predication.83 In Posterior 
Analytics A 4 (73a23-b5), Aristotle distinguishes between two ways in which the 
predicate belongs to the subject kath’ hauto: (i) if it is predicated of the subject, and 
belongs to the essence (to ti esti, “the what it is”) and definition of it, or (ii) if it is 
predicated of the subject, and the subject belongs to the essence and definition of the 
predicate.84 Aristotle contrasts essential predications with accidental (kata symbebêkos) 
ones, which are not necessary and hence not subject to scientific demonstrations. His 
account of necessity relies thus on a distinction familiar from the Categories, even 
though in the Categories he does not use the terminology of kath’ hauto and kata 
symbebêkos. But while Aristotle, in the Categories, allows the subjects of essential 
predications to be particulars (e.g. this horse, this human being) as well as universals 
(horse, human being), Aristotle of the Posterior Analytics (esp. A 4-5) seems to be more 
restrictive and associates unqualified knowledge with what is universal. 
  It is not unambiguously clear in what sense Aristotle requires demonstrative 
knowledge to be universal. At the very least, he requires demonstrative premises to be 
universal in the sense that the predicate “belongs to every instance of the subject” 
(hyparchein kata pantos, A 4, 73a28-30). This implies that demonstrations are first figure                                                         
83 I follow the common practice (of English translators) to put the point in terms of essences: an “in itself” 
predication is called an essential one, and what something is (ti esti) is called its essence. 
84 Aristotle’s discussion in A 4 (see also A 6, 74b5-10; A 22, 84a11-17) suggests that essential predications 
are definitional, and there are several passages suggesting that definitions have a special claim for being 
first principles (e.g. A 10; A 8, 75b31; B 3, 90b25; B 13, 96b22). Nonetheless, the identification of 
essential predication with definitional one is also problematic: it has led scholars to complain that 
demonstrative explanations are severely restricted to what we might now call analytic truths (see, e.g., 
Ferejohn (1991, 177)), and it raises the difficulty concerning kath’ hauta symbebêkota (per se accidents). 
Aristotle’s paradigmatic example is “having angles equal to two right angles”, which belongs to “triangle”. 
This is his favorite example of demonstrable truth in the Posterior Analytics, but neither the “triangle” nor 
the predicate “having angles equal to two right angles” belong to the definition of the other. On the other 
hand, they are not mere accidents either, since they are explained through the essence. I will not delve into 
the details of this difficulty, but will be content to point out that Aristotle recognizes predicates that are 
essential but not definitional. For a further discussion of this difficulty (and of the question whether or not 
all premises must be implicitly definitional), see Ferejohn (1991), McKirahan (1992), and Goldin (1996). 
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syllogisms whose premises and conclusions have the form “A belongs to every B”, e.g. 
“having angles equal to two right angles belongs to every triangle” or, alternatively, 
“every triangle has angles equal to two right angles”. In the De Interpretatione, Aristotle 
calls “every human being” a universal taken universally, literally, “as of a whole” 
(17b11-12). Since “every human being” cannot be a predicate, it is not strictly speaking 
universal (it does not, as Aristotle says, signify the universal, 17b12-16). But it is 
universal in the sense that in those statements (e.g. “every human being is animal”), a 
claim is made about each and every thing of which the universal term (“human”) can be 
truly predicated.85 Thus, the premises of demonstrations must be universal at least in the 
sense that the predicate belongs to all instances of the subject, or, contemporarily stated, 
the subject of such premises is quantified universally. 
  Occasionally, however, Aristotle appeals to a stricter notion of a universal, which is 
introduced in Posterior Analytics A 4: “I mean by a universal (katholou) that which 
belongs to every instance of its subject (kata pantos) and in itself (kath’ hauto) and as 
itself (hêi auto)” (73b26-27). Aristotle does not raise or answer the question whether 
“belonging to each instance” implies necessity but he makes clear that what belongs 
universally in the above sense is necessary (73b28). This definition is more demanding 
because it seems to require that the predicates be convertible with their subjects. Aristotle 
illustrates “belonging as itself” with the example of “having angles equal to two right 
angles”, which belongs universally to triangle but not to figure (which is supposedly too 
wide) nor to isosceles triangle (which is too narrow). This suggests that universal 
                                                        
85 Fur a further discussion of “universals taken universally” in the De Interpretatione, see Whitaker (1996, 
chap. 7). 
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predicates are such that (in addition to belonging essentially to every instance of the 
subject) they are convertible or coextensive with their subjects.86 
  This brief sketch of Aristotle’s account of unqualified knowledge invites the widely 
accepted view that Aristotle restricts unqualified scientific knowledge to what is 
necessary and universal. Such an account raises at least two related questions concerning 
the knowledge of particulars. Firstly, does knowledge in the unqualified sense exclude 
the possibility of knowing particulars? Secondly, does Aristotle allow statements about 
particulars to be part of any kind of scientific knowledge (though perhaps not of 
unqualified knowledge)? I believe that Aristotle’s answers to these questions are 
affirmative. More precisely, I will argue that Aristotle distinguishes between unqualified 
scientific knowledge, which is of the universal, and qualified scientific knowledge, 
which is of the particular. Thus, he allows statements about particulars to be instances of 
qualified scientific knowledge. Further, I will suggest that although unqualified scientific 
knowledge is restricted to what is universal, it does not exclude the possibility of 
knowing particulars. Rather, knowledge of the universal is (as Aristotle puts it) potential 
knowledge of particulars, and hence it implies (rather than excludes) knowledge about 
particulars. 
  I begin by considering Posterior Analytics A 8, where the distinction between 
unqualified and qualified knowledge is first introduced and explained: 
                                                        
86 Commentators usually call predicates that are convertible or commensurate with their subjects, 
“commensurate universals”. The precise role and function of commensurate universals in Aristotle’s 
account of demonstration is controversial. The received view is that Aristotle does indeed subscribe to the 
view that premises (and, by implication, conclusions) of demonstration must be convertible. In recent 
decades, however, this view is challenged by scholars such as Barnes (2002, 258) and McKirahan (1992, 
176), who are skeptical that Aristotle is committed to what Barnes calls “the most extreme form” of the 
doctrine of Commensurate Universal and holds that all premises must convert. Aristotle never asserts this 
doctrine, and considers propositions that do not convert as demonstrable. See also Inwood (1979), who 
argues that Aristotle is committed to a moderate version of the doctrine of Commensurate Universal. 
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It is also evident that if the premises from which a syllogism proceeds are universal, the 
conclusion of such a demonstration – of a demonstration in an unqualified sense – must 
be eternal (aidion). There is therefore no demonstration or knowledge of perishable 
things (phthartôn) without qualification, but only in a qualified sense (houtôs hôsper 
kata symbebêkos) because it [the predicate] does not belong [to the subject] universally 
but only at a time and in a way (pote kai pôs). Where there is such a demonstration and 
knowledge, the other premise must be non-universal and perishable – perishable because 
only so will the conclusion also be [about] perishable, and non-universal because it [the 
predicate] will belong only to one [instance of the subject] but not to others… (75b21-
29)87   
The above passage is one of the few passages in the Posterior Analytics, where Aristotle 
explicitly states that the premises and a conclusion of a demonstration in an unqualified 
sense are universal. Nonetheless, from this he does not draw the conclusion that 
particulars cannot be scientifically known at all, but that they cannot be known in an 
unqualified sense – they can be demonstrated and known only in a qualified way. This 
suggests that Aristotle does not think that all scientific knowledge is of the universal 
without qualification. Knowledge in the qualified sense is of particulars, and qualified 
knowledge (as suggested by Aristotle’s explicit talk of demonstration and epistêmê) 
counts as scientific knowledge too. As we will see, Aristotle also appeals to such a 
distinction in Metaphysics M 10, where he argues that the statement “all knowledge is of 
the universal is true in one way but not in another” (1087a15).  
  Aristotle does not offer examples in the above passage but we may assume that an 
example of an unqualified demonstration would be a syllogism that has as its conclusion                                                         
87 Unless otherwise noted, all the following translations are the author’s. 
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“every triangle has angles equal to two right angles” (which, after all, is Aristotle’s 
favorite example of a demonstrable truth in the Posterior Analytics). An example of a 
qualified demonstration would be the following syllogism that Aristotle presents in 
Posterior Analytics A 1: 
   (1) Every triangle has angles equal to two right angles (2 R); 
(2) This [figure] in a semicircle is a triangle; 
Therefore,  (3) this triangle in the semicircle has 2 R. 
This syllogism appears to be an example of a qualified demonstration because one of its 
premises is universal (predicate belongs to every instance of the subject term), whereas 
the other premise is particular (predicate belongs to only one instance of the subject 
term). Consequently, the conclusion of the demonstration is about something particular 
(this triangle here and now), and hence it does not hold universally and always, but “at a 
certain time and in a way”. This raises the question of why should we think that this 
conclusion counts as instance of scientific knowledge or epistêmê (though only in a 
qualified sense) in the first place? 
  The central consideration here is that the knowledge of the particular, e.g. 
knowledge that this triangle has 2 R, is derived from the knowledge of the universal, e.g. 
knowledge that every triangle has 2 R. In so far as it is derivable from universal 
knowledge it satisfies, in a way, two central conditions for demonstrative knowledge. 
Aristotle holds, as I have argued before, that we know something in an unqualified sense 
when we know its explanation as being its explanation, and that it is necessary. Now, the 
above syllogism gives us a sort of an explanation – it explains that this figure has 2 R 
because it is triangle and every triangle has 2 R. This explanation depends clearly on 
prior universal knowledge; without universal knowledge we could perhaps have an 
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opinion or a hunch that this triangle has 2 R but we would not know why it has 2 R. More 
fundamentally, this explanation assumes that particulars are not completely unique but 
are capable of falling under universals. This is the reason why we can know them 
scientifically, though only in a qualified sense. We can have explanations about a 
particular triangle qua triangle, but we cannot provide explanations about this triangle as 
such (this triangle qua this triangle). And this, we may presume, is also the reason why 
we cannot have unqualified knowledge of this triangle, viz., we cannot know its 
explanation as being its explanation (see An. Post. A 5). In other words, 2 R belongs to 
this triangle only because it is triangle, not because it is this triangle – the predicate 2 R 
and the subject this triangle do not convert.  
  Another and related consideration is that the knowledge that this triangle has 2 R 
counts as scientific knowledge because it is derived from knowledge of what is universal 
and necessary. I do not believe that Aristotle’s claim that the particular conclusion does 
not hold always or eternally but “at a certain time and in a certain way” implies that this 
conclusion is not necessary at all. If this would be the case, then it would be hard to see 
why Aristotle is willing to accept such conclusions as instances of epistêmê at all (as he 
clearly does not only in the above passage but also in passages I will consider below). 
Rather, since Aristotle clearly thinks that we can move from statements about universals 
to statements about particulars (this point will become clearer as I proceed), we may 
presume he also thinks that we can move from necessary truths about universals to 
necessary truths about particulars. For example, when he explains the notion of “belongs 
to every instance” in Posterior Analytics A 4, he says (with my emphasis): “if animal 
belongs to every human, if it is true to call this (tond’) a human, it is also true to call him 
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an animal, and if the former is true now, so is the latter” (73a29-31).88 This suggests that, 
from the standpoint of the particular, the necessity is qualified or, we could say, 
conditional: if every human is (necessarily) animal, then this human is (necessarily) 
animal too. From the standpoint of the universal, however, the necessity is unconditional: 
humans are necessarily animals.89 I believe that such conditional necessity is the main 
factor that distinguishes qualified knowledge (e.g. this triangle has 2 R), which Aristotle 
says is “as though accidental” (houtôs hôsper kata symbebêkos), from merely accidental 
truths (e.g. this triangle is red), which cannot be derived from necessary truths at all, and 
hence cannot be subjects of demonstrative knowledge.90  
                                                        
88 Cf. Met. Δ 18, where Aristotle is willing to extend the distinction between kath’ hauto and kata 
symbebêkos so that what is predicated in a singular proposition can be said to belong to its subject kath’ 
hauto. At 1022a26-29, we are told that some of the predicates true of Callias express universals that Callias 
exhibits kath’ hauto; and at 1022a34-35, we are told explicitly that the term “human being” is predicated 
kath’ hauto of this or that human being. 
89 A distinction (similar to mine) between two types of necessity is drawn also by McKirahan (1992, 107-
110) and Byrne (1997, 204-207). See also Heinaman (1981b), who shows that Aristotle’s examples of 
“things that can be otherwise” include accidents and never statements like “this human being is animal”. 
For a general discussion of different kinds of necessity in Aristotle, see Sorabji (1980, chap. 13). For a 
discussion of Aristotle’s modal syllogistic, see Lagerlund (2000, chaps. 1-2). 
90 My interpretation differs from a common (if not traditional) understanding of the Posterior Analytics A 
8, according to which this chapter excludes the possibility of having scientific knowledge of particulars on 
the grounds that particulars are perishable and hence do not exist necessarily. I find it very hard to believe 
that Aristotle is claiming that particulars (and perishable phenomena or events in general) cannot be objects 
of scientific knowledge. This claim would exclude virtually all natural science, since physics, as Aristotle 
understood it, is science of the changing. Further, this claim is not compatible with the examples Aristotle 
uses throughout the Posterior Analytics. See A 13 (78a39-b3), B 8 (93b7-14), B 16 (98b6-16), B 17 (99b5-
6). Finally, Aristotle says at the end of A 8 that “demonstrations and knowledge of things that occur 
repeatedly – e.g. of an eclipse of the moon – plainly hold always (aei), insofar as they [demonstrations and 
knowledge] are of something of a certain kind (toiounde), but are particular (kata meros) insofar as they 
[things that come about repeatedly] are not always. As with eclipses, so in the other cases” (75b31-35). 
This suggests that Aristotle does not want to claim that recurring events (like lunar eclipses) cannot, as a 
matter of principle, be objects of knowledge. Rather, Aristotle wants to put restrictions on the way in 
which such phenomena must be considered in order to be knowable. He seems to think that we can 
produce unqualified demonstrations (i.e., demonstrations that hold “always”) to the effect that every 
eclipse is thus and so, and qualified (“particular”) demonstrations to the effect that this eclipse (qua 
eclipse) is thus and so. Both ways of having knowledge of lunar eclipse assume that it falls under certain 
universals, is “of a certain kind”. Thus, what counts in science is not (primarily) the eternal existence of 
particulars (or of perishable events, e.g. the eternal occurrence of an eclipse), but rather the way in which 
particulars are considered. 
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  Although the proposal that Aristotle distinguishes between two types of knowledge 
has not received much scholarly attention, there are few scholars who have taken such a 
distinction seriously. These scholars prefer to use application-terminology. Richard 
McKirahan (1992), in particular, argues that qualified demonstrations (as I call them) are 
demonstrations that apply the conclusions of universal demonstrations to particular cases. 
Accordingly, he calls them “application arguments”.91 However, I believe that the 
application-terminology can be misleading in so far as it might give the impression that 
unqualified knowledge excludes the knowledge of particulars (is something separate 
from them) but once we have it, we can go on to apply it to particulars. In what follows, I 
will argue that both unqualified and qualified knowledge involve particulars, but in 
different ways. This view emerges from Posterior Analytics A 1 (as well as from 
Metaphysics M 10).  
  In Posterior Analytics A 1, Aristotle says the following: 
It is possible to come to know (gnôrizein) by knowing some things beforehand and 
getting knowledge (lambanonta tên gnôsin) of the others at the very same time (hama), 
viz., of whatever falls under a universal which one knows. Thus he already knew 
(proêidei) that every triangle has 2 R, but he comes to know that this [figure] (tode to) in 
the semicircle is a triangle at the same time as he draws the conclusion (hama 
epagomenos) [that it has 2 R] … Before drawing a conclusion or grasping the syllogism 
                                                        
91 McKirahan (1992) distinguishes between what he calls “USA proofs”, i.e., demonstrations that prove 
that an attribute belongs universally to its primary subject, and “application arguments” which apply 
universal conclusions of USA proofs (e.g. every triangle has 2 R) to (sub)species (e.g. isosceles), and to 
particulars (e.g. this triangle). He agues that “these arguments are of little interest from the point of view of 
scientific theory, and little is said about them, but they are the key to applying demonstrative science to the 
world” (1992, 184). See also Lennox (1987b), who distinguishes between A-type explanations and B-type 
explanations, where A type explanations are similar to what McKirahan calls “application arguments” and 
what I call qualified knowledge and demonstration. Cf. Reeve (1992), who distinguishes between 
unconditional and conditional knowledge.  
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(labein syllogimon), he should perhaps be said to know (epistasthai) in one way, but in 
another way not. If he did not know (êidei) without qualification (haplôs) whether there 
exists such-and-such a thing, how could he have known without qualification that it had 
2 R? Yet it is clear that he knows (epistatai) in this sense: he knows it universally 
(katholou epistatai), but he does not know it in an unqualified sense (haplôs de ouk 
epistatai). (71a17-29) 
This passage presents the familiar syllogism about this triangle, which I have used earlier 
as an example of a qualified demonstration. But it is interesting for two further reasons. 
First of all, it tells us something about the “mechanism” of qualified demonstrations. 
More precisely, it suggests that while one premise must be known in advance (i.e., we 
must already possess the knowledge of the universal), the other premise becomes known 
simultaneously with the conclusion. Aristotle elaborates on this point in Prior Analytics 
B 21, where he says that “it never happens that people know the particular in advance, 
but rather they get the knowledge of the particular at the same time as they draw the 
conclusion, as if by recognizing (anagnôrizontas) them; for there are things we know 
straight off (euthys), e.g. that it has 2 R, once we see that it is a triangle” (67a23-26). So, 
knowing already that every triangle has 2 R, you recognize this figure in the semicircle 
as a triangle and immediately infer that it has 2 R.  
  Secondly and more importantly, this passage reveals something about the nature of 
the unqualified universal knowledge. Aristotle argues that when we have universal 
knowledge but have not yet drawn the particular conclusion, we can be said to know the 
particular in one way, but not in another. In the above passage he says that we know the 
particular universally. Elsewhere he says that we know it potentially. In Posterior 
Analytics A 24, Aristotle argues that “if you know that every triangle has 2 R, you know 
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in a sense of isosceles too that it has 2 R – you know it potentially (dynamei) –, even if 
you do not know of the isosceles that it is a triangle” (86a25-27). Similar reasoning 
applies presumably to particulars too, for if you know that every triangle has 2 R, then 
you know in a sense – universally and potentially – that this triangle has 2 R. This 
suggests, interestingly enough, that unqualified knowledge of the universal is potential 
knowledge of particulars. Hence unqualified knowledge does not exclude knowledge of 
particulars nor suggest that particulars cannot be subject to demonstrative knowledge at 
all. Rather, unqualified knowledge implies knowledge of particulars.  
  Although there is a sense in which we can be said to know the particular before we 
draw the particular conclusion, there is also a sense in which we do not know the 
particular, viz., we do not know that such-and-such a particular exists. Aristotle’s point 
seems to be that you may know that every triangle has 2 R and at the same time not know 
that this holds of some particular triangle which you have never come across. As soon as 
you recognize this triangle as a triangle, you come to know “without qualification” 
(71a27) that it has 2 R. It is a matter of initial surprise that Aristotle calls the knowledge 
that this triangle has 2 R – which, according to A 8, is qualified knowledge – unqualified 
knowledge of the particular. Aristotle does not explain why he chose such terminology, 
but it may well be that he wants to contrast it with the potential knowledge of the 
particular and indicate that unqualified knowledge of the particular is the most 
appropriate kind of scientific knowledge we can have of particulars. In Prior Analytics B 
21 (67a11-30), where he draws a similar distinction between universal and particular 
knowledge, he says that “we contemplate (theôroumen) the particulars by universal 
knowledge, without knowing them by the kind of knowledge appropriate (oikeia) to 
them” (67a28-30). Indeed, the potential or universal knowledge of the particular is 
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definitely a less appropriate or worse way of knowing that this triangle has 2 R, since we 
can have such knowledge without even being aware of the existence of this triangle. 
Consequently, we have a neat asymmetry: knowledge in an unqualified sense is only 
potential (and less appropriate) knowledge of the particular, whereas unqualified (and 
most appropriate) knowledge of the particular is only knowledge in a qualified sense.  
  Thus, both unqualified and qualified knowledge involve knowing particulars, but in 
different ways – we can know a particular universally (potentially) or in an unqualified 
sense. This distinction between two ways of knowing a particular is important because I 
will argue in the following section that Aristotle appeals to this distinction also in 
Metaphysics M 10, where he gives his most explicit solution to what I have labeled 
Aristotle’s “problem of katholou”.  
Actual and Potential Knowledge in Metaphysics M 10 
In Metaphysics M 10, Aristotle formulates an aporia (or rather reformulates it, since he 
has introduced this aporia already in B 6) concerning whether principles should be 
regarded as universal or particular. His formulation of the difficulty assumes that the 
principles must be either universal or particular. If they are particular, they will not be 
knowable; if they are universal, there will be no particular substances.  
  Aristotle begins this chapter by saying that if one does not allow there to be 
substances which are separate and particular (kath’ hekaston), one will destroy the notion 
of a substance (1086a14-19). The rest of the chapter proceeds on the assumption that 
there are such substances, and Aristotle is mainly concerned with the epistemological 
problem of how there can be knowledge of particular substances when knowledge must 
be regarded as knowledge of the universal. He claims that the statement that all 
knowledge is universal presents “the greatest aporia”. For if all knowledge is of 
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universals (and knowledge is of what is real) then principles and all things derived from 
them must be universal, which conflicts with the notion of a substance as something 
separate and particular. Aristotle’s solution is to modify this statement – he denies that 
knowledge is of the universal without qualification, and argues that there is a sense in 
which knowledge is of particulars: 
The statement that all knowledge is universal (to de tên epistêmên einai katholou pasan), 
so that the principles of things must also be universal and not separate substances, 
presents the greatest problem (aporia) among these mentioned, but yet the statement is 
true in one way but not in another. For knowledge (epistêmê), like knowing (epistasthai), 
is of two kinds, of which one is potential (dynamei) and the other actual (energeiai). The 
potentiality, like matter, being universal and indefinite (aoristos), is of the universal and 
indefinite, but the actuality is definite (hôrismenê) and of what is definite, being 
particular (tode ti, this something) it is of the particular (toude tinos). Sight sees universal 
color accidentally (kata symbebêkos) because this color (tode ti chrôma), which it sees, is 
a color; and this A (tode to alpha), which the grammarian contemplates (theôrei), is an 
A. For if the principles are necessarily universal, what comes from them must also be 
universal, as in demonstrations; and if this is so, nothing can be separate and a substance. 
But it is clear that there is a sense in which knowledge is universal and a sense in which 
it is not. (1087a10-25) 
Aristotle’s solution turns on the distinction between potential knowledge, which is 
correlated with universals, and actual knowledge, which is correlated with particulars. 
That Aristotle appeals to the distinction between potentiality and actuality is not overly 
surprising, since it is Aristotle’s favorite “device” for solving philosophical problems (he 
appeals to it in discussing the possibility of change, for instance, and of akrasia). 
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However, this brief passage does not make it clear whether or not the correlation between 
potential knowledge and universals excludes the correlation between potential 
knowledge and particulars. In other words, it is not clear what Aristotle means by saying 
that potential knowledge is “universal” and “of the universal”. There are two possible 
interpretations. Aristotle can be interpreted as saying that (i) universal knowledge is 
merely potential knowledge (potential-knowledge-full-stop, so to speak), or that (ii) 
universal knowledge is potential knowledge of particulars.92 
  Interpretation (i) maintains that although Aristotle correlates potential knowledge 
with universals, there is no corresponding correlation between potential knowledge and 
particulars (or between actual knowledge and universals). Potential knowledge has one 
object (viz., the universal), and actual knowledge has another object (viz., the particular). 
As Walter Leszl (1972) has pointed out, this type of interpretation assumes that 
particulars and universals are categorically distinct and isolated objects of knowledge. 
The main objection to this interpretation is that it is not easily compatible with Aristotle’s 
account of knowledge found in the Posterior Analytics and elsewhere. In the Analytics, 
Aristotle says nothing to the effect that universals are objects of potential knowledge, or 
that an unqualified knowledge that arises through universal demonstrations is merely 
potential knowledge.93                                                          
92 Not surprisingly, the question concerning how to interpret Aristotle’s solution has been the issue of 
scholarly dispute. However, it is safe to say that these are the two main types of interpretation developed 
by authors, who have considered this passage in greater detail (and not simply dismissed it as incompatible 
with Aristotle’s epistemological views). Different versions of interpretation (i) are developed, e.g., by 
Allen (1970), Brakas (1988), Witt (1989). Different versions of interpretation (ii) are developed by Leszl 
(1972) and Heinaman (1981b). A third type of interpretation is developed by Cherniss (1962 [1944]) and 
Owens (1951), who find the solution in the notion of form, which, as they argue, is neither universal nor 
particular. I will not consider the third type of interpretation in this chapter. (For a discussion and criticism 
of such an interpretation, see Leszl (1972)). However, I will consider it indirectly in Chapter Five, where I 
discuss Alexander’s account, which is similar to the one Cherniss and Owens attribute to Aristotle.  
93  See, e.g., Allen (1970), who develops a version of interpretation (i) but complains that Aristotle’s 
explanation in M 10 is a surprising one, since “in the Analytics, it has often been said that the object known 
is the universal, without the slightest hint that this is true only of potential knowledge” (1970, 112). Indeed, 
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  Interpretation (ii), on the other hand, maintains that both potential and actual 
knowledge involve knowing particulars but in different ways – potentially and actually. 
This interpretation assumes that Aristotle uses the notion of potential knowledge in the 
same way as in the Posterior Analytics. Consequently, this notion does not exclude the 
possibility of having actual knowledge of the universal, but rather indicates that in 
knowing the universal we know potentially the particular too – we know potentially that, 
e.g. this triangle has 2 R, when we do not know that this triangle exists (and so of course 
we do not know that it has 2 R). Thus, interpretation (ii) is compatible with Aristotle’s 
account of knowledge in the Posterior Analytics. This, I believe, is an important 
consideration in favor of interpretation (ii) over interpretation (i).94 However, there are 
also other considerations that support interpretation (ii). 
  One consideration that should be taken into account concerns Aristotle’s examples. 
Admittedly, Aristotle’s examples are confusing.95 Nonetheless, it is reasonably clear that 
these examples concern actual knowledge, e.g. knowing this A. In so far as Aristotle 
                                                        
this incompatibility seems to be the main reason why several authors have disregarded Aristotle’s 
distinction between potential and actual knowledge. For a list of authors, who have dismissed Aristotle’s 
solution in M 10 as inconsistent with his own epistemological views, see Heinaman (1981b, 63).  
94 Although interpretation (ii) is compatible with Aristotle’s epistemological views, it is not immune to the 
objection that was leveled against interpretation (i). For the question – viz., how can the potential 
knowledge of particulars be something actual? – may be raised also about interpretation (ii), and, 
consequently, about the Posterior Analytics, where Aristotle uses the notion of potential knowledge in the 
same way. I will return to this issue when drawing conclusions from my interpretation.  
95 Aristotle’s examples are confusing not only because he uses sense perception to illustrate a point about 
knowledge but primarily because these examples (“Sight sees universal color accidentally because this 
color, which it sees, is a color; and this A, which the grammarian contemplates, is an A”) might suggest 
that knowledge of particulars (this A) is potential knowledge of universals (an A). This suggestion is 
clearly problematic. For although Aristotle thinks that we acquire knowledge of universals from the 
perception of particulars (this is the main point of the process he calls epagôgê), he nowhere uses the terms 
“actual knowledge” and “potential knowledge” in the way suggested above. In fact, this suggestion 
conflicts blatantly with the way these terms are used in the Analytics, where Aristotle insists that 
knowledge of particulars depends on knowledge of universals (i.e., on the universal premise), but not vice 
versa. In Posterior Analytics A 21 he states that “one who grasps the latter proposition [this triangle has 2 
R] does not know the universal in any sense, neither potentially nor actually” (86a13). See also An. Pr. B 
21 (67a23-24); De. An. B 5 (417a24-9). For a more detailed criticism of such an interpretation, which no 
one (to my knowledge) has developed in any detail, see Heinaman (1981b, 68-69). 
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insists that knowing this A is knowing an A (“this A, which the grammarian 
contemplates, is an A”), we may suppose that he is trying to make the point that actual 
knowledge is not of the particular qua particular (this A qua this A) but qua falling under 
a given universal (this A qua an A). That this is Aristotle’s point is also confirmed by his 
rejection of the view that regards the particular as something absolutely unique. On this 
view (Aristotle associates it with the Platonic theory of Forms), the particular is “one in 
number” is such a way that besides it there is nothing that belongs to the same species. 
Aristotle argues that if particulars are one in number in this way, then there will not be 
many As, only one A (and so for all the letters), and the particulars will not be knowable 
(1086b18-33). Aristotle rejects this view by pointing out that nothing prevents there 
being many particulars of the same sort: “there is nothing to stop there being many As 
and Bs without there being an A in itself and B in itself besides the many” (1087b7-8). 
The point that particulars are knowable qua members of the same species is compatible 
with interpretation (ii), which maintains that neither actual nor potential knowledge is of 
the particular as such, but of the particular of a certain sort. But this point is not so easily 
compatible with interpretation (i), which relies on the contrast between the universal and 
the particular as categorically distinct and isolated objects of knowledge, and which thus 
seems to assume that particulars are absolutely unique. If “this A” and “an A” are taken 
to be distinct objects of knowledge, then it is difficult to see that see how knowing this A 
is knowing an A.96  
                                                        
96 This objection is raised by Leszl (1972). He argues that if universals and particulars are irreducibly 
distinct objects, then “Aristotle could not say, as he does in the present passage, that there is some sense in 
which knowing this A is to know A in general (thus to know all A’s); for this is excluded if knowledge of 
this A is something absolutely unique (something which can regard only it and nothing else), as it would 
follow from its correlation to the individual as such” (1972, 294).  
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  Interpretation (ii) also finds support from Aristotle’s formulation of the problem that 
he attempts to solve by drawing a distinction between potential and actual knowledge. 
This problem is epistemological and arises from the supposition that principles are 
particular. Aristotle claims that if principles are particular, they will not be knowable, 
and offers the following argument: 
For they [particular principles] are not universal, but knowledge is of universals. This is 
clear from demonstrations (apodeixeôn) and definitions, for there is no syllogism 
(syllogismos) that this triangle has 2 R unless every triangle has 2 R, nor is there a 
syllogism that this human being is an animal unless every human being is an animal. 
(1086b33-7)  
Aristotle gives an argument familiar from the Posterior Analytics that knowledge of 
particulars depends on knowledge of universals (we can know that this triangle has 2 R 
only if we know that every triangle has 2 R). Since this argument presupposes that we 
can have knowledge of particulars (e.g. knowledge that this triangle has 2 R), it might 
not be evident how it is supposed to show that particular principles are unknowable. It is 
reasonably clear that this argument constitutes a problem only on the assumption that 
principles of knowledge are either universal or particular. Since “it is clear from 
demonstrations and definitions” that knowledge of particulars requires prior universal 
principles, it cannot be the case that all principles are particular. As a result, the 
argument cancels out the supposition that all principles are particular.  
  Thus, Aristotle’s formulation of the difficulty presupposes that we can know 
scientifically that this triangle has 2 R. The issue is about what kind of principles are 
needed to account for this knowledge. This, I believe, is the issue Aristotle addresses by 
drawing a distinction between potential and actual knowledge. 
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  In order to account for the knowledge of particulars, Aristotle rejects the assumption 
that all principles must be either particular or universal. He develops, characteristically, a 
middle position between these alternatives. On the one hand, Aristotle is clearly 
committed to the position that if there is to be knowledge of particulars, it will depend on 
knowledge of universals. So, if there are only particular principles, there will not be any 
knowledge at all. On the other hand, although there is no demonstration without a 
universal premise, if there are only universal principles or premises (so that all 
knowledge is of the universal), there will be no inference to the particular conclusion. 
Aristotle’s solution, his middle position, seems to be that knowledge of particulars 
requires both universal and particular premises.97 He holds that in knowing the universal, 
we are in a position to know the particular, i.e., we know potentially the particular falling 
under given universal. However, in order to have actual knowledge of particulars, we 
also need a particular premise that “actualizes” our potential knowledge.98  
  So, Aristotle’s solution consists in rejecting the position that all knowledge must be 
universal, so that only universals are real (for knowledge is of what is real). He argues 
that knowledge of the universal is potential knowledge of the particular. When the 
potential knowledge is “actualized”, we will have actual knowledge of the particular (e.g. 
knowledge of this triangle or this human being here and now). And this kind of 
knowledge counts as scientific knowledge as well. Consequently, he rejects the crude                                                         
97 This interpretation differs from interpretation (i), which seems to maintain that Aristotle’s solution 
consists in admitting that principles are particulars. At least Witt says that “since Aristotle’s resolution of 
the aporia involves the claim that particular principles can be known, the obvious conclusion seems to be 
that the principles of substances are particular or individual and not universal” (1989, 163). However, Witt 
ignores Aristotle’s formulation of the difficulty which shows that Aristotle is committed to the position that 
if there is to be knowledge of the particular, it must be derived from a universal principle (even though a 
universal premise is not, by itself, sufficient for drawing a particular conclusion).  
98 As Aristotle explains in Posterior Analytics A 1, a particular premise consists in the recognition of 
something as an instance of a universal, of which we already possess knowledge.  
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dichotomy between universal and particular principles; knowledge of the particular 
requires both universal and particular principles or premises. This interpretation is 
compatible with my earlier interpretation of Posterior Analytics, according to which 
Aristotle distinguishes between two types of knowledge, both of which involve knowing 
particulars but in different ways, viz., potentially and actually. Further, this interpretation 
confirms that Aristotle’s claim that knowledge is of the universal does not imply that 
there is no knowledge of particulars, or that knowledge is of something that is irreducibly 
distinct from the particulars. Hence, on this interpretation, the claim that knowledge is of 
the universal does not commit Aristotle to any sharp discrepancy between the universal 
and particular. 
  Nonetheless, although Aristotle’s distinction between actual and potential 
knowledge minimizes the conflict between the real and the knowable, it does not seem to 
solve the conflict. The above interpretation explains how someone, who already 
possesses knowledge of the universal, comes to acquire actual knowledge of the 
particular. Given that the actual knowledge of the particular depends on the knowledge 
of the universals, universals seem to remain epistemologically prior to particulars. 
Surely, universals cannot be prior in any strong sense (for universal knowledge is, after 
all, knowledge of particulars) but we might nevertheless be skeptical about whether what 
is most real could also be also most knowable. 
  In the following section, I will argue that there is a sense in which universals are 
epistemologically dependent on particulars as well. They depend on particulars for their 
acquisition – knowledge of the universals is acquired from the perception of particulars. 
Hence the very possibility of universal knowledge requires or originates with particulars. 
I will focus on the last chapter of the Posterior Analytics, were Aristotle considers the 
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question of how we come to acquire the knowledge of the universal, presumably, for the 
first time. 
Induction and Knowledge of Universals in Posterior Analytics B 19 
Aristotle holds that demonstrative knowledge requires there to be first principles 
(archai), which must be known in some way other than demonstration. For if all the 
principles are demonstrable, then our demonstrations are either circular or continue ad 
infinitum, which makes knowledge impossible (see An. Post. A 3). This immediately 
prompts the question of how we are supposed to know these principles. This question is 
of fundamental importance, since Aristotle thinks that all knowledge is either derived 
from principles or is knowledge of principles.99 So it is impossible to have any 
knowledge whatsoever in the absence of knowledge of principles. Aristotle takes up this 
question in the famous last chapter of the Posterior Analytics, where he promises to tell 
us, “concerning the principles, how they become known (gnôrimos) and what is the state 
(hexis) is that knows them (gnôrizousa hexis)” (99b17-18). Aristotle’s answers these to 
questions are, in rough terms, that we come to know the principles for the first time by 
epagôgê (“induction”), and that the state we are in when we know them is nous 
(“comprehension”).  
  It is safe to assume that what we acquire by induction is knowledge of universals. In 
light of Aristotle’s previous discussions one might expect him to account for the 
knowledge of propositions, especially definitions. However, his discussion in B 19 seems 
to concern only the acquisition of universal concepts (e.g. “human being”, “animal”, 
                                                        
99 See An. Post. A 3, where Aristotle denies that all epistêmê is demonstrative, i.e., derived from 
explanatory principles. He says that in addition there is a type of epistêmê which is non-demonstrative and 
of the principles themselves. In An. Post. B 19 he identifies this type of epistêmê with nous. 
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100b1-3). This has led scholars to complain that Aristotle’s account in B 19 is 
incomplete, or plainly inadequate – it does not explain how we get from concepts to 
definitions.100 However, this complaint seems to rely on the assumption that in B 19 
Aristotle intends to give a complete account of the acquisition of principles. I am not 
convinced that this is Aristotle’s intention.101 I believe that his aim in this chapter is to 
show that knowledge of universals is possible in the first place. In order to show that the 
principles can be known, it certainly helps to show that we can acquire knowledge of 
concepts; for concepts can be viewed as the starting points for definitions. I will not 
attempt to develop a complete account of the acquisition of principles, which goes, in 
one way or another, beyond Posterior Analytics B 19. My main concern here is to show 
that particulars play a role in the acquisition of universal principles, and to this aim it 
suffices to show that they play a role in the acquisition of universal concepts.102 That 
Aristotle’s main concern is to account for the possibility of knowing the principles 
becomes clearer, when we look at the way in which he motivates his discussion of the 
question “How do the first principles become known?” 
                                                        
100 See Barnes (2002 [1975]), but also Kahn (1978), who speaks about the “gap between vulgar and 
scientific conceptualization”. 
101 I sympathize with Bronstein’s (unpublished) view that Aristotle’s answer in B 19 to the question of how 
the first principles are acquired is only partial – B 8 and 13 fill in Aristotle’s account. According to 
Bronstein, we acquire knowledge of concepts by induction. We use these to acquire knowledge of 
definitional principles via demonstration and division, outlined in An. Post B 8 and 13, respectively. 
102  Relatedly, I will not delve into the controversial issue concerning the role of nous in B 19, i.e., I will 
not try to explain how (or when) we get to the state in which we know the principles. It is clear that in B 19 
Aristotle regards nous as a state (hexis) in which we know the principles. It is not clear, however, whether 
he would agree with the traditional interpretation of his position, according to which nous is not only the 
state in which we know, but also the means by which we discover the principles. In recent decades, several 
scholars have pointed out that the traditional view confuses two questions that Aristotle distinguishes near 
the beginning of B 19: (i) how do the principles become known? (ii) what is the state we are in when we 
know them? The rest of B 19 makes it clear that nous is Aristotle’s answer the second question; he does 
not mention it in his answer to the first question. Different versions of the traditional interpretation are 
developed, e.g., by Kahn (1978), Irwin (2002 [1988]) and, most recently and in great detail, by Groarke 
(2009), who, however, makes almost no mention of B 19. For a criticism of the traditional interpretation, 
see, e.g., Barnes (2002), Lesher (1973), Bronstein (unpublished), Harari (2004). 
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  Aristotle begins his discussion by outlining a puzzle. One the one hand, it cannot be 
the case that we have a sort of innate knowledge of principles. It would be absurd, 
Aristotle argues, to suppose that “we possess pieces of knowledge more exact 
(akribesteras) than demonstration without its being noticed” (99b26-27).103 On the other 
hand, if knowledge of principles is indeed the first knowledge of all, then it would seem 
that if we lack it we can never acquire it, for we always acquire knowledge, says 
Aristotle, on the basis of prior knowledge (99b28-30, esp. 71a1-2). This puzzle is, thus, a 
dilemma: either we acquire knowledge of principles without any prior knowledge, which 
contradicts the guiding assumption of the Posterior Analytics (see A 1); or we have a 
full-fledged prior knowledge present in us that escapes our notice, which is absurd. This 
dilemma thus raises the question of how knowledge of principles is possible at all. In 
order to show that knowledge of principles is possible, Aristotle needs to explain how it 
gets started: What is the origin of our knowledge? 
  Aristotle’s explanation reveals, again characteristically, a middle position between 
these two alternatives. He tries to show that although we do not already know innately 
exactly what we come to know, our knowledge does not begin from scratch. He claims 
that we possess a capacity (dynamis) for acquiring knowledge, but not one that is greater 
in respect of accuracy than the states that constitute knowledge of principles. This 
“innate capacity for discriminating” (dynamin symphyton kritikên, 99b35) is identified as 
sense perception (aisthêsis). Thus, Aristotle thinks that knowledge of principles is, in a 
way, innate, but the innateness involved is the innateness of the capacity (shared by all 
animals) rather than the innateness of some items of knowledge (in human soul). 
Aristotle’s account of the path from perception to universals is brief and sketchy; it falls                                                         
103 The reference is obviously to Plato and his theory of reminiscence (anamnesis), and the question about 
the origin of knowledge of the principles in general is reminiscent of Meno’s paradox. 
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into two parts (100a3-14 and 100a15-b5).104 The first part (which in many respects 
parallels Metaphysics A 1) identifies a number of stages in rapid fashion: “from 
perception there comes memory, as we say, and from memory (when it occurs in 
connection with the same thing) experience; for memories which are many in number 
form a single experience” (100a3-5). Aristotle describes experience (empeiria) as a state 
in which we possess a “whole universal (pantos katholou), which has come to rest in the 
soul” (100a6). I will consider the question of what he might mean by the “whole 
universal” later on, but for now it suffices to say that universals are acquired in 
experience, through repeated perceptions and memories.  
  Although Aristotle does not explain in what way experience involves universals, and 
says little about how we get from one stage to the next, this empiricist picture presents, 
despite its vagueness, an explanation for why particulars are epistemologically 
fundamental. It shows that Aristotle holds that knowledge of the principles begins with 
sense perception, and sense perception is, as he often says, of the particular.105 Indeed, 
Aristotle emphasizes also in Posterior Analytics A 18 (81b2-6) that it is impossible to 
study (theôrein, think of) universals except by induction, and it is impossible to carry out 
an induction without having perceptions of particulars (ta kath’ hekasta). 
  In the second part of B 19, Aristotle makes another attempt to explain the origin of 
our knowledge of universals:  
Let us say again what we have just said but not said clearly. When one of the 
undifferentiated items (tôn adiaphrôn enos) makes a stand (stantos), there is a primitive 
universal (prôton katholou) in the soul (for although you perceive particulars, perception 
                                                        
104  For a useful discussion of Aristotle’s account of the early stages of the acquisition of knowledge (and 
especially of sense perception), see De Haas (2005). 
105 See, e.g., De An. B 5 (417b22); An. Post. A 31 (87b28-31). 
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is of universals – e.g. of human being, not of Callias the human being). Next, a stand is 
made among these items, until something partless and universal makes a stand. E.g. 
such-and-such an animal makes a stand, until animal does; and with animal a stand is 
made in the same way. Thus it is plain that we must get to know the primitives by 
induction (epagôgê); for this is the way in which perception instills universals. (100a15-
b5, Barnes’ translation, slightly modified)  
This passage confirms that Aristotle is concerned with tracing the origin of our 
knowledge of principles back to sense perception. But other than that, Aristotle’s 
clarification is rather unclear. Firstly, it is not clear what Aristotle means by saying that a 
“primitive universal” is in the soul when one of the “undifferentiated items” makes a 
stand. Secondly, it is not clear what kind of a contrast he is trying to make in saying that 
although we “perceive particulars, perception is of the universals – e.g. of human being 
and not of Callias the human being”. The last part of this statement is especially 
confusing since it seems to blur Aristotle’s standard distinction between perception 
(which is of the particular) and knowledge (which is of the universal). 
  According to what Jonathan Barnes (2002, 266) calls the “orthodox” interpretation, 
both “undifferentiated item” and “primitive universal” refer to the least general universal, 
the infimae species (e.g. human being), which is “undifferentiated” in the sense of not 
being further divisible. However, this interpretation is not easily compatible with 
Aristotle’s contention that the primitive universal is given in a sense perception. For it is 
hard to see how sense perception could give us infimae species (or, more generally, 
universals in the strict sense, whether concepts or definitions). And the tentative 
suggestion that perception does give us infimae species leaves it very hard to see how 
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sense perception differs from knowledge. Further, if perception does as much, what need 
is there for memory and experience? 
  I believe that Aristotle’s point is better captured in light of my earlier suggestion that 
he is trying to work out a middle position between the following alternatives: either we 
acquire knowledge of principles without any prior knowledge, or we have a full-fledged 
prior knowledge present in us that escapes our notice. He holds that our knowledge of 
universals does not begin from scratch but with sense perception, which is, in a way, of 
the universal. On the other hand, he maintains that sense perception cannot give us 
anything more accurate and explicit than the knowledge we acquire after going through 
the whole process of induction (100a10-11). This suggests that sense perception cannot 
give us universals in the strict or complete sense (universals that are ready to be used in 
demonstrations, so to speak). But if sense perception is of some sort of universal but not 
of the universal in the strict sense, then it seems to follow that perception gives us 
universals that are somehow confused or “jumbled up”. This is precisely how Aristotle 
describes the starting points of scientific inquiry in Physics A 1.  
  As Robert Bolton (1991) has pointed out, there are many similarities between 
Posterior Analytics B 19 and Physics A 1. Both works aim to explain how we come to 
know the first principles of knowledge. Further, both identify what is most knowable to 
us (the starting points for knowledge) with what is most knowable in relation to sense 
perception.106 Finally, in both works Aristotle claims that sense perception is of 
something universal and uses similarly unusual language to describe these starting 
points. According to Physics A 1, learning begins with a grasp of a universal that is a 
“sort of whole (holon) comprehending many things within it like parts” (184a25-26).                                                         
106 See An. Post I 2 (72a1-5), Phys. A 1 (184a24). 
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This kind of universal is described as “jumbled up” (sygkechymena, 184a22) and 
“undifferentiated” (adiorista, 184b2). Aristotle gives the example of a child who begins 
by calling all men fathers and all women mothers (184b12-14). His point, I take it, is not 
that the child mistakenly believes all men to be her fathers, but that she mistakenly uses 
the term “father” for the more general term “man”. As she develops, she learns to make 
proper distinctions, and acquires mastery over the relevant concepts. 
  When we read Posterior Analytics B 19 in light of Physics A 1, then the 
interpretation suggesting itself is that “whole universal”, “primary universal” and 
“undifferentiated item” do not refer to universals in the strict or complete sense (infimae 
species) but instead to a vague sensible whole more knowable to us, from which come 
universals in the strict sense. Accordingly, the child begins with a confused grasp of 
human being. The universal at this state is confused or “jumbled up” with, or 
“undifferentiated” from, other sorts of animals, and hence it might happen that the child 
calls other types of animals mistakenly “humans”. As she develops, she eventually learns 
to distinguish humans from other animals – at this point she is able to recognize 
particular humans as humans.107  
  On this interpretation, we do not only move from what is specific to what is more 
and more general but also from what is given in a sense perception in a confused and 
                                                        
107 Although I will not attempt to solve here the controversial question of what Aristotle means by epagôgê 
(and whether or not he has an unified account of induction), I would like to propose that this kind of 
recognition (i.e., recognition of a particular as an instance of a universal) seems to be the main idea behind 
his notion of epagôgê. It is noteworthy that he appeals to this idea already in Posterior Analytics A 1, 
where he argues that the conclusion that this [figure] in the semicircle has 2 R hama epagomenos 
egnôrisen (“became familiar along with the induction”). It seems that epagomenos refers to the recognition 
of this [figure] as a triangle, which leads immediately to drawing the conclusion. Similar suggestion 
concerning A 1 is made also by Harari (2004) and McKirahan (2002). Further, this suggestion is 
compatible with Engberg-Petersen’s (1979) view that the root idea of Aristotle’s epagoge is “something 
like ‘attending to particular cases with the consequence that insight into some universal point is acquired’ 
or ‘acquiring insight into some universal point as a consequence of attending to particular cases’” (p. 305). 
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undifferentiated manner to what is more explicit and clear.108 The advantage of this 
interpretation is that it helps to make sense of Aristotle’s claim that “although you 
perceive particulars, sense perception is of the universal”. It suggests that sense 
perception gives us universals in a confused or implicit manner (as Aristotle says in the 
De Anima – kata symbebêkos, incidentally or indirectly, 418a21-24).109 Indeed, if the 
universal were not somehow already embedded in the particular, we could not make a 
transition from bare sensory discrimination to the recognition (and, further, knowledge) 
of the particular. Aristotle makes similar point in Posterior Analytics A 31, where he 
claims that “perception is of a certain sort of thing (toioude), not of the particular” 
(87b29). But he goes on immediately to add that, nevertheless, what we perceive must be 
“a this something (tode ti) at a place and at a time, and it is impossible to perceive what 
is universal and belongs to every instance (epi pasin)” (87b30-31). So, although 
perception is “of a certain sort of thing” and so (in a way) of the universal, we cannot 
perceive universals in the strict or “differentiated” sense (as something belonging 
essentially to every instance of its subject, say), and in this aspect sense perception 
differs from knowledge of the universal.110  
                                                        
108 This interpretation differs from Bolton’s (1991) interpretation in that Bolton seems to maintain 
(differently from what Aristotle says in Posterior Analytics B 19) that the movement is from what is more 
general to what is more specific. He claims, for instance, that we move from “ the grasp of man, i.e., of a 
certain animal, to the point where we can clearly distinguish the kind, animal, and within it man and other 
distinct species” (1991, 9). I believe that the movement is from specific to general. That is, we begin with a 
confused grasp of a human being, which we do not differentiate from other animals, but this does not mean 
that we begin with the grasp of an animal. Thus, we move from “human being” to “such and such an 
animal” to “animal”, etc.  
109 So, the direct objects of perceptions are not universals but sense qualities or sensible forms (see De 
Anima B 6).  
110 Since perception does not give us universals in the strict sense, we need not be worried about the role of 
memory and experience. We may suppose that the refinement of the confused grasp of universals occurs 
through repeated perceptions and memories, which, then, constitute an experience. In Metaphysics A 1 
(981b10-13), Aristotle claims that people with experience cannot properly explain what they known: they 
know the fact (hoti) but not the reason why (dioti). Those who have knowledge, on the other hand, know 
not only the fact but also the reason why.  
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  This interpretation suggests that corresponding to the ontological interdependence 
between particulars and universals, there is also an epistemological interdependence – 
particulars cannot be scientifically known without universals, and universals cannot be 
scientifically known without particulars, since our scientific knowledge of universals 
begins with the perception of particulars. In other words and more generally, we grasp 
particulars only by grasping the universal under which they fall, and we grasp the 
relevant universals, in turn, only by epistemic contact with the particulars that exemplify 
them. To conclude this chapter, I will discuss the consequences of my interpretation in 
greater detail, and consider how this interpretation helps to resolve Aristotle’s problem of 
katholou. 
Conclusion 
Aristotle’s problem of katholou is generated by two of his philosophical commitments: 
(i) particulars are most real and (ii) universals are most knowable, since knowledge is of 
the universal. According to the received view, these commitments lead to a discrepancy 
between the real and the knowable or, alternatively, between Aristotle’s ontology and 
epistemology.111  
 According to my interpretation, Aristotle is able to reconcile the requirements of his 
ontology with the requirements of his epistemology. I have suggested that the statement 
that knowledge is of the universal becomes the source of the discrepancy if it is taken to 
imply that (i) there is no knowledge of particulars, and/or (ii) universals as objects of 
knowledge are irreducibly distinct from particulars (so that knowing the universal does 
not entail knowing the particular). If Aristotle were committed to these implications, then                                                         
111 For a more detailed characterization of the received view, see Chapter One. 
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the discrepancy between the real (particular) and the knowable (universal) would indeed 
be sharp and unavoidable. However, I have proposed that Aristotle’s account of 
knowledge implies neither (i) nor (ii). In what follows, I will examine this proposal in 
greater detail.  
 As to the implication (i), I have argued that Aristotle’s account of scientific 
knowledge and its requirements does not exclude the possibility of knowing particulars. 
Rather, Aristotle wants to put restrictions on the way in which the particular must be 
considered in order to be knowable. Science cannot regard the particular in all its non-
repeatable particularity and uniqueness. But any given science can regard the particular 
under a definite aspect which it shares with other particulars and in this way can acquire 
knowledge of it.112 Thus, what counts in science is that the particular is of a certain sort, 
i.e., falls under certain universals. As far as I know, no one has denied that Aristotle is 
committed to a position that particulars are knowable qua falling under universals. 
Nevertheless, many commentators maintain that his position involves or leads to a 
serious logico-epistemological problem. The source of the problem appears to be 
Aristotle’s denial that knowledge is of the particular qua particular. But why is this 
denial problematic? It involves a serious problem only if it is assumed that particulars are 
completely or absolutely unique – if being unique is all that the particular is. If we make 
this assumption, then it would follow that Aristotle’s position “leaves us without 
knowledge of the individuals which make up the world in which we live” (Brakas 1988, 
108).  
                                                        
112 See McKirahan (1992, esp. chap. 8), who argues that sciences treat a particular qua being of a certain 
sort, where “being of a certain sort” means belonging to the science’s subject genus, e.g. a bronze triangle 
is comprehensible partly by geometry (qua triangle), partly by natural science (qua bronze). A given 
science, then, treats a particular partially, under one aspect, and ignores the manifold other aspects under 
which it can be considered. 
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 However, it is clear that Aristotle does not think that particulars are utterly unique. 
As I have argued in chapter two, he rejects the bare particular view according to which 
particulars are things that can exist independently of universals essentially predicated of 
them. Rather, he believes that each particular necessarily belongs to a species and genus 
and treats a particular’s belonging to a species as a primitive or unanalyzable fact. 
Further, in Metaphysics M 10 he rejects the view according to which each particular is 
completely unique in the sense of being the sole member of the species. (On this view, 
particulars would be similar to Thomas Aquinas’ angels, each of which forms its own 
species, so that there are as many different species as there are angels.) Aristotle rules out 
the utter uniqueness of particulars by pointing to the fact that nothing prevents there 
being many particulars of the same species.  
 On Aristotle’s view, then, particulars are instances of universals, “this somethings”. 
This view is compatible with his epistemological position according to which particulars 
are knowable qua instances of universals. We could say that his epistemological position 
that particulars are knowable sub specie universalitatis relies on (or is prepared by) his 
ontological position that particulars are not utterly unique, but are capable of falling 
under species and genera. Consequently, there is no sharp discrepancy between his 
ontology and epistemology.113 
 As to the implication (ii), all interpreters agree that Aristotle cannot be committed to 
the position that knowledge is of separated universals, i.e., universals that resemble 
Platonic Forms in being capable of existing independently of particulars. Since Aristotle 
rejects the existence of separated universals, it seems uncontroversial that the objects of                                                         
113 One might still argue that since we cannot know the particular when it is considered in its uniqueness, in 
what does not make it a member of a species, Aristotle cannot escape the discrepancy altogether. But even 
so, the discrepancy between the real and the knowable would be limited to the fact that certain aspect of 
reality is unknowable, rather than consisting of the fact that what is real is not knowable at all.  
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knowledge must differ in some important ways from Platonic Forms. However, I think 
Walter Leszl is right to point out that Aristotle’s interpreters are conditioned by certain 
Platonic presuppositions (1972, 282). The position that knowledge is of the universal 
does not appear to be particularly problematic if it is taken to mean that knowledge 
concerns (or applies to) all members of a species. But it becomes a problem if Aristotle 
accepted a Platonic separation of universals; for in this case it would appear that 
universal knowledge concerns something other than each instance of a given universal. 
Since Aristotle’s interpreters tend to think that there is a reason why the problem arises 
or is particularly worrisome in the context of Aristotle’s philosophy, they seem to adopt 
(and to attribute to Aristotle) an ontological dualism between universals and particulars. 
Earlier I suggested that one source of the problem appears to be Aristotle’s denial that 
knowledge is of particulars qua particulars and that this denial appears to be problematic 
on the assumption that particulars are completely unique. Now, this assumption opens a 
back door to the Platonic dualism; for if particulars are utterly unique then they must 
differ in some strong sense from universals. 
 I have argued that knowledge of the universal is, according to Aristotle, potential 
knowledge of particulars. This raises the question (this question has probably been on the 
reader’s mind ever since I introduced this view) whether universal knowledge is nothing 
other than potential knowledge of particulars. Does Aristotle reduce knowledge of 
universals to knowledge of particulars, so that the talk of universals becomes talk of 
particulars?114 The rest of this section will focus on this question.  
                                                        
114 To ask this question is equivalent to asking whether or not Aristotle is (an extreme) nominalist. 
However, since my primary aim is not to solve the traditional problem about the ontological status of 
universals, it will avoid the traditional labels “realism” and “nominalism”. 
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 The idea that Aristotle reduces knowledge of universals to knowledge of particulars 
underlies the interpretation that takes Aristotle to be committed (at least in Metaphysics 
M 10) to the position that knowledge of the universal is merely potential knowledge. This 
radical interpretation suggests that universals can be reduced entirely away.115 According 
to another possible interpretation, knowledge of the universal, while being something 
actual, is nonetheless less actual than knowledge of the particular. This type of 
interpretation is subtler and less radical, since it maintains that universal knowledge is 
potential knowledge of particulars, but insists that such knowledge is fully actual only 
when it is applied to particular cases. One could in this context invoke Aristotle’s 
distinction between two sense of actuality – a distinction “analogous to possession of 
knowledge and exercise of it” (De An. B 1, 412 a23; see B 5). Accordingly, knowledge 
of the universal would correspond to knowledge possessed but not exercised or 
contemplated (i.e., an actuality which is also a dynamis), and knowledge of the particular 
would correspond to the exercise or contemplation of knowledge possessed. 
Contemplating thus represents a higher level actuality (traditionally called “second 
actuality”) than knowledge whose exercise the contemplating it. Consequently, one could 
argue that Aristotle reduces knowledge of universals to knowledge of particulars in 
requiring that universal knowledge needs to be applied to particulars in order to be fully 
actual.116 
                                                        
115 See, e.g., Brakas (1988), who argues that Aristotle’s position in Metaphysics M 10 implies that 
“universal is something which is actually nothing” (p. 108). Since I have discussed (and criticized) the 
interpretation which takes particulars to be utterly unique and maintains that knowledge of the universal is 
merely potential knowledge in greater detail earlier, I will not pay more attention to it here.   
116 This kind of understanding of Aristotle seems to underlie Leszl’s (1972) interpretation of Metaphysics 
M 10 and Ferejohn’s (1991) interpretation of the Posterior Analytics. Even though these authors do not 
invoke the De Anima distinction between different senses of actuality, they both think that in order to be 
fully actual potential knowledge must be applied to particular cases. 
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 However, there are passages indicating that Aristotle does not think that the 
contemplation or exercise of universal knowledge must involve an application to 
particular cases. For example, Aristotle argues in Prior Analytics A 21 (67a33-7) that we 
may known the universal premise and the particular premise, but nevertheless fail to 
draw the particular conclusion, since we do not contemplate (theôrein) these premises 
together.117 This suggests that both universals and particulars can be actively 
contemplated, and that we can contemplate them separately. From this it seems to follow 
that the universal can be contemplated without applying it to a particular case.  
 Furthermore, I do not think we need to worry that the universal knowledge, if not 
applied to particular cases, would be empty or vacuous.118 In order to show that universal 
knowledge has meaningful content, we do not need to maintain that it cannot be 
exercised without applying it to particular cases. It is sufficient to take into account 
Aristotle’s position that we acquire knowledge of universals by induction. Since 
universal knowledge is acquired from perceptions of particulars, it cannot be void and 
empty. The content of the universal knowledge is determined by the instances that 
formed the basis of the induction that generated it; they alone provided data for all 
further knowledge. This suggests, as I have argued earlier, that particulars and universals 
are not only ontologically but also epistemologically interdependent – we cannot acquire 
                                                        
117 See also NE 1146b35-1147a3; An. Post. 78a5-6. In general, I believe that in drawing a distinction 
between potential and actual knowledge in Metaphysics M 10 (and in the Posterior Analytics), Aristotle 
does not have in mind the De Anima distinction between different senses of actuality. Rather, he has in 
mind the distinction between knowing the universal (without knowing a definite particular instance of it) 
and knowing a particular instance of a universal of which we already possess knowledge. See also 
Heinaman (1981b), who criticizes the kind of interpretation, according to which universal knowledge must 
be applied to particular cases. 
118 This worry seems to be the main motivation behind Leszl’s (1972) interpretation. He says that the 
universal knowledge “would become void if not applied to particular cases since it formulates a sort of 
general rule which only awaits to be applied to particular cases” (p. 301).  
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knowledge of particulars without universals, and we cannot acquire knowledge of 
universals without particulars. 
 In light of the above considerations, I do not think that Aristotle reduces knowledge 
of universals to knowledge of particulars in the aforementioned ways, either holding that 
knowledge of the universal is merely potential knowledge, or that universal knowledge 
must be applied to particular cases in order to be fully actual. This does not mean, 
however, that Aristotle does not reduce universal knowledge to particulars at all. His 
position that universal knowledge is potential knowledge of particulars implies that 
knowledge of the universal is nothing other than knowledge of particulars. But it is 
important to notice that he reduces knowledge of the universal to particulars of a certain 
sort, to particulars qua instances of universals. This suggests that universals cannot be 
reduced away entirely – after all, particulars exist (and are knowable) as instances of 
universals. On the other hand, universals cannot enjoy any irreducible ontological status, 
since they cannot exist (or become known) without particulars instantiating them.   
 All this reveals an important difference between Aristotle’s and Plato’s approaches. 
Aristotle does not begin with what he takes to be the main motivation behind the Platonic 
theory of Forms, viz., the Heracleitean view that “all sensibles (aisthêta) are always in 
flux and there is no knowledge of them” (Met. 987a31; 1087b13), which, then, leads the 
Plato to separate universals as objects of knowledge from particulars. Rather, he begins 
with the recognition that every particular belongs necessarily to a species and genus, and 
this is why we can have knowledge of particulars.119 Aristotle does not explain why 
particulars must fall under universals, or what unifies the many particulars in the species 
human being, for example. I do not believe Aristotle had any answer in the Organon                                                         
119 I agree with Cresswell (1975), who says that “the necessity of a thing’s being what it is can be seen as 
what makes it unnecessary to postulate any further things to explain what the original thing is” (p. 240).  
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other than the obvious one that they are all humans. Things get more complicated in the 
Metaphysics, where particulars have internal structure: they are composites of matter and 
form. Consequently, particular’s belonging to a species is not any more an unanalyzable 
fact, but can be explained in terms of its possessing a form. Aristotle’s account of 
substance and form in the central books of Metaphysics will be the focus of the following 
two chapters. 
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4 
Metaphysics Z and Forms 
Aristotle’s treatment of other causes is clear, but what he says about form has a certain obscurity. 
Alexander of Aphrodisias120 
In the central books of the Metaphysics (Z-Θ), Aristotle regards form (eidos) as a 
primary substance. This immediately raises the problem of explaining how forms can be 
most real yet objects of knowledge. More precisely, it invokes the controversial issue of 
whether Aristotle’s forms are particular or universal. If they are universal, then it is hard 
to see how they can be substances; but if they are particular, then it is not clear how they 
can be knowable. The controversy surrounding the status of forms is the single largest 
and most intricate interpretative question about Aristotle’s Metaphysics. I will not 
attempt to give a comprehensive answer to this question which I am sure would be the 
size of the Metaphysics itself. I will focus on presenting a broad picture emerging from 
Metaphysics Z without delving into the labyrinth of controversial interpretive subtleties. 
 In the first part of the chapter, I will present and analyze the most important textual 
evidence for the view that forms are universal (i.e., somehow sharable by many 
particulars) and for the view that forms are particular (i.e., unique and peculiar to the 
particular things of which they are the forms). In the second part of the chapter, I will 
sketch four possible solutions to the puzzle concerning the status of form, and analyze in 
greater detail the view that particular forms are instances of universals. I take this view – 
                                                        
120 Commentary of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book A (19, 14-15). 
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which is suggested by and compatible with my interpretation in previous chapters – to be 
the best solution to the problems concerning the status of forms. 
The Status of Forms in Metaphysics Z 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z is centered on the question “What is substance (ousia)?” As 
we have seen, in the Categories Aristotle answers this question by distinguishing 
between primary substances (basic subjects for all predication) and secondary substances 
(species and genera that are essentially predicated of them). He gives as examples of 
primary substances such things as this human being and this horse (2a13-14), but either 
ignores or fails to recognize the possibility of analyzing such things as compounds of 
form and matter. It is well known that matter is not mentioned at all in the Organon.121 
Aristotle uses the word eidos but not in contrast to the matter (usually translated as 
“form”), but rather in contrast to the genus (usually translated as “species”) and 
occasionally122 to designate the Platonic Form. 
 In the Metaphysics, particular substances like humans and horses are analyzed in 
terms of matter and form. Aristotle starts to use the locution “substance of each thing” 
(ousia hekastou), which is absent from the Categories, and which seems to announce a 
shift to a new level of analysis. It suggests that he is now interested in the substance of 
                                                        
121 Matter makes its first appearance in the Physics, where Aristotle defines it as “the primary subject 
(hypokeimenon) of each thing, from which it comes to be, and which persists in the result” (A 8, 192a31). 
According to a widely known hypothesis, Aristotle introduces the concept of matter because of his worries 
about change; more precisely, because of his desire to explain substantial change. This hypothesis is 
developed in detail by Graham (1987, chap. 5) and criticized by Burnyeat (2001, chap. 5). 
122 See, e.g., An. Post. A 11, 77a5; 22, 83a33; Top. Z 8, 147a6-9. The answer to the question of whether 
eidos of the Organon differs from the eidos of the Metaphysics depends to a large extent on the position 
one takes on the nature of eidos in the Metaphysics. Those who think that eidos is universal are usually 
willing to see a close connection between them. See, e.g., Woods (1993). Those who think eidos is 
particular distinguish between two senses of eidos, form and species. See, e.g., Frede and Patzig (1998). 
For a lucid discussion of different meanings and etymology of eidos, see Novak (2005). 
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the substances that the Categories has indicated as primary.123 Aristotle’s use of ousia is 
thus ambiguous: he talks (i) of a particular substance, such as Socrates, as a substance, 
and also (ii) of the substance of the substance. Aristotle moves quite freely between these 
two senses in the central books of Metaphysics (which undoubtedly complicates the 
understanding of his views), but his primary concern in book Z appears to be with the 
substance of a thing. This is suggested by the way he introduces four candidates for the 
title of substance in Z 3. These candidates – essence (to ti ên einai), universal, genus and 
subject (which may, in turn, indicate matter, form, and the composite of both) – are 
introduced on the strength of the fact that they are thought to be the substance of each 
thing, ousia hekastou. Thus, it is reasonable to suppose that the question “What is 
substance?” is the question about the substance of composite substances.124 
 Aristotle’s preferred answer to this question in Metaphysics Z is clearly form, eidos. 
The view that form is substance first appears in Z 3, is repeated in Z 7 and 9, 10 and 11, 
receives detailed treatment in Z 17 and H 2 – in several passages form is explicitly called 
“primary substance”.125 It is less clear, however, what it means to say that form is 
primary substance. In the brief discussion of substance in Metaphysics Δ 8, Aristotle first 
characterizes substance as he does in the Categories (as that which is “not predicated of a 
                                                        
123 However, although Aristotle does not use in the Categories the locution “the substance of”, the idea that 
primary substances have essences or substances is present in the Categories’ claim that the secondary 
substances reveal what primary substances are.   
124 This supposition is developed and defended in great detail by Wedin (2005, chap. 5). Several authors 
have pointed out that the question “What is substance?” in Metaphysics Z is ambiguous between asking (i) 
for a list of things that are substances (“the population question”), or asking (ii) for an account, analysis, or 
explanation of what it means to be a substance (“the definition question”). They seem to think that the four 
candidates for the title of ousia hekastou are four reputable answers to question (ii). See, e.g., Furth (1988, 
54-58), Witt (1989, 7-14), Burnyeat (2001, 12-14). I think the same kind of ambiguity can be found in 
Aristotle’s discussion of these four candidates, i.e., the ambiguity between asking for the list of items that 
are “substances of” (e.g. universal; form, etc.) and asking “what it is to be the substance of” (e.g. to be 
predicated of many things; to be a cause, etc.). 
125 See the following passages (and their surrounding context): Z 3 (1029a26-33), Z 6 (1032a4-6), Z 7 
(1032b1-3), Z 11 (1037a21-b7), Z 17. See also De An. B 1 (412a6-11, 19-21; 412b9-10).  
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subject but of which everything else is predicated”), but then tells us that ousia can mean 
also “that which, being present in such things as are not predicated of a subject, is the 
cause of their being” (1017b14-16). In Metaphysics Z 17, Aristotle tells us that form is 
“the cause by reason of which the matter is some definite thing; and this is the substance 
of the thing” (1041b6-9) and “the primary cause of its being” (1041b27). This suggests 
that form is primary substance in the sense of being the primary principle (or source, 
archê) and cause (aitia) of the being of particular substances, something that makes the 
substance to be what it is, and explains why it is such (i.e., why a given piece of matter 
is, or constitutes, a substance of a certain sort).126  
 The view that a form is the substance of a thing, “a cause or principle of certain sort” 
(1041a9-10), prompts immediately the question of whether form is particular or 
universal. Indeed, Aristotle’s aporia in B 6 concerning whether the principles of things 
are particular or universal is often understood as an aporia concerning the status of forms 
as primary substances.127 The status of Aristotle’s forms has been the most intensively 
disputed issue in the recent history of Aristotelian scholarship. The debate has been so 
heated partly because it touches the heart of Aristotle’s conception of substance 
(understanding whether form is particular or universal means knowing whether in the 
Metaphysics Aristotle regards substance as particular or universal), and partly because 
Aristotle’s solution to this puzzle is not easy to discern. As a matter of fact, Metaphysics 
                                                        
126 I will not delve into the complicated issue concerning whether or not the idea that form is primary 
substance undermines the Categories’ idea that particular sensible substance is primary substance. I 
believe that particular substance’s being a primary substance in the sense of being an ultimate subject of 
predication is not incompatible with the idea that form is prior to the particular substance as a principle of 
its being. See also Categories 14b10-13. For a further discussion of the issue of whether Aristotle’s 
account of substance in the Categories is compatible with that of the Metaphysics, see Wedin (2005), but 
also Graham (1987). 
127 See, e.g., Witt (1989, chap. 5), Code (1984). 
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Z can be seen as aporematic, at least in so far as it presents conflicting lines of thought 
and leaves open the question of how to reconcile them.128 
 Aristotle associates forms with universals when he talks about the definition and 
knowledge, and distinguishes between them when he denies that universals are 
substances. Accordingly, Aristotle’s interpreters ascribe to him three theses or 
commitments which, as is easily realized, form an inconsistent set: 
(i)  Substance is form; 
(ii) no universal is substance; 
(iii) form is universal.129 
Some believe that Aristotle is committed to all of (i)-(iii), and that the inconsistency is 
unavoidable.130 But most believe that Aristotle does not hold all three theses in the triad 
and hence the inconsistency can be avoided. All interpreters agree on (i), so the dispute is 
focused on either challenging or denying (iii) or reinterpreting (ii) so that it is consistent 
with (iii).131 In what follows, I shall present the most important textual evidence for the 
view that forms are universal and for the view that they are particular, then sketch four 
possible solutions to the aporia concerning the status of Aristotle’s form, and defend one 
of these solutions in greater detail.  
                                                        
128 See, esp., Code (1984), Owen (1978). 
129 This is the most straightforward way of presenting the inconsistency, which relies on the assumption 
that “substance” (or “universal”) is not ambiguous. As we will see, one way to avoid the inconsistency is to 
challenge this assumption, and argue that “substance” (or “universal”) is ambiguous (so that, e.g. 
“substance” in (i) is not the same as substance in (ii)). 
130 For the charge of inconsistency, see Lesher (1971), Sykes (1975), and Graham (1987, chap. 9). 
131 Proponents of particular forms, i.e., those who deny (iii), include Sellars (1957), Albritton (with 
reservations, 1957), Hartman (1976, 1977), Heinaman (1980, 1981b), Lloyd (1981), Frede (1987b), Frede 
and Patzig (1988), Irwin (2002 [1988]), Witt (1989), Spellman (1995). Opponents include Owen (1965b), 
Woods (1967, 1993), Modrak (1979), Furth (1988), Loux (2008 [1991]), Lewis (1991), Wedin (2005). 
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Forms are Universal 
Although Aristotle never says that forms are universal, there are reasons to think that he 
is nonetheless committed to this view. Predictably, the main reason or intuition behind 
the view that forms are universal is that only as such are forms able to satisfy Aristotle’s 
demands on knowledge and definition. Since he clearly takes forms to be knowable and 
definable, and since he maintains that knowledge and definition is of the universal, it 
seems to follow that forms are universal. This conclusion is suggested by his remarks to 
the effect that definition belongs to form and to the universal, and by his denial that 
particulars as such are definable. 
 I begin by considering Metaphysics Z 15, where Aristotle argues at length that 
particulars are indefinable (i) because of their matter, and (ii) on account of the very 
nature of definition. The first arguments runs as follows:  
For this reason also there is neither definition nor demonstration of sensible particular 
substances (tôn ousiôn aisthêtôn tôn kath’ hekasta), because they have matter whose 
nature it is to be capable both of being and of not being. That is why all of them that are 
particular are perishable (phtharta). If demonstration is of what is necessary (tôn 
anagkaiôn)… clearly, then, there can be no definition or demonstration of such 
[perishable] things. (1039b27-1040a2) 
This passage bears some similarity to Posterior Analytics A 8, where Aristotle argues 
that there is no scientific knowledge and demonstration of perishable things (phthartôn) 
without qualification, but only in a qualified way, “at a time and in a way”. The above 
passage goes a step further and identifies a reason for their indefinability – perishable 
particulars are indefinable on account of their matter whose nature is such that it can both 
be and not be. Aristotle does not mention forms in Z 15, but his insistence that particulars 
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are indefinable because of their matter suggests that definition is of the form. This 
suggestion finds support from Z 10-11, where Aristotle (in discussing the question what 
parts of a thing are parts of its definition) makes several statements to the effect that 
definition contains parts of the form. For example, he says that the material parts of a 
thing “are parts of the composite whole (synolou) but not parts of the form and/i.e. (kai) 
of what has definition” (1035a21-22). The following statements are even more explicit: 
“only the parts of the form are parts of the definition, and this is the definition of the 
universal” (1035b31-36a2); “definition is of the universal and the form” (1036a28-29; cf. 
1036a8). When we combine these statements with Z 15’s claim that the particular is 
indefinable because of its matter, the view naturally suggesting itself is that the definition 
is not of the particular substance as a whole, but of its form. And if form is to be the 
object of definition, it should be universal.132 
 Other arguments in Z 15, however, are more general in character; they do not tie 
indefinability to matter, but concern any particular whatsoever. Aristotle suggests that 
every particular (whether Platonic Form or eternal particular like the sun) is indefinable 
on account of the very nature of definition: 
Nor is it possible to define any Form (idea). For a Form is a particular and separate, as 
they [the Platonists] say. But its definition (logos) must consist of words, and one cannot 
                                                        
132 It is reasonably clear that Aristotle thinks that the form is defined without reference to matter, but is 
controversial whether he wants to exclude matter from the definition of the composite substance. In Z 11 
we are told that it is “useless labor” on the part (presumably) of the Platonist to “reduce all things to forms 
and to eliminate the matter” (1036b22). Some things, Aristotle insists, are surely “a this in that” (tod’ en 
tode), which seems to imply that such things can be defined only by reference to the appropriate matter 
(1036b23-28). So, Aristotle’s position in Z 10-11 is not unambiguously clear. Although he suggests in Z 11 
that the definition of some things (presumably of natural substances, for which it is essential to be 
composed of form and an appropriate kind of matter) includes a reference to matter, he ends Z 11 as if he 
has defended the position that definition is of the form. For a detailed overview of Aristotle’s arguments, as 
well as of scholarly positions taken on this issue, see Galluzzo (2006, 135-165). For a classical discussion 
of this issue, see Thomas Aquinas’ De Ente et Essentia (esp. chap. 2). 
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define by coining a word (for it would be unknown), but the words which are in use are 
common to all [of the things they denote], and so they must apply to something besides 
the thing defined. (1040a8-2) 
As has been said, the impossibility of defining particulars is hard to realize when we are 
dealing with eternal things, especially those that are unique (monacha), like the sun or 
the moon. For people go wrong by adding the sorts of things (e.g. going round the earth 
or being hidden at night) after whose removal the sun would still exist… but also by 
mention of those [attributes] which can belong to another subject; e.g. if something else 
of this sort comes to be, clearly it will be sun; the definition (logos) is therefore common 
(koinon). (1040a27-b2) 
Aristotle is apparently trying to explain why the fact that something is one of a kind (a 
unique member of a species), like a Platonic Form or an eternal particular like the sun, 
does not constitute a counterexample to the thesis that particulars are indefinable. 
Aristotle claims that an attempt to give a unique definition of a Form would be like 
inventing a new word (or giving it a name). Further, although it might happen that a 
definition as a matter of fact applies to just one thing, it would not be unique to this 
thing. Aristotle points out that even if we were able to produce a definition of a sun, it 
would not be unique; if another thing should appear that has all the stated attributes, the 
thing will be a sun. This suggests that the indefinability of particulars is a consequence of 
what definition is (rather than of some flaw in the proposed object of definition). It is 
impossible to give a unique definition of a particular because definition is common, and 
is always stated in words that have application to more than one thing. In other words, 
definition does not capture the particularity of a particular but always refers to a certain 
kind of thing. 
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 Metaphysics Z 15 is often regarded as the main piece of evidence in favor of 
universal forms. Aristotle argues that particulars are indefinable because of the matter 
and because their particularity (the latter argument excludes also the definability of the 
Platonic Form). This does indeed suggest that the form, if it is to be the object of 
definition, should be universal. Nonetheless, this suggestion does not need to exclude the 
possibility of there being particular forms. Aristotle’s argument that particulars are 
indefinable qua particulars (that the definition cannot capture the very particularity of a 
particular) surely suggests that forms are not definable qua particulars. However, I have 
argued in the previous chapter that concrete particulars, while not being knowable and 
definable qua particulars, are knowable in so far as they fall under universals. 
Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to suggest (I will return to this suggestion in the 
following chapter) that particular forms are knowable and definable qua instances of 
universal forms (qua specifically identical, as some authors like to say133). 
 Another important piece of evidence in favor of the view that the substance (of a 
thing134), and therefore the form, is universal is represented by Aristotle’s discussion of 
essence (to ti ên einai, literally “the what it was to be”) in Z 4-5. Aristotle shows no 
hesitation in affirming that the substance is (or alternatively, has) essence, which makes 
it quite clear that essence is a successful candidate for the title of substance. The reason 
why essence belongs to substance “either alone or especially and primarily” (1031a12-
14; 1030b5-6) is that only substance cannot be analyzed in terms of “one thing being said                                                         
133 See, e.g., Cresswell (1975). 
134 Aristotle’s discussion of an essence is particularly good example of his wavering between two senses of 
“substance”. He begins his discussion be referring to essence as one of the four candidates of substance 
proposed at the beginning of Z 3, which suggests that he is speaking about the “substance of” of a thing 
(although he does not use the locution “substance of”). But the rest of Z 4-5 speaks about substance as 
something that is contrasted to other categories. I will follow Aristotle’s lead and speak simply (and 
ambiguously) about “substance” without trying to determine in each instance what sense of “substance” 
Aristotle has in mind. 
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of another” (mê tôi allo kat’ allou legesthai, 1030a10). This excludes accidental 
compounds like “white human being”, which is analyzable in terms of white being said 
of human being. On closer inspection even accidents like “white” are analyzable in such 
terms, since white is said of something else, viz., of something that is white. Aristotle 
draws a conclusion that “essence will belong to nothing that is not an eidos of a genos; it 
will belong to these alone, for these do not seem to involve predicating one thing of 
another by way of participation (kata metochên) or affection (pathos) or as an accident” 
(1030a10-14). 
 This conclusion is significant for at least two reasons. First of all, Aristotle’s 
emphasis that the eidê, to which alone essences are said to belong, are the eidê of a genus 
suggests that he has in mind something that is common to many things (species or 
species-form135). Secondly, Aristotle’s discussion suggests that he is committed in the 
Metaphysics to the kind of essentialism that is implicit in the Categories and is 
developed in greater detail in the Posterior Analytics (e.g. A 4; A 22, 83b14-15). He is 
clearly contrasting species with accidents and accidental compounds. But is he also 
contrasting species with concrete particulars? Does he perhaps mean that human being 
has an essence but Callias does not? That is not likely. For one thing, Aristotle says 
nothing to this effect. For another, eidos of a genus seems most naturally to refer to 
something that may be predicated alike of Socrates and Callias. Aristotle’s point would                                                         
135 I mean by species-form the form that is shared by all members of the species. Alternatively, one could 
take the species-form to be the form of the universal compound (compound of this matter and form, taken 
universally) that Z 10 (1035n27-31) and 11 (1037a5-10) identify with species, such as human being. I am 
not sure what to make of these two occurrences of the idea that universals (like particulars) are compounds 
of matter and form, taken universally. It seems that Aristotle introduces this idea in connection with the 
suggestion that the definition of some things should include reference to matter. But since it is unclear what 
precisely is Aristotle’s view on this issue (i.e., whether the definition of the composite substance should 
mention form alone or matter as well), it is also not clear how seriously one should take the idea that the 
universal is composed of form and matter. But see Driscoll (1982), who argues at great length that species 
differs from form, although form is universal. 
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seem to be, then, that species are not different from their instances of which they are 
predicated (Socrates is human being). Now, if essence deserves the title of substance, and 
essence belongs to species, then it seems to follow that species deserves the title of 
substance. As we will see, it will be difficult to reconcile this line of thought with Z 13’s 
slogan “no universal is substance”. 
 The third kind of evidence, which plays a crucial role in debates over the status of 
forms and cannot be ignored, concerns individuation (as we would today call it). As 
several authors have pointed out, Aristotle does not pay much attention to the problem of 
individuation.136 In fact, he seems to say very little about individuation quite generally. 
But there are few passages suggesting that he thinks of matter as that which distinguishes 
one particular from others (in particular, from others of the same species). These 
passages ground the well-established view that one of the roles of matter in Aristotle’s 
philosophy is to provide a principle of individuation. The star passage for matter as a 
principle of individuation is in Metaphysics Z 8:    
And when we have the whole, such and such a form in this flesh and these bones, this is 
Callias or Socrates; and they are different in virtue of their matter (heteron men dia tên 
hylên), for that is different, but the same in form (tauto de tôi eidei), for their form is 
indivisible (atomon). (1034a5-8)137  
                                                        
136 See Galluzzo (2006, 70-74); Charlton (1972), who argues that Aristotle never posed such a problem at 
all. There has been some confusion over what the problem of individuation is supposed to be. In a well-
known symposium on this topic in 1953, Lukasiewicz and Anscombe gave opposing answers to the 
question concerning the “source of individuality” for Aristotle, the former taking the side of form, the latter 
that of matter. But their fellow symposiast, Popper, pointed out that they were actually dealing with 
entirely different problems. Roughly, it can be said that Lukasiewicz was dealing with the problem 
concerning the unity of something: what makes the composite particular one thing, rather than a plurality? 
Anscombe was dealing with the problem concerning distinctness from other individuals: what makes one 
individual distinct from other (cospecific) individuals? I will follow the common practice of regarding 
“matter” as the answer to Anscombe’s problem. 
137 The other star passage is in Met. Δ 6 (1016b31-32). 
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Aristotle thus maintains that two particulars, Socrates and Callias, differ from one 
another in terms of their matter. Their form, by contrast, which is described as 
“indivisible”, is the same. This passage is often thought to offer insuperable difficulties 
for the view that forms are particular, since the believer in particular forms will need to 
say that Socrates and Callias are distinguished by each having a different form, yet 
Aristotle says that they are the same in eidos, and also that they are different because 
their matter is different. So the argument is that Socrates and Callias are the same in 
eidos because there are no distinct eidê that might serve to differentiate them.138 I agree 
that this passage suggests that it is matter (rather than form) that individuates, i.e., 
distinguishes particulars of the same species from one another. But this does not exclude 
the possibility of there being particular forms. Rather, it raises the issue of what we mean 
by the particularity of forms. As we will see in greater detail later on, it is reasonable to 
suggest that Aristotle allows for numerically distinct instantiations of a universal form 
individuated by the material substance whose form it is, or by the matter in which it is 
realized – and these numerically distinct instances can be called particular forms.  
 This suggestion appears when we question what it means to say that forms are 
universal. Admittedly, Aristotle’s view that the form is substance does not make him a 
Platonist. He does not hold (and no one to my knowledge has tried to foist on him the 
view) that there are universal forms enjoying independent existence apart from the 
material substances of which they are forms. The form that Aristotle says is a primary 
substance is not, like a Platonic Form, separable from all matter (except, perhaps, in 
thought), and it cannot exist without being the form of some material substance.139 But if 
form cannot exist as some uninstantiated universal, then the view suggesting itself is that                                                         
138 This line of thought is taken from Woods (1993). 
139 I leave here (and in what follows) out of consideration the unmoved movers, separate forms. 
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the form exists as particular, and hence there must be (at least) particular (numerically 
distinct) instances of forms. 
 If we allow there to be particular instances of forms, then the contrast between the 
view that forms are universal and the view that forms are particular is not as exclusive or 
sharp as it is sometimes taken to be. As a matter of fact, the insight that forms exist only 
in particular substances that have them might have been the point of Wilfred Sellars’ 
remark that “if anything is clear about an Aristotelian form is that its primary mode of 
being is to be a this…” (1957, 688; my italics). And Sellars is usually considered to be 
the initiator of the view that Aristotle’s forms are particular. Before I will expand on this 
line of thought, I will consider the most important piece of evidence for the view that 
forms are particular. 
Forms are Particular 
The most important evidence in support of the view that forms are particular is usually 
considered to be Metaphysics Z 13’s arguments for the conclusion that no universal is 
substance. It is noteworthy that this chapter, which has been the main battlefield for the 
debate over the status of forms, does not mention forms at all – the word eidos does not 
make a single appearance in the whole chapter (and in Z 14-16 it is used only to denote a 
Platonic Form). Nonetheless, since Aristotle holds that forms are substances, his thesis 
that no universal can be substance suggests that (as substances) forms should be 
particular. He develops several arguments in support of this thesis. I shall confine myself 
to three, which are by far the most important and controversial ones. The first argument 
runs as follows: 
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The universal also is thought by some to be in the fullest sense a cause and a principle; 
let us therefore attack the discussion of this point also. For it seems impossible for any of 
the things predicated universally (tôn katholou legomenôn) to be substance. For in the 
first place the substance of each thing is peculiar (idios) to it and does not belong to 
anything else; but the universal is common (koinon), since that is called universal which 
by nature belongs to many things. (1038b7-13) 
It is clear that Aristotle intends this argument to rule out Platonic Forms as substances of 
things, but it also makes trouble for his own conception of the universal as that which by 
nature belongs to a plurality of things. If the substance of each thing must be peculiar to 
it, then it evidently cannot be universal, since “that is called universal which by nature 
belongs to many things”. From this it seems to follow that forms must be particular or, 
alternatively, that each particular must have its own form. However, it should be pointed 
out that Aristotle’s argument is an abstract one: that the substance of each thing (ousia 
hekastou) is peculiar to it. The conclusion that each particular must have its own form 
follows only on the assumption that by hekastou Aristotle means a concrete particular 
(rather than infima species). 
 Aristotle’s second argument is rather brief and runs as follows: 
Further, substance is said to be that which is not predicated of a subject, but the universal 
is always predicated of some subject (to de katholou tinos legetai aei). (1038b13-15) 
This argument appears to be a straightforward contrast. If universal is that which is 
always predicated of some subject, and substance is that which is not predicated of a 
subject, then universal cannot be a substance. This contrast between the subject and 
predicate is familiar from the Categories, and echoes Aristotle’s definition of the 
“universal” and “particular” in De Interpretatione: “By universal I mean that which is by 
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nature predicated (katêgoreitai) of many things; by particular, what is not” (17a38). No 
universal can be a particular – by definition. Although the view that particular things 
have particular forms does not follow directly from this argument, it seems to offer 
indirect support for this view. If substances cannot be predicates, then it appears that they 
cannot be universal.140 
 Thirdly, Aristotle insists that a substance must be a “this something” (tode ti), 
whereas universal is a “such” (toionde): 
From these considerations it is clear that none of the things that belong universally (tôn 
katholou hyparchontôn) is a substance, and also because none of the things predicated in 
common (koinê katêgoroumenôn) signifies a this something (tode ti). (1038b34-36) 
[A] universal signifies a such (toionde), and not a this something… (1039a15) 
This argument is, again, familiar from the Categories (3b10-22), where Aristotle argues 
that each primary substance signifies a “this something”, whereas a secondary substance 
signifies a “such” (poion ti) and, more precisely, a “substance of such a sort” (poian tina 
ousian). So in the Categories, a paradigm tode ti is a particular substance or, more 
generally, “whatever is one in number and indivisible” (3b12). Although tode ti figures 
as a leading mark of substance also in the Metaphysics, he does not explain it in terms of 
particularity.141 In fact, Aristotle never provides a clear explanation of this notion (it                                                         
140 However, it should be pointed out that since this argument establishes that the substance cannot be a 
predicate, it makes trouble not only for universals (or universal forms), but forms in general. Aristotle often 
says that forms are predicated of matter. See, e.g., Met. H 2 (1043a5-6), H 3 (43b30-2), Z 13 (1038b5-7), Θ 
7 (49a34-36); cf. Z 3 (1029a23-24), Z 17 (41a26-8, b4-9). Thus he commits himself to a two-tiered theory 
of predication, in which accidents are predicated of substance and substances, in turn, are compounds of 
form predicated of matter But if form is predicated of matter, then it seems to follow that form cannot be a 
substance, whether one thinks of a form as universal (predicated of different chunks of matter) or particular 
(predicated of one chunk of matter). Several authors have tried to escape this difficulty by arguing that 
form is predicated of matter, rather than of particulars whose substance it is. See, e.g., Loux (2008). 
141 See, e.g., Z 1 (1028a11), Z 3 (1029a28-30), Z 4 (1030a4-6). The main source of confusion is Z 4, where 
Aristotle first claims that substance is hoper tode ti (usually translated as “just what something is” but more 
literally “just what is a this something”), and then draws a conclusion that substances are eidê of genera. 
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seems to convey the idea of determinateness and perhaps of countability). Nonetheless, it 
seems that in contexts (like the above passage) where “this something” is contrasted with 
the “such”, Aristotle has in mind the contrast between the particular and the universal. If 
no universal is a “this something”, but every substance must be, then, once again, it 
seems to follow that Aristotle’s substances in the Metaphysics are particular.  
 What should we think of these arguments? Do they show that forms are particular? 
The first thing to point out is that all these arguments rely on a contrast between being a 
universal and being a substance (of each thing). Aristotle appeals to such a contrast also 
in his criticism of the Platonists, who placed universals outside the being (ousia, 
substance) of particular substances, and promoted them to the status of particular 
substances. The Platonic theory of Forms is Aristotle’s official target also in Z 13-16: he 
explicitly directs his arguments against those who think that “the universal is in the 
fullest sense a cause and a principle” (Z 13, 1038b7), “who believe in the Forms as 
separate substances” (Z 14, 1039a25), and “who are wrong in supposing that the one 
over many is a [separate] form” (Z 16, 1040b27). In fact, his discussion in these chapters 
can be read as Aristotle’s most thoroughgoing criticism of the view that treats universals 
as particular substances beyond particular substances.142 
  But while it is clear that Aristotle contrasts substances with separate universals 
(Platonic Forms), it is not clear whether he wants to contrast them with his own 
universals. The answer to the latter question depends on how exhaustive and exclusive                                                         
This might suggest that he is willing to call eidê of genera “this somethings”. However, it is reasonably 
clear that although the phrase “this something” can be used to pick out both universals and particulars (e.g. 
this animal can pick out a certain sort of animal, or a particular animal of certain sort), it is primarily 
applied to particulars. For a further discussion, see Bostock (2003, 83-90).  
142 I agree here with Lacey (1965), who contends that “what Aristotle ought to be saying in the Metaphysics 
is that terms like ‘man’ are not the name of an ousia in the sense in which one can talk of an ousia as an 
object, but are used to say what the ousia of an object is. But it seems to me that Aristotle never makes this 
completely clear (though he often approaches doing so and I think this is the view he is really aiming for)” 
(p. 66). 
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Aristotle intends this contrast to be. As I pointed out earlier, Aristotle’s last two 
arguments (viz., that universals are always predicated of some subject, and that they do 
not signify a “this something”) are familiar from the Categories. But there he nonetheless 
maintains that universals are called “substances” (albeit “secondary”) since they reveal 
what the primary substances are. This insight seems to be present also in Metaphysics Z 
4-5, where Aristotle argues that the essence and definition belong only (or primarily) to 
eidê of genera. I have taken the idea that universals (species and genera) are embedded in 
the very being and essence (we could now say, substance) of particular substances to be 
the central point of Aristotle’s essentialism. And this idea is hardly compatible with the 
suggestion that the contrast between the universal and the substance is intended to be 
exhaustive and exclusive. This suggestion would leave it very hard to see how universals 
could contribute to the being and knowledge of particular things or, more generally, how 
the substance (of each thing) could be knowable at all. We would inevitably face the 
aporia Aristotle formulates in Metaphysics B 6 in terms of principles. If the principles 
are universal, they will not be substances, but if they are particular, they will not be 
knowable. If there is a crude dichotomy between the universal and the substance, then 
the knowledge of substances will not simply be elusive, but impossible. It is noteworthy 
that Aristotle ends Metaphysics Z with this very recognition – the recognition that taking 
the slogan “no universal is a substance” literally leaves one at an impasse, aporia, 
because it makes knowledge of substances impossible.  
 These considerations, especially Aristotle’s commitment to essentialism, suggest 
that he does not want to draw a sharp contrast between being a universal and being a 
substance (of each thing). On the other hand, however, it is also characteristically 
Aristotelian to deny universals the same kind of status as substances. For him, substances 
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(at least in the strict and primary sense) are particular. And this seems to apply not only 
to the primary substances of the Categories but also to the “substances of” of the 
Metaphysics. This latter point finds its strongest support in the first argument of Z 13 that 
the substance of each thing must be peculiar to it (and does not belong to other things), 
and in his insistence that the substance must be a “this something”. Is there a way to 
reconcile his essentialism with the slogan “no universal is substance”? In what follows, I 
will give a rough sketch of four different attempts of reconciliation or, alternatively, four 
interpretations of the claim “no universal is substance”.  
  1. Universals do not exist at all; forms are particular 
According to one (and by far the most radical) line of interpretation, Aristotle intends to 
deny that any universal is substance. Forms as primary substances are particular, whereas 
universals (universal forms or universal kinds, either species or genera) lack any 
ontological status. Roughly put, they simply do not exist.143  
 This line of interpretation preserves the basic insight of the Categories that the 
primary substances are particular, and accords with Aristotle’s insistence that the 
substance must be a “this something”. But it also involves a radical shift away from the 
Categories since Aristotle of the Metaphysics would now be denying that secondary 
substances have any status in the ontology at all.144 Accordingly, this interpretation 
undermines Aristotle’s essentialism which takes particulars to be instances of universals 
(secondary substances) and thus implies that there are universals having instances. As we 
                                                        
143 This line is taken most strongly by Frede and Patzig (1988), who hold that Aristotle rejected the notion 
of a species-form and that this represents his final emancipation from Platonists. They think that we can 
still say that particulars are the same in form, but this means nothing more than that their forms are exactly 
alike. Thus their view comes close to what is usually called “resemblance nominalism”. 
144 This interpretation thus implies that Aristotle applied the word eidos to two radically different types of 
things: particular forms (in the Metaphysics) and substantial kinds (in the Categories). 
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have seen before, Aristotle’s essentialism underlies his epistemology. He holds that 
particulars are knowable and definable in so far as they are capable of falling under 
universals. Consequently, an interpretation which construes forms as unique particulars 
in their own right (rather than as instances of universals) makes it hard to see how there 
could be knowledge of such particular forms. 
 There seem to be, on this interpretation, two ways of handling the problem 
concerning knowledge. One obvious way to solve the problem is to insist that particular 
forms are knowable after all. Aristotle appears to identify forms with essences (and 
essences are ontological correlates of definitions); but if particular forms can be said to 
have (or to be) essences, then they can be said to have definitions.145 The problem with 
this solution is that it would foist upon Aristotle an account of knowledge and definition, 
which is radically different from the account he explicitly adheres to. If there were a 
form that is somehow unique to some sensible particular, say Callias, then the definition 
corresponding to that form, or essence, would apply uniquely to Callias – it would define 
him, which is precisely what Aristotle says cannot be done (e.g. Z 15).  
 Another way to solve the problem is to maintain that knowledge is of universals, but 
universals exist only in thought, as abstractions of some sort. As is well known, Aristotle 
regards mathematical objects as abstractions which do not have a separate existence from 
sensible particulars but which may nevertheless be separated by thought.146 One could                                                         
145 For an identification of essence and form, see Z 7 (1032b1-2), but also Z10 (1036a16-19), Z 11 
(1037a33-b4), H 3 (1043b2-4). This type of solution is developed (but eventually rejected) by Code 
(1984). It seems that all those who maintain that Metaphysics M 10 commits Aristotle to the position that 
knowledge of the universal is simply potential knowledge (whereas actual knowledge is of the particular) 
should be willing to accept this type of solution. I have discussed and criticized this kind of interpretation 
of M 10 in previous chapter.  
146 Aristotle at least once describes mathematical objects as things that “exist by abstraction” (aphairesei 
ontôn) (De An. Γ 4, 429b18), and in Met. M 2, he concludes that things “from abstraction” are neither 
substances nor in sensible substances and that therefore they “either do not exist at all or exist in some way 
(tropos tina) but not in an unqualified way” (see 1077b6-17). Since abstraction is an act of thought, it 
suggests that the existence of mathematical objects must in some way be dependent on thought. 
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argue that abstraction has a much broader application than merely to mathematics, and 
that universals can likewise be regarded as abstractions. However, this would go beyond 
what we find in Aristotle, since he does not seem to link mathematical abstractions with 
universals. There are few passages in Aristotle – most notably, De Anima B 5 (417b18-
28) and Posterior Analytics B 19 (100a5-9) – indicating that universals exist in the soul. 
But these passages do not appear to commit Aristotle to the view that universals exist 
only in the soul, and they do not figure in his attempts to solve or address the aporia 
concerning the status of principles (or forms).147 
 2. Some universals are substances; forms are universal 
At the other extreme, there is an interpretation according to which forms are universal 
(or, alternatively, forms are species), and hence Aristotle does not intend to deny that any 
universal is a substance. On this line of interpretation, the form or essence of the 
particular is shared by all particulars of the same species. This idea – i.e., a universal 
form shared by all members of the same species – is in scholarly literature often called 
the species-form. 
 This interpretation implies that Aristotle reverses in the Metaphysics the order of 
priority defended in the Categories. The secondary substances (or at least the species) of 
the Categories are now promoted to the status of primary substances, so there is a 
“renewal of sympathy” with Plato on this score.148 This line of interpretation is easily                                                         
147 The view that universals are thought-dependent is defended, most notably, by Lloyd (1981). Lloyd 
thinks that universals are “mental generalizations” of particular forms, committing Aristotle thus to the 
view that could be labeled as “conceptualism with real basis”. The view that universals exist only in the 
soul is criticized, to my mind definitely, by Tweedale (1987) and Heinaman (1982). I have considered the 
difficulties with the view that forms are abstractions also in my “Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Account of 
Universals and its Problems” (forthcoming). The main difficulty is to explain what guarantees that the 
abstraction does not become (fictitious) invention.   
148 This line of interpretation was particularly popular in 1960s and ’70s. See, most notably, Owen (1965b), 
Woods (1967), but also Driscoll (1981). The expression “renewal of sympathy” with Plato is taken from 
Owen (1965b, 137).  
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compatible with Aristotle’s requirements for knowledge and definition, but it is rather 
difficult to reconcile it with his arguments in Z 13 for the conclusion that no universal is 
a substance. 
 One way to reconcile the view that forms are universal with the slogan that no 
universal is a substance is to appeal to Aristotle’s essentialism and suggest that Aristotle 
wants to exclude as substances only those things that can be analyzed in terms of “one 
thing being said of another” (Z 4, 1030a10). This requirement excludes accidents, the 
Platonic Forms, and perhaps also genera. But it does not exclude species, which can be 
said to be peculiar to the thing in that it determines the very being of the thing of which it 
is predicated. Socrates, for instance, is not a particular that can be first picked out and 
then have “human being” predicated of him – his being a particular substance is his being 
human. So being human is inextricably tied up, we might say, with his being. The 
genera, on the other hand, do not determine the being of a thing as intimately as species – 
Socrates is an animal only because he is a human being, and his remaining the same 
animal is, for him, remaining the same human being. This interpretation thus implies that 
Aristotle did not really mean to argue in Z 13 that no universal is a substance. Rather, he 
intends to rule out genera as substances but allows that species can be substances.149  
 The problem with this interpretation is that it makes Aristotle’s arguments in Z 13 
lose much of their force. Although there is some evidence that in Z Aristotle is willing to 
distinguish between species and genera,150 one might fairly ask why he would rely upon                                                         
149 This type of interpretation is developed by Ross (1997 [1924]) and, most notably, by Woods (1967). See 
also Lear (1987) and Albritton (1957), who argue that the whole discussion in Z 13 is carried out on the 
level of universals, i.e., Aristotle wants to deny that genera can be substances of species. Another possible 
way to reconcile Z 13’s thesis with the view that forms are universal is to argue that Aristotle equivocates 
on “substance”. The sense of “substance” in which a species-form is a substance is not that in which no 
universal is substance. See, e.g. Lacey (1965, footnote 142), and Loux (2008, chap. 6).  
150 See Z 12, for example, where Aristotle appears to maintain that the genus does not exist independently 
of the form and should be thought of along the lines of matter (1038a5-9).  
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such a distinction and, nevertheless, neglect to mention it in Z 13. Further, Aristotle does 
say that no universal is a substance: “For it seems to be impossible for any of the things 
which are predicated universally to be substance” (1038b8-9); “nothing universal is 
substance” (1038b35); “nothing common is substance” (1040b23; cf. 1040b23, 1041a4, 
1042a21, 1060b21, 10871a2, 1087a12).151 But having said all that, it is also worth noting 
that Aristotle’s conclusion does not resound as an inconvertible truth. His language is 
also cautious: “For it seems impossible (eioke gar adynaton) for any of the things which 
are predicated universally to be substance” (1038b8-9).   
 Thus, neither (1) the interpretation that forms are particular nor (2) the interpretation 
that forms are universal seems to be fully satisfactory. The prospects of finding a fully 
satisfactory interpretation is, of course, controversial.152 But it seems that on these lines 
of interpretation we need to give up too much; the problems with these interpretations are 
precisely the ones Aristotle has outlined in his formulation of an aporia in Metaphysics B 
6. If forms are particular and universals lack any status, then there is a danger of having 
to conclude that no knowledge of them is possible. If they are universal, then it is hard to 
see how they could be substances (and peculiar to the thing). However, in addition to 
these extreme interpretations, we can also distinguish between two more subtle 
interpretations.  
 3. Universals exist, but as accidents; forms are particular 
According to one (more subtle) line of interpretation, Aristotle intends to deny that any 
universal is substance, but this does not mean that universals lack any ontological status. 
                                                        
151 For a detailed criticism of this type of interpretation (esp. Woods’ interpretation), see Lesher (1971) and 
Heinaman (1980). 
152 Code (1984), in particular, argues that any solution to the puzzle over the status of forms needs to give 
up something and contradict some passages. 
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Rather, universals (species and genera) exist as accidents of some sort (or “accidental 
properties” as we would nowadays call them). 
 Although Aristotle criticizes the Platonists for separating universals from particulars, 
he does not thereby appear to deny the existence of universals. Thus it seems that he 
wants to claim both that the universals exist, and that they are not substances. Hence he 
seems committed to saying that universals exist somehow but not as substances. Given 
that for Aristotle there is a category distinction between substances and accidents, one 
could conclude that universals exist as accidents of some sort. Now, accidents are always 
accidents of something. Their existence requires there to be something to which they 
attach from outside, something that is distinct from them (the existence of white, for 
example, requires there to be something else that is white).  
 Similar reasoning can be extended to cover universals; their existence requires there 
to be something else to which they attach as accidents. Now, one could argue that the 
“something else” to which the universal belongs as an accident is a form, and that the 
distinction between forms and universals is clear when we consider that a form can exist 
in only one particular. If there were only one human being in existence, for example, the 
form of human being would exist; but human being as species with many members 
would not, since you cannot have a species (or genus) unless you have something 
existing in many. Hence, universal exists only if form has more than one instance. But 
since the form can exist without having many instances (it can exist in only one 
particular), it is accidental to the form whether or not it is universal. 
 The idea that universal (or, we might want to say, universality) is accidental to 
whatever it is that is universal was first introduced by Alexander of Aphrodisias, and 
became very influential in later tradition. In fact, I believe his account of universals had 
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major consequences for future direction of the discussion of the status of Aristotle’s 
forms and of the traditional problem of universals. I will consider Alexander’s account in 
the following chapter and suggest that although it offers an attractive solution to 
Aristotle’s problem of katholou, it eventually raises more problems than it solves. 
 4. Universals are secondary substances; particular forms are instances of 
universals 
Another more subtle line of interpretation maintains that particular forms are instances of 
universals (species or species-forms). It seems that most authors defending the view that 
forms are particular would not accept the extreme view that forms are particular and 
universals lack any status, but a more modest view that particular forms are instances of 
universal forms.153 The classic version of this view is formulated by Rogers Albritton: 
“Since what Aristotle calls ‘the form’ of a particular thing is sometimes certainly the 
universal form of its species (e.g. at 1034a58), the doctrine [of particular forms] is better 
stated as follows: A particular material substance not only shares with others of its 
species a universal form but has a particular form of its own, an instance of that universal 
form, which is not the form of any other thing” (1957, 699-700). Further, it seems that (at 
least) some authors defending the view that forms are universal would allow there to be 
numerically distinct instances of form, thus committing themselves to the existence of 
particular forms in this sense.154 Hence the position that forms are instances of universals 
appears to be a sort of a middle position between the view that forms are particular and 
the view that forms are universal.  
                                                        
153 See, e.g., Albritton (1957), Hartman (1977), Irwin (2002 [1988]), Tweedale (1988), Sharples (2005).  
154 For this suggestion, see Gill (2005). 
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 Now, the idea that the particular form is an instance of the universal (e.g. this 
particular instance of the human form is the form of a particular human being) implies 
that there are universals, i.e., universals exist. How do they exist? If we take seriously 
Aristotle’s arguments in Z 13 then it seems to follow that they cannot exist as particular 
substances. And as we will see in the following chapter, it is hard to maintain the view 
that universals are mere accidents. The third alternative that naturally suggests itself is 
that universals exist as secondary substances. Aristotle is committed to this position in 
the Categories, and although he does not use the terminology of “secondary substance” 
in the Metaphysics, it is not unreasonable to think that does not give up the idea of 
secondary substances. The view that universals are secondary substances would help to 
explain why Aristotle says both that they are substances (e.g. Z 4) and that they are not 
substances (e.g. Z 13). 
 This interpretation does not imply that Aristotle’s position in Metaphysics Z involves 
a radical shift away from the Categories. Rather, it suggest that the basic insight of the 
Categories – viz., that being a particular involves being an instance of a universal (a “this 
something”), and being a universal involves being instantiated (“particularized”) – is 
operative also in the Metaphysics. This line of interpretation offers, in my mind, the best 
way to minimize the problems surrounding the status of forms. In so far as particular 
forms are instances of universals, they are knowable and definable; and they also fulfill 
the requirement for being a substance, namely, being a “this something”. Nonetheless, 
this interpretation has not found much (explicit) support among Aristotelian scholars.155 
We may presume that one reason for this is that it is not easy to make sense of the idea 
                                                        
155 But see Irwin (2002 [1988]), who is one of the few authors, who develops this type of interpretation in 
greater detail. He suggests that Aristotle gives up the phrase “secondary substances” for universal 
substances because it should refer not only to universal (but also to matter, for example). 
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that particular forms are instances of universals. Does it mean that forms are somehow 
both particular and universal? Or does it mean that there are two sorts of forms, 
particular and universal? I will focus on these issues in the following section. 
Particular Forms as Instances of Universals  
If there are indeed particular forms that are instances of universals (species-forms), and if 
particular forms are substances of particular sensible substances such as Socrates and 
Callias, then we can rewrite our original triad in the following consistent manner: 
(i) The particular form of Socrates and Callias is their primary substance; 
(ii) if something is universal, then it is not a (primary) substance; 
(iii) the species-form of Socrates and Callias is universal. 
On this interpretation, then, inconsistency can be avoided by rejecting the assumption 
that forms must be either universal or particular, that is to say – by noting that the 
dichotomy between the universal and particular is not exhaustive. The substance of each 
thing (ousia hekastou) is a particular form, which is not completely unique but an 
instance of a species-form. The particular form is both the substance of the thing and 
definable since it shares its definition with the species-form whose instance it is. 
 This line of interpretation raises at least three questions. Firstly, one might wonder 
whether Aristotle is really committed to the existence of particular forms. So far, I have 
discussed only Aristotle’s arguments in Z 13, and these can be regarded as inconclusive 
evidence, especially if we take into account the fact that the word eidos does not occur at 
all in this chapter. Secondly, it is not obvious what philosophical sense we can make of 
particular forms that are instances of universals. How can forms be both particular and 
universal? And thirdly, if forms are somehow both particular and universal, we might 
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wonder whether Aristotle becomes subject to some of the criticisms which he had earlier 
raised against the Platonists. 
 The strongest evidence for the view that Aristotle is committed to particular forms in 
the Metaphysics comes from Λ 5: 
For it is the particular that is the principle (archê, cause) of particulars; human being is 
the principle of human being universally, but there is no universal human being, but 
Peleus is the principle of Achilles, and your father of you, and this B of this BA… And 
the causes of things which are in the same species (eidei) are different, not in species, but 
because different particulars have a different cause (aition) – your matter and form (sê 
hylê kai to eidos) and moving cause, and mine – but these are the same in universal 
definition (tôi katholou de logôi tauta). (1071a20-29) 
The claim that you have a form that is yours and I have a form that is mine suggests that 
we each have our own, particular, forms. Thus, Aristotle seems to be saying that every 
particular substance has a particular form of its own. But there is a sense, even in Λ, in 
which a form is universal and predicable of many substances. Most plainly, the 
expression “the same in eidos” as it is used at 1071a27, as well as the claim that our 
forms are the same in definition, implies that particular substances may share a species-
form. Thus this passage also suggests that the particular form is an instance of a universal 
(species-form). Aristotle does not here actually say that the particular form is primary 
substance, but this is what we would naturally suppose if we add two claims from 
Metaphysics Z, namely, that a primary substance is form and no universal is substance. 
Since no universal is substance, the universal form that the particular forms instantiate 
cannot be a primary substance.  
 124 
 There are also other passages in Metaphysics where Aristotle talks as if particulars 
have their own forms and essences.156 And there are a small number of passages, where 
Aristotle explicitly calls form a tode ti,157 which suggest that the form must be particular, 
rather than universal.  
 The main difficulty with the talk of particular forms (and with the view that forms 
are particular in general) is to explain what philosophical sense we can make of 
particular forms. It is easier to understand how concrete particulars retain their 
particularity whilst yet being marked out as being of a certain kind than to understand 
how forms can be of the same kind (include only those features that are shared by all 
particulars belonging to the same species) and yet remain distinct particulars (peculiar to 
things to which they belong). How do these particular forms differ? The most obvious 
and straightforward answer seems to be that they differ numerically: I am numerically 
different from you, and, accordingly, my form is numerically different from yours.158 
This raises a further question: what accounts for the particularity (or, numerical 
difference) of our forms? Here the most obvious and straightforward answer is that they 
differ on account of being joined to (or predicated of) different bits of matter. After all, 
Aristotle says in Z 8 that composite substances like Socrates and Callias differ from one 
another on account of the matter. Similar reasoning might be applied also to their forms, 
i.e., each composite substance may be said to have its own form but the particularity of 
such a form entirely depends on the matter the form is joined to.159 The particularity of 
                                                        
156 See, e.g., Met. Z 4 (1029b15). 
157 See Met. H 1 (1042a28-29), Δ 8 (1017b23-26), Θ 7 (1049a35-36), Λ 3 (1070a11); cf. Z 12 (1037b27), Z 
3 (1029a27-30). However, at least once Aristotle speaks of the form as a “such” in Met. Z 8 (1033a21-26). 
158 However, whether the forms of particulars belonging to the same species are only numerically distinct 
or differ qualitatively as well is a matter of dispute among the proponents of particular forms. 
159 This account of the particularity of forms is developed by, e.g., Tweedale (1988); Hartman (1977). 
Alternatively, one could suggest the forms of Socrates and Callias differ by virtue of their being the forms 
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forms is thus not due to anything intrinsic to them (intrinsically all forms of the same 
species share the same essential features), but rather to matter to which they are joined. 
 Several authors have found this answer unsatisfactory since it ascribes to forms a 
weak sense of particularity.160 One could object that this account of the particularity of 
forms entails that forms are not strictly speaking particular (they are not particular in 
themselves or essentially), but only particularized, i.e., made particular by the matter. 
Alternatively, one could complain (following James Lesher, for example) that this 
account merely shows that “the form exists only in the individual substances which have 
it” (Lesher 1971, 177) and this is compatible with the view that forms are universal. 
Indeed, it seems that many (of especially 1970s) opponents of the attribution of particular 
forms to Aristotle assume that the “particular form” must include material particularities 
(features that are not shared by all members of the same species). However, I do not 
think we need to make this assumption in order to show that forms are particular in the 
relevant sense. For being “numerically one” involves being particular for Aristotle, and 
thus it is not unreasonable to suggest that forms can be particular in the sense of being 
numerically different between Socrates and Callias, but yet universal (common to many 
particulars) in the sense of excluding material peculiarities below the level of species. I 
believe that this is the view Aristotle is committed to (at least in the Metaphysics), but I 
do not think this view is as weak as some claim.  
                                                        
of different composite substances. The composite substance, on this view, functions just as matter does in 
relation to the composite. This view is considered by Witt (1989, chap. 5).  
160 See, esp., Graham (1987), Lesher (1971), Woods (1967; 1993). A stronger sense of particularity of 
forms is defended by, e.g., Frede and Patzig (1988), who seem to think that the particularity of forms is a 
brute fact, which stands in no need of further explanation (this view, we could say, is hard to reconcile with 
Aristotle’s instance that it is matter that individuates). See also Irwin (2002, 248-55), who argues that 
particular forms themselves contain a bit of matter of the right functional type (this view, one could say, 
blurs Aristotle’s distinction of matter and form). 
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 Firstly, too much emphasis on the uniqueness of forms (on the idea that forms 
themselves must include individual particularities say) would make it hard to see how 
they could be knowable and definable. In Metaphysics Λ 5, Aristotle insists that our 
particular forms are the same in definition. This suggests that as far as essential definition 
goes, each form of one and the same species (or, alternatively, each instance of the 
species-form) is the same as any other form of that species, just as every particular 
human being is the same as every other so far as the definition is concerned. The above 
account of particularity of forms can accommodate Aristotle’s demands on knowledge 
and definition. According to this account, forms of the same species (or, instances of the 
same form) differ from one another only in terms of the matter they are joined to. So, 
when we talk about my form and yours, we do not talk about anything essentially 
different. 
 Secondly, our talk of particular forms (of my form and your form) is not a mere 
façon de parler, since the form never actually exists except in a particular instantiation. 
Since forms can only exist as enmattered (save for nous, which I shall ignore here) they 
can only exist as particularized in the sense here defended. There are no universal forms 
in their own right, no universal human being or auto anthrôpos (as Aristotle puts it) in 
addition to particular human beings. When we define “the human form” or “the form of 
human”, although we do not define the form of any particular human (in particular), we 
are not defining the form of some universal human. When we talk about “the human 
form”, we talk about the particular instantiations of a form, although these instantiations 
are indistinguishable as far as their definition is concerned.  
 Thirdly, the interpretation according to which particular forms are numerically 
distinct instances of universals is compatible with the principle that (for Aristotle) every 
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particular is a “this something”, a particular of a certain kind. Indeed, the desire to 
attribute to forms (if they are to be particular) some kind of strong ontological 
independence from universals might well have its origin in the desire to attribute to 
concrete particulars some kind of strong ontological independence from universals. 
However, as I have argued before, particulars have only a weak kind of ontological 
independence from universals, and the same holds also of particular forms. Particular 
forms (like concrete particulars themselves) are “this somethings”, where “something” 
picks out the universal, and “thisness” depends on the matter to which they are joined.  
 The above account of the particularity of forms helps to minimize the tension 
between the two apparently opposed insights, viz., that substances must be “this 
something” and hence particular, and that they must be definable and hence universal. 
Indeed, Aristotle begins his discussion of substance in Z 1 by requiring that a substance 
be both a “this something” (tode ti) and “what it is” (ti esti) (1028a11-15). This suggests 
that he is not willing simply to reject one at the expense of the other.  
 This leads us to the third question I mentioned at the beginning of this section, viz., 
does Aristotle become subject to some of the criticisms which he had earlier raised 
against the Platonists? His standard complaint against the Platonists is that they turned 
universals into separate substances, but no universal can be a separate substance. As 
Aristotle explains in Z 16, the Platonists were right in making Forms separate, if indeed 
they are substances, but they were wrong in supposing that a separate Form is “the one 
over many” (1040a25-30). Aristotle present this objection also in Metaphysics M 9: 
For they [the Platonists] treat forms both as universals and again, at the same time, as 
separate (chôristas) and as particulars (tôn kath’ hekaston). But it has been argued before 
that this is impossible. Those who said that the substances were universals combined 
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these things in the same thing because they did not make them [the substances] the same 
as sensibles. (M 9, 1086a33-35) 
Aristotle’s main objection to the Platonists is that they failed to make Forms the same as 
sensible things (1086a36). They treated Forms as universals and, at the same time, as 
separate substances, which is tantamount to saying that they treated Forms as particulars 
beyond their particular instances. Aristotle’s own position evades this objection, since he 
does not separate universals from their instances. Accordingly, he does not turn 
universals into particular substances, which, as he says, is an “impossible” combination. 
However, he does not thereby lean to the other extreme and separate particulars from 
universals, i.e., he does not think that particulars can exist independently of their 
essential features. He thinks that every particular (whether a particular substance like this 
human being, or the particular form of this human being) is a particular something or 
other. There can be no particular, and hence no particular form either, that is not the form 
of some kind or other. Stated otherwise, just as there is no Socrates apart from there 
being a particular human being (who is, at the same time, a certain animal, etc.), so there 
is no form of Socrates apart from being a particular human form.  
 Hence, there is no deep problem of how what is most real can also be most 
knowable, assuming that particulars are most real and knowledge is of the universal. 
There is no deep problem, since the relationship between the concrete particular and its 
species (or between the particular form of the concrete particular and its species) is not 
correctly thought of as a relationship between two quite separate things. Rather, as I have 
suggested in previous chapters, their relationship can be thought of as that of mutual 
ontological dependence. Particulars cannot exist without being particulars of a certain 
sort, and universals cannot exist without being instantiated (or “particularized”).  
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 In the following chapter, I will consider Alexander of Ahprodisias’ views on 
universals. His views are worthy of attention since he seems to be the first author who 
separates being a form (and, by implication, being a particular) from being a universal. 
Thus he forces to the surface the underlying difficulties in Aristotle’s position, and 
invokes the traditional problem about the ontological status of universals. 
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5 
Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Solution*  
The previous chapters were discussing Aristotle and his take on the problem of how what 
is most real can also be most knowable. We now skip some six hundred years to discuss 
the solution that emerges from the writings of Alexander of Aphrodisias to Aristotle’s 
problem of katholou. Alexander, who was known to later generations as “the 
Commentator” (until Averroes took over that title), wrote at the end of the second 
century AD and the beginning of the third. His views on universals became very 
influential in later tradition (his influence can be found in Porphyry and Boethius, and 
among the Arabic philosophers and the Scholastics).161 Although Alexander’s 
contribution is not yet generally recognized, his views on universals influenced the future 
direction of the discussions of both Aristotle’s problem of katholou and of the traditional 
problem of universals (i.e., the problem about the ontological status of universals). 
 Alexander seems to be the first post-Aristotelian philosopher who explicitly defends 
a distinction between what it is to be a form (eidos) and what it is to be a universal 
(katholou). He thinks that this distinction is clear when we consider that the universal 
attaches to a form as an accident, and thus he commits himself to what I refer to 
(following Martin Tweedale) as the “accidentiality thesis”. In the first part of the chapter, 
I will outline this distinction (and the underlying “accidentiality thesis”), as I understand                                                         
* A few parts of this chapter are reproduced in a paper which has been accepted for publication in the 
Journal of the History of Philosophy. 
161 See Tweedale (1993, 1984). Tweedale (1993) uses the label “Aphrodisian” to indicate a tradition of 
interpretation of Aristotle on universals, which begins with Alexander of Aphrodisias. He argues that 
Avicenna and Duns Scotus worked within the Aphrodisian framework of interpretation. 
  
 131 
it. By distinguishing being a universal from being a form, Alexander seems to offer a 
solution to the problem of katholou, which not only accounts for the definability of 
particulars, but also ascribes to them a strong ontological independence. However, as we 
will see in the second part of the chapter, his solution invokes more problems than it 
solves. In fact, I believe that the consideration of Alexander’s views on universals helps 
to understand why Aristotle’s views evade the seriousness of the problem of katholou 
and of the traditional problem of universals. In the last part of the chapter, I will discuss 
Aristotle’s neutrality with regard to the ontological status of universals.  
Alexander’s “Accidentiality Thesis” 
My presentation of Alexander’s distinction between being a form and being a universal 
relies on Quaestiones 1.11 and 1.3, where this distinction is introduced and developed in 
greatest detail. My primary focus will be on Quaestio 1.11, which is probably 
Alexander’s most important and influential text on universals.162 Its aim is to give an 
explanation of what is meant by the assertion in the first book of Aristotle’s De Anima 
that “animal, universal, either is nothing or is posterior” (402b7). Alexander’s 
explanation, however, goes far beyond Aristotle’s intention in the De Anima. He tries to 
understand what is meant by this claim in general and takes up a definite position of his 
own on the whole question of universals. 
 Alexander explains that in saying that “animal, universal, either is nothing or is 
posterior”, Aristotle added “universal” to “animal” to indicate “animal” as a genus. A 
genus remains Alexander’s paradigm of a universal, even though elsewhere (e.g. Quest.                                                         
162 Quaestio 1.11 was translated into Arabic around 900, so it is quite possible that it was known to 
Avicenna, since he defends a position that is recognizably similar to that of Alexander’s. Through 
Avicenna Alexander’s views influenced medieval thinkers, especially Thomas Aquinas. See Pines (1961), 
who proposes that Quaestio 1.11 was seminal for later medieval discussions in the West. 
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1.3) he identifies also species like human being with the universal. His emphasis on 
genera and species as paradigm examples of universals definitely contributes to the long 
tradition of discussing the problem of universals in terms of Aristotle’s secondary 
substances (rather than of accidents say).  
 Alexander begins his explanation of De Anima’s assertion by claiming that the 
universal (“animal”) is not merely nothing but something (some being, ti on), for “it is 
not the case that, being nothing, it is universal and a genus and predicated of many 
things” (Quaest. 1.11, 23, 21-23).163 Alexander thus relies on Aristotle’s definition of a 
universal as “that which is by nature predicated of many things” and rejects the idea that 
the universal lacks any status in ontology – that it is simply nothing. If it is to be 
predicated of many things, a universal must be something. So when Aristotle said “either 
nothing” he meant, Alexander explains, that a universal is not a thing in its own right 
(pragma ti kath’ hauto), being in the primary or proper sense (kyriôs), but rather an 
accident of that thing.  
 The conclusion that the universal (or the genus, or animal as genus) is an accident of 
the thing in the primary sense goes beyond what Aristotle himself says expressis verbis. 
But the origin of Alexander’s explanation is Aristotelian. Its origin can be found in 
Aristotle’s frequent criticism that the Platonists, in positing Forms, turned universals into 
particular substances and in his reluctance to attribute the same status to universals as to 
particular substances. If universals exist but not as particular substances, it is indeed 
tempting to draw the conclusion that universals are some sort of accidents. It is 
controversial whether Aristotle would have accepted this conclusion (I will return to this 
                                                        
163 I rely for the most part on English translations published in the Ancient Commentators on Aristotle 
series (gen. ed. Richard Sorabji), but I have revised them and, where necessary, retranslated words and 
entire sentences. 
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issue shortly). But it is clear that Alexander is committed to what Tweedale calls the 
“accidentiality thesis”, viz., the idea that the universal is an accident of whatever it is that 
is universal.164 This thesis is a cornerstone of his account of universals, underlying the 
distinction he draws between the form and the universal: 
That of which the universal (to katholou) is an accident (symbebêken) is some thing 
(pragma ti), but the universal is not some thing in the proper sense, but something that is 
an accident of that thing. For example, animal is something and reveals (dêlôtikon) some 
nature (physis), for it signifies (sêmainei) an animate being with sensation – and this in 
its own nature is not universal. (Quaest. 1.11, 23, 25-29) 
This passage is significant in that Alexander calls the thing in the proper sense (to which 
the universal belongs as an accident) a “nature” (physis). Quaestio 1.11 is sometimes 
understood as saying that universals attach to concrete particulars.165 This understanding 
of Quaestio 1.11 would commit Alexander to the sort of bare particular view that I have 
discussed in previous chapters and according to which particulars enjoy ontological 
priority over universals (in the sense that they can exist independently of universals 
essentially predicated of them). However, a closer reading of Quaestio 1.11 (and the 
above passage, in particular) suggests that the thing to which the universal belongs as an 
accident is not in the first place the concrete particular or the concrete particulars, but 
rather the nature or form of a given particular.  
                                                        
164 See Tweedale (1993, 79). In his commentary on Book B of Metaphysics, Alexander attributes this 
“thesis” to Aristotle himself: “For universals have their being in the manner of accidents, as Aristotle will 
say further on” (233, 20-21). Although Aristotle does not say in Metaphysics B that universals are 
accidents, he does say that they are not substances. 
165 See Tweedale (1984), who shows that this was a common understanding of Alexander’s position in 
Quaestio 1.11 among later Commentators (and also among some modern authors), and that this “may well 
be the source of Alexander’s reputation for anti-realism among the ancients” (p. 290). 
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 Elsewhere Alexander characterizes “nature” as the “source of change”.166 But in 
Quaestio 1.11 (as well as in 1.3) “nature” seems to be equivalent with “form” and 
indicates a source or cause of being: something that makes the thing to be what it is.167 
Alexander’s point seems to be that although a universal “reveals” or “signifies” a form 
(e.g. “an animal” reveals “an animate being with sensation”), the form in itself is not 
universal. This implies that the form is prior to the universal. Therefore, the universal 
either is nothing or is posterior because the universal is accidental to the form of a given 
thing and an accident is posterior to that of which it is an accident.  
 Alexander offers the following argument to show that form is prior to universal: 
That the animal as genus (genos zôon) is posterior to the thing is clear. For given the 
existence of (an) animal, it is not necessary for the animal as genus to exist (for it is 
hypothetically possible that there is just one animal…). But if the animal as genus should 
exist, it is necessary also for (an) animal to exist. If an animate being with sensation were 
done away with, animal as genus would not exist (for it is not possible for what is not to 
exist in many), but if animal as genus were done away with, it is not necessary for 
animate being with sensation to be done away with, for it could exist, as I said, even in 
one thing. And it is for these reasons that he said: “either is nothing or is posterior. 
(Quaest. 1.11, 24, 8-16) 
This passage suggests that a nature or form is prior to the universal because a form can 
exist without the universal, but not vice versa. Thus the sort of priority Alexander                                                         
166 See Quaestio 2.18. 
167 In his commentary on Book Δ of Metaphysics, Alexander states that the fundamental sense of nature is 
form, and argues that form is the intrinsic source of both change and being of natural things. In his De 
Anima, Alexander specifies that although a living thing’s form or nature is its soul, “soul is not merely a 
nature”, for “there are many non-living things which, as everyone agrees, have a nature but do not have a 
soul” (31, 24-26). Thus “nature” has a broader meaning than “form”. However, since Alexander does not 
distinguish them in Quaestiones 1.11 and 1.3, I will proceed to use “nature” and “form” interchangeably. 
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attributes to forms is ontological, i.e., the priority according to which one thing is prior to 
another, when the former can exist without the other, but not vice versa.168 Alexander 
argues that if there were only one animal in existence, the animal nature (“animate being 
with sensation”) would exist, but animal as genus with many members would not. 
Alexander’s argument is thus based on the hypothetical cases involving the existence of 
only one particular member of a species. Further, the argument evidently assumes that 
the existence of the animal as genus requires the existence of more than one animal, but 
not vice versa, since “it is hypothetically possible that there is just one animal”. Thus, 
Alexander thinks that the distinction between the form and the universal is clear if we 
consider that the form can exist in only one particular, whereas the existence of a 
universal (animal as a genus) requires the existence of more than one particular. And 
since a form can exist in only one particular, it is accidental to that form whether it has 
more than one instance. Hence it follows that the universal is accidental to the form.169 
 Alexander uses similar argument also in Quaestio 1.3 to show that the form of 
human being need not be common to many particulars. However, his argument there 
adds an important qualification concerning definitions: 
Therefore, definitions are not of things that are common as common (tôn koinôn hôs 
koinôn), but of those thing to which it attaches as an accident (symbebêken) that they are 
common. For even if there were only one human being in existence the definition would 
be the same. For it is not the definition of it because it is present in many [particulars],                                                         
168 Alexander explains in his commentary on Book Δ of Metaphysics that things prior in this sense are 
“those whose removal involves the removal of other things but that are not themselves removed when 
others are” (387,5-6). 
169 I will follow here Alexander’s lead and say that the universal is accidental to the form. Since being a 
universal lies in belonging or being common to many things, it would be more natural to say that 
universality is accidental to the form. But Alexander repeatedly puts this point by saying that the genus, or 
the animal as a genus, or the universal is accidental to the form. This raises problems for understanding the 
ontological status of his universals, which I will discuss in the following section.  
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but because the human being is human being in accordance with a nature of this sort, 
whether there are several sharing in this nature or not. (Quaest. 1.3, 8, 12-17) 
Alexander argues that even if there were only one human being in existence, the form of 
human being (“mortal rational animal”) would exist, though the universal (human being 
as a species with many members) would not. Further, Alexander insists that if there were 
only one human being in existence, this human being would still be definable. This is so 
because the definition is of the form and it is accidental to the form whether it has one 
instance or more than one. In other words, the definition is not of what is common as 
common, for the form that is defined is the same regardless of the number of its 
instances. This argument implies that the form includes only essential features that can 
be shared by all members of the species (and not material particularities), but makes the 
point that the form need not be shared by many things in order to be definable. We may 
presume that the same point holds also of the form of animal: it no less exists as a 
definable nature when there is only one animal in existence than when there are many. 
 Quaestio 1.3 thus suggests that in distinguishing between being a form and being a 
universal, Alexander also distinguishes between being essential and being universal. If 
there were only one human being in existence (Socrates say), that particular human being 
would exist without human being existing as a species with many members; but within 
Socrates, the essential nature of human being would still exist and be definable. 
 Alexander’s distinction between being a form and being a universal seems to offer a 
solution to Aristotle’s problem of katholou, which not only accounts for the definability 
of particulars but also attributes to them a strong kind of ontological independence. 
Hence his solution might appear to be more satisfactory than the one I have developed 
and attributed to Aristotle in previous chapters. According to my interpretation, concrete 
 137 
particulars are always particulars of a specific sort and hence they have only a weak sort 
of ontological independence. More precisely, I have suggested that particulars are 
ontologically independent in the sense of not having any instances, but not in the sense of 
being capable of existing independently of universals essentially predicated of them.  
 According to Alexander, universals are posterior to forms (to which they belong as 
accidents) and hence they are also posterior to particulars, since it is “hypothetically 
possible” that there exists just one particular. Consequently, Alexander attributes to 
particulars a strong kind of ontological independence. On his view (and he evidently 
takes his view to be in line with Aristotle’s view), particulars enjoy ontological priority 
over universals, i.e., they are capable of existing without there being universals. He can 
hold this view because he distinguishes the nature of a given particular from the 
universal. The particular human being, for example, cannot exist without her own form 
or nature which makes her to be what she is (to wit, a human being) but her existence 
does not depend on there being human being as a species with many members (for she 
might well be the only human being in existence). Since Alexander preserves the insight 
that particulars are always of a specific kind, he can also account for their definability – 
particulars are definable because of their form (although form need not be universal). 
Thus it seems that Alexander’s solution allows particulars (and within them forms) to be 
both ontologically prior to universals and definable. In the following section, I will 
analyze Alexander’s solution in greater detail by outlining the assumptions it relies on 
and discuss the problems it invokes. 
Alexander’s Solution and its Problems 
Alexander’s solution (involving the “accidentiality thesis” and the distinction between 
the form and the universal) relies on two important assumptions. These assumptions 
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concern (i) Aristotle’s standard definition of a universal and (ii) the ontological character 
of genera and species (Aristotle’s “secondary substances”).  
 First of all, Alexander takes up a definite position on Aristotle’s definition of the 
universal as “that which is by nature predicated of many things” (De Int. 17a36). In fact, 
he seems to be the first one to bring out the ambiguity implicit in this definition and to 
make it central to his account of universals. There are two possible interpretations of the 
assertion that the universal is predicated of many things. It might mean that for 
something to be a universal (i) it must be actually predicated of more than one thing, or 
(ii) it must be such that it can be predicated of more than one thing. On interpretation (i), 
for a given universal to exist it must be multiply instantiated. So if just one human being 
exists, then the universal, human being, does not exist. Its existence requires the 
existence of more than one particular human. On interpretation (ii), a given universal 
need not be multiply instantiated in order to exist. So if just one particular exists, it does 
not follow that the universal does not exist because the universal is such that it can exist 
in a plurality of things (even if there is, now, only one in existence). 
 Alexander accepts, in a way, both of these interpretations yet applies them to 
different things. He accepts (i) and assumes that a universal is something that is actually 
predicated of many things, i.e., it is predicated of more than one particular. He also 
accepts (ii), since he holds that a form is such that it can be common to many particulars, 
even though in virtue of its own nature it need not belong to more than one.  
 Alexander’s account thus indicates that the term “universal” is ambiguous between 
(i) that which is actually predicated of many things (universal as universal), and (ii) that 
which can be so predicated (to which being a universal attaches as an accident). These 
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two senses of the universal do not necessarily coincide: what can be universal need not 
be universal. 
 It is controversial which one of these two interpretations Aristotle himself would 
accept, and Aristotelian scholars who have paid attention to this issue divide equally 
between the two interpretations. Some think that the existence of Aristotle’s universal 
requires (i) actual plural instantiation, others that it requires (ii) possible plural 
instantiation  (the latter seems to be the majority view, if we can speak of the majority 
view at all in this case).170 I am inclined to think that Aristotle would not be much 
concerned with this issue, since he seems to take it for granted that in the sublunary 
world universals have plural instances – species with only member, if there were such 
things at all, would be exceptionally rare. 
 However, there are few considerations which suggest that if pressed on this issue 
Aristotle would demand actual plural instantiation on doctrinal grounds (and not only 
because species with only one member are exceptionally rare). A possible problem with 
the interpretation according to which universal can be predicated of many things is that it 
does not make it necessary for universals to be instantiated in order to exist. If we hold 
that a universal is one which, by nature, is such that it can belong to many things, then it 
is not clear why we should assume that it must be actually predicated of something at all. 
If a universal may hold of a plurality of things, even if there is currently only one in 
existence, why should we not allow that some such universals can exist without 
belonging to any particular at all? Thus, this interpretation opens a back door to 
                                                        
170 Scholars who adopt interpretation (i) are Irwin (2002) and Fine (2008). Scholars who defend 
interpretation (ii) include Modrak (1979), Sharples (2005), Sorabji (2005). Sorabji writes: “This point, 
dependence on the existence of more than one particular, goes beyond Aristotle, for Aristotle’s definition 
of universals at Int. 17a29-40 requires only that a universal is shareable, whereas Alexander’s is actually 
shared” (2005, 150). 
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Platonism according to which universals can regardless of whether or not they are 
instantiated. 
 Indeed, this problem also lurks behind Alexander’s account of universals. Although 
Alexander is usually considered to be a loyal follower of Aristotle, he goes beyond 
Aristotle in his understanding of the Platonic position. Aristotle seems to think that the 
Platonic theory of Forms is (supposed to be) a theory of universals, but Alexander finds 
the distinction between the form and the universal already in Plato’s philosophy. In his 
commentary on book A of the Metaphysics, Alexander claims that “Plato supposed that 
definitions are of natures of another sort and not of any particular sensible thing nor of 
the universal… and these natures to which definitions belong, he called “Forms”” (50, 7-
15). The position Alexander attributes to Plato does not appear to be that different from 
his own position in Quaestio 1.3: “definitions are not of things that are common as 
common, but on those things [i.e. natures] to which it attaches as an accident that they 
are common” (8, 12). In other words, the objects of definitions are not strictly universals 
but forms which need not be universal though they can be. Although Alexander would 
not admit that definitions are of some separate natures, he does not explain what 
precisely the relation is between forms and particulars and why forms cannot exist 
uninstantiated (given that the form is such that it may exist in many things, though it does 
not need to).171 
 That the requirement of possible plural instantiation does not make it evident why 
the universal must be actually instantiated might well be one reason why Aristotle would 
reject Alexander’s distinction between two senses of a universal. Since for Aristotle the 
existence of a universal requires actual instantiation (he rejects the existence of                                                         
171 For a longer discussion of this difficulty, see my “Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Account of Universals and 
its Problems” (forthcoming). 
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uninstantiated universals), it is natural to suppose that it requires actual (rather than 
possible) plural instantiation. This point is brought out by Terence Irwin (2002): “For the 
definition [of a universal] either requires possible plural instantiation or requires actual 
plural instantiation; but if it supports the claim about actual instantiation, it cannot 
merely require possible plural instantiation, but must be taken to require actual plural 
instantiation” (p. 80). Further, the claim that the universal can exist in only one thing 
does not appear to be much different from the claim that the universal signifies a 
particular thing. However, Aristotle repeatedly says that the universal does not signify a 
“this something” (tode ti), some numerically one thing, which also appears to suggest 
that Aristotle’s universals have necessarily plural instances. There are also other 
considerations suggesting that Aristotle would be reluctant to adopt Alexander’s 
distinction between two senses of the universal, but in order to discuss these 
considerations we need to first consider the second assumption underlying Alexander’s 
account. 
 Secondly and relatedly, Alexander’s account relies on a certain understanding of the 
ontological character of genera and species, which he (following Aristotle) identifies 
with universals. It is not easy to determine Aristotle’s views on this issue. His negative 
and polemical remarks (e.g. that they do not signify a tode ti) suggest that he does not 
want us to conceive of them as concrete things. But other than that, the ontological 
character of secondary substances remains obscure and very difficult to cash out using 
contemporary terminology. In particular, they seem to escape the distinction we make 
today between collections of particulars and properties. Aristotle often speaks of 
particulars as if they were members of species and genera, which might suggest that a 
secondary substance is some sort of a collection of particulars (perhaps something like a 
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class).172 But he also says that the secondary substances reveal what the primary 
substances are, which might suggest that they are some sort of property (for it is not 
evident how a class could reveal the nature of a particular). Although we can evidently 
speak about the property of being a human being (or being human), the natural examples 
of properties are accidents like being white. But Aristotle is careful to point out that 
secondary substances are not simple properties like being white.173  
 Now, it seems that Alexander conceives of universals (species and genera) as 
properties (i.e., corresponding to the species human being, for example, we have, as a 
property, being human). This conception of a universal plays an important part in his 
argument, since the existence of a property does not need plural instances (as Aristotle 
himself admits when he draws in the Categories a distinction between particular and 
universal accidents). Thus this conception helps (or enables) Alexander to draw a 
distinction between forms and universals: he construes the form as a property (or a 
cluster of properties) which can have only one instance. When the property of being 
human, for example, happens to have more than one instance, then we can speak of a 
human being as a species.  
 Now that we have discussed the most important assumptions underlying Alexander’s 
solution to Aristotle’s problem of katholou, we can turn to the question of how 
satisfactory his solution is. It is my contention that Alexander addresses several                                                         
172 For example, Aristotle says that primary substances “exist in” or “belong to” (hyparchein en) secondary 
substances (Cat. 2a14-16). If we conceive of species and genera as classes, then we need to modify the 
modern understanding of a “class”. For classes are typically defined extensionally, but Aristotle’s 
universals are not purely extensional classes. If Aristotle thinks of secondary substances as classes (i.e., 
classes that are defined extensionally), then it is not clear how they can survive changes in the particulars 
falling under them, or how they can reveal what the particulars are. 
173 Aristotle struggles to maintain the distinction between secondary substances and properties in 
Categories 5, where he claims that secondary substances signify a “such” (poion ti, “quality”), but then 
immediately adds that they do not signify a “such” in the same way as accidents like white do; for “white 
signifies nothing other than a such” whereas species and genera signify a “substance of such a sort” (3b10-
21).  
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difficulties latent in Aristotle’s views, but in the end he succeeds more in forcing these 
underlying difficulties to the surface than in providing a solution to them.  
 First of all, Alexander argues that if there is only one particular in existence, then 
this particular would nonetheless be knowable and definable, since the definition is of the 
form, and it is accidental to the form whether or not it is universal. For example, if there 
is only one particular human in existence, then, although there is no ground for (actual) 
universal predication, this particular human would still have a definable nature. But what 
does it mean to say that this particular human (the only one in existence) is nonetheless 
knowable and definable? Could we have any actual knowledge of her (or, more 
precisely, of her form), or is she knowable only in principle? If she is knowable only in 
principle (so that in order to be actually knowable she must have universals actually 
predicated of her), then this argument does not show that particulars existing without 
universals can nonetheless be knowable and definable. If she is an object of actual 
knowledge (so that we have actual knowledge of her definition, although the definition 
applies as a matter of fact only to her), then it would be hard to see the role of universals 
in scientific knowledge. If particulars are known without universals, then why do we 
need universals in the first place? Further, Alexander’s view that the knowledge and 
definition are of forms (which need not be universal) implies that Aristotle’s oft-repeated 
claim that knowledge is of the universal should be reinterpreted as the claim that 
knowledge is of that which happens to be universal. 
 Secondly, the main advantage of Alexander’s solution might appear to be that it 
helps to explain what philosophical sense we can make of particular forms. Alexander 
argues that forms are ontologically prior to universals, which suggests that forms are 
particular in the sense of being capable of existing without being universal (i.e., having 
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many instances). Indeed, he insists that it is accidental to forms whether they have one 
instance or more than one. However, this apparently straightforward attribution of 
ontological priority to forms leaves it very hard to see what precisely is the status of 
forms. Alexander cannot allow his forms to be (essentially) universal, since they may 
exist in only one particular. This suggests that forms are particular. On the other hand, he 
cannot say that they are (essentially) particular either, since they will exist in many 
instances sometimes. Hence, he must be committed either to the view that (i) the form is 
neither universal nor particular, or (ii) that the form, e.g. the property of being human, is 
sometimes particular (when it has only one instance) and sometimes universal (when it 
has more than one instance). However, it would be even more difficult to explain in what 
sense forms could be neither universal nor particular than to explain in what sense they 
could be particular. The second view seems to introduce to his ontology rather peculiar 
entities – properties that are sometimes particular and sometimes universal. Aristotle 
escapes this awkward consequence since he does not attribute to particulars any strong 
kind of ontological independence from universals (which would make it necessary to 
draw a sharp distinction between them). Thus, it seems that it is Alexander’s (not 
Aristotle’s) account which sharply raises the question of whether forms are particular or 
universal (or perhaps neither). 
 Further, by distinguishing forms from universals, Alexander’s account invokes the 
problem about the ontological status of universals. Quaestiones 1.11 and 1.3 suggests 
that universals depend for their existence on the existence of particulars. More precisely, 
a universal exists if a form has at least two instances. However, it is not clear how we are 
supposed to understand its existence. Alexander’s “accidentiality thesis” indicates that he 
wants to keep forms distinct from universals – being a universal attaches to being a form 
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only as an accident from outside, so to speak. This suggests that the universal must be an 
“extra” entity – perhaps something that somehow pops into existence when a form 
happens to have more than one instance and stops existing as soon there is no longer 
more than one thing.174 On the other hand, my earlier suggestion that Alexander’s forms 
appear to be peculiar entities that are sometimes universal and sometimes particular 
indicates that universals are not “extra” entities. Rather, forms themselves are sometimes 
universal (when they have more than one instance) and sometimes particular (when they 
have only one instance). Be this as it may, it is at least clear that Alexander’s account of 
universals has a realist side. The requirement of more than one instance does not make 
universals thought-dependent, since the existence of more than one particular does not 
(or so it seems to me) depend on our recognition.  
 Nonetheless, Alexander occasionally makes claims that appear to turn universals 
into something thought-dependent. In his commentary on Aristotle’s Topics, he clearly 
rejects the idea that genera are “mere thoughts without existence” like the centaur (355, 
12-14). But although they are not merely fabrications of human imagination, they seem 
to somehow depend on thought. In Quaestio 1.3, for example, he says that if the human 
nature, “the mortal rational animal is taken apart from the material circumstances and 
differences it becomes (ginestai) common” (8, 1-4). In a passage from the De Anima, 
Alexander speaks of things that are common or universal as “becoming common or 
universal”, and adds that “if they are not thought, they no longer are, so when they are 
separated from the intellect that thinks them they perish, if their being (einai) is in being 
thought” (90, 6-8). This suggests that universals cannot exist (at all) without being 
                                                        
174 This suggestion is made by Tweedale (1984), who compares Alexander’s universal to a Matthews-style 
“kooky object” (“accidental entity”) that comes into existence and stops existing as multiple particulars 
come and go.  
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thought, i.e., apprehended by the intellect.175 These statements raise difficult questions. 
What is it that depends on the intellect for its existence? Are thought-dependence and 
existence in many things two (alternative) ways of being a universal?   
 Alexander’s views are no doubt subtler than these excerpts suggest, but they are 
enough to show that he, unlike Aristotle, started to struggle with the problem concerning 
the ontological status of universals. Indeed, in several places he comes close to explicitly 
formulating “the problem”, and it has been suggested that Porphyry (who is usually 
regarded to be the first to announce “the problem”) takes his formulation of the problem 
over from Alexander.176 But whether or not this is true, it is at least clear that Boethius 
takes over Alexander’s take on the problem. It is Boethius’ commentary, rather than 
Porphyry’s Isagoge itself, which made Porphyry’s questions famous. And when Boethius 
presents his solution to the problem in his second commentary on the Isagoge, he claims 
to be following Alexander of Aphrodisias. So Alexander plays an important role in the 
development of the problem of universals. His contribution does not lie simply in the fact 
that he more or less explicitly formulated the question of whether universals are real or 
exist in thought alone. His contribution runs deeper, and lies eventually in the distinction 
he draws between being a universal and being a form. Since Aristotle thinks that 
universals are embedded in the very nature of particulars, he does not face this question 
in all its seriousness. In the last section, I briefly discuss Aristotle’s approach to the 
problem about the ontological status of universal. 
                                                        
175 Furthermore, in Quaestio 2.28 Alexander goes as far as to say that a genus taken as a genus is a “mere 
name”, not a thing that underlies, and it is common only in thought (noeisthai), not in reality (hypostasis). 
For a further discussion of the ontological status of Alexander’s universals and the problem it raises, see 
my “Alexander’s Account of Universals and its Problems” (forthcoming). 
176 For Alexander’s formulation of the problem, see (esp.) in Top. 355, 12-14. According to de Libera 
(1999), “that Porphyry depends on Alexander for the very formulation of “his” problem is … beyond 
discussion” (p. 49) 
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Aristotle and the Ontological Status of Universals 
In order to understand and appreciate Aristotle’s views on universals, it is important to 
take into account the context in which he philosophizes. In Aristotle’s day, the 
contemporary teaching treated Forms as things in their own right and distinguished them 
sharply from sensible particulars. Platonism, as Aristotle understands it, has Forms 
standing entirely apart from concrete particulars participating in them, leaving it hard to 
see how they could possibly contribute to the being and knowledge of particular things 
(Met. A 9, 991a12-14). It is not surprising that such a sharp distinction invokes difficult 
questions concerning the existence and ontological status of Forms – the questions 
concerning the existence and range of Forms were disputed among the Platonists 
themselves.177  
 Aristotle takes the theory of Forms to be a theory of universals, but Aristotle’s 
katholou is not simply a synonym for the Platonic Form (idea, eidos). It is easy to miss 
this point, since talk of universals is today often understood as talk of some independent 
or additional entities, posited by some metaphysicians (usually called “realists”) and not 
by others. So, in contemporary usage, the term “universal” is associated with something 
like the Platonic Form. This association, however, is quite misleading when applied to 
Aristotle’s katholou. He is very careful to disassociate his katholou from the Platonic 
Form. He says repeatedly that universals are not, strictly speaking, substances (they do 
not signify “this somethings”) and that they are not separate from sensible particulars. 
Since Aristotle is very much concerned with rejecting the existence of separate Forms, he 
is evidently aware of the problems concerning the existence and ontological status of                                                         
177 On this point, see Gerson (2005, chap. 6). I have avoided speaking about Plato’s own views, but it 
should be pointed out Plato raises many of the problems himself in the Parmenides. 
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universals. Nonetheless, he nowhere tries to prove the existence of his universals (at least 
not in the way the Platonists try to prove the existence of Forms).178 Most significantly, 
his positive remarks on universals remain neutral with regard to their ontological status 
(and escape the standard divide of realism and nominalism). It is difficult to determine 
the precise reasons for his neutrality but it is clear that since Aristotle is aware of the 
ontological problem, his neutrality cannot simply be the result of ignorance. Instead, 
Aristotle might think that his rejection of separate Forms gives him certain immunity 
against these ontological questions. He might think that the ontological status of 
universals is not particularly worrisome as long as we do not separate them from 
particulars and treat universals as things in their own right, extending to them an 
irreducible ontological status.  
 As far as I know, none of Aristotle’s commentators have tried to develop a positive 
account of his neutrality. His commentators instead concentrate on the question 
concerning the ontological status of his universals. Indeed, it is hard to avoid this 
question, given that the concept of universal has long been understood in association 
with the “problem of universals”. Furthermore, this problem might appear to be 
particularly worrisome in the context of Aristotle’s philosophy because Aristotle remains 
painstakingly non-committal with regard to the ontological status of universals.  
 Nonetheless, I do not think the reason why Aristotle’s commentators have focused 
on, and disputed over, the ontological status of his universals lies simply in his neutrality 
on the topic, though this plays a role. Above all, this dispute seems to rely on the widely 
accepted view that Aristotle commits himself to a dualism of particulars and universals, 
                                                        
178 See Met. A 9 (990b9-17), where Aristotle mentions five arguments for the existence of Platonic Forms, 
which are discussed in greater detail in Peri Ideôn, portions of which are preserved by Alexander in his 
commentary on Metaphysics A.  
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which differs from the Platonic dualism only in that he denies that universals could exist 
independently from particulars of which they are predicated. The most important 
motivations for attributing to Aristotle a Platonic dualism of particulars and universals 
come from his standard definitions of the “universal” and “particular” in the De 
Interpretatione, and from his account of primary and secondary substances in the 
Categories. 
 Aristotle’s standard definitions (“By universal I mean that which is by nature 
predicated of many things; by particular, what is not”) seem to set up some sort of 
distinction between particulars and universals. If universal is that which is predicated of 
many things and particular is that which is not, then it follows (by definition) that what 
Aristotle calls “universal” and what he calls “particular” cannot be strictly identical. No 
universal can be a particular (or vice versa), since no universal can be both predicated 
and not predicated of many things. From this it is easy to draw a further conclusion that 
the distinction between particulars and universals is absolute (both exclusive and 
exhaustive), and hence Aristotle, like Plato, treats particulars and universals as 
irreducibly distinct kinds of things. This is a natural conclusion to draw in light of 
contemporary discussions. On the contemporary conception, the alternative between 
universals and particulars is seen as absolute, and it is often assumed that this is the case 
with Aristotle’s distinction as well.179 However, it should be pointed out that Aristotle 
defines particular in the De Interpretatione only negatively and his positive discussions 
indicate that the particular stands in a peculiarly intimate relation to the universal (which 
cannot be characterized as a kind of dualism).  
                                                        
179 See, e.g., Sykes (1975), who argues that Aristotle’s definitions of “universal” and “particular” commit 
him to “a dichotomy between particular and universal which appears to be both exclusive and exhaustive” 
(p. 313). 
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 Another (and perhaps the most important) reason for attributing to Aristotle a 
Platonic dualism goes back to his Categories. Aristotle’s discussion in the Categories 
throws some light on the ontological commitments that lie behind his standard definition 
of the “universal” as “that which is by nature predicated of many things”. In the 
Categories, Aristotle argues that everything that is predicated of some subject is 
ultimately predicated of some primary substance, and famously concludes that “if the 
primary substances did not exist it would be impossible for any of the other things to 
exist” (2b5). This conclusion indicates that Aristotle takes the opposite position to 
Platonists with regard to the ontological dependence of universals: while universals 
cannot exist without or independently of particulars, Forms can. However, according to 
the traditional interpretation, their disagreement runs even deeper and concerns the issue 
of ontological priority. Aristotle’s conclusion that universals cannot exist independently 
of particulars is traditionally understood as implying that particulars can exist 
independently of universals predicated of them. Hence particulars enjoy ontological 
priority over universals, i.e., universals cannot exist without particulars but not vice 
versa. Consequently, Aristotle turns the Platonic position “upside down”: whereas the 
Platonists ascribe an ontological priority to universal Forms, Aristotle attributes it to 
concrete particulars. This well-established interpretation is, I believe, the main reason for 
attributing to Aristotle a dualist position. It implies that both Plato and Aristotle separate 
two things, the one of which can exist without the other. The only difference is that, 
while the Platonists separate universals from particulars (they hold that universal Forms 
can exist without particulars, but not vice versa), Aristotle separates particulars from 
universals (he holds that particulars can exist without universals, but not vice versa). The 
latter separation, however, has a result similar to the Platonic separation – it immediately 
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brings to the forefront questions concerning the existence and ontological status of 
universals. 
 I have argued that Aristotle’s conclusion that universals cannot exist without 
particulars does not imply that particulars can therefore exist without universals. More 
precisely, I have developed an interpretation according to which particulars and 
universals are ontologically interdependent, i.e., it is no more possible for particulars to 
exist without universals than it is for universals to exist without particulars. This 
interpretation suggests that although Aristotle does not turn the Platonic position “upside 
down”, he definitely changes it, and he does so in a more radical manner than is 
traditionally thought. The traditional interpretation holds that particulars can exist 
independently from universals, thereby committing Aristotle to a dualism (i.e., the view 
that there is an exhaustive distinction between particulars and universals, so that the one 
can exist without the other). My interpretation, on the other hand, holds that particulars 
and universals are ontologically interdependent, and their ontological interdependence 
implies that “particular” and “universal” (or “primary substance” and “secondary 
substance”) cannot be labels for irreducibly distinct types of things. Aristotle thinks that 
for a particular to be it has to be something and universals provide the something that the 
thing is. However, universals add nothing “extra” to particular things; they are no extra 
entities. Rather, they are embedded in the very nature and being of particulars: the 
universal is what the particular is. Hence, we could say that talk of particulars and 
universals (or, primary and secondary substances) is really a shorthand way of talking 
about universalized particulars and particularized universals. 
 Thus, Aristotle does not commit himself to a dualism of universals and particulars. 
Universals are part of the essential being of particulars and this might well be the reason 
 152 
why Aristotle does not feel the need to prove the existence of universals. Their existence 
is as obvious as the existence of particular things. After all, we do not – at least, not until 
we have been influenced by post-Cartesian philosophy – assume that the existence of 
particular physical objects needs to be proved in some special way. 
 Nonetheless, although Aristotle does not want to set up an exhaustive distinction 
between universals and particulars, he does not go to the other extreme and identify 
universals with particulars. Accordingly, while “interdependence” is not a dualism it is 
not a strict identity either. Strict identity is governed by the principle (often called 
“Leibniz’ Law”) which can be loosely expressed by saying that if A and B are identical, 
then whatever is true of the one is true of another. But it does not seem to be the case that 
whatever is true of a particular is true of a universal, and vice versa. This is suggested by 
Aristotle’s definitions of the “universal” and “particular”: universals are said of many 
things, whereas particulars are not. Stated otherwise, while universals may have different 
instances, it makes no sense to speak of different instances of particulars. Furthermore, if 
the universal is strictly identical with the particular, then it seems to be no less of a “this 
something” than the concrete particular itself. And this would make Aristotle’s view as 
“impossible” as the view of the Platonists who treated universals as particulars beyond 
their particular instances (cf. Met. M 9, 1086a31-b11). That the separation of universal 
Forms from particulars turns Forms themselves into particular substances is one of 
Aristotle’s most important criticisms of Platonism, which predates the contemporary 
criticism according to which realists tacitly assimilate general terms to proper names 
(they assume that general terms signify some particulars entities). This criticism 
suggests, again, that universals cannot be strictly identical with particulars. 
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 The above considerations indicate that Aristotle is trying to work out a middle 
position between dualism and strict identity. On the one hand, Aristotle does not want to 
attribute to universals an irreducible ontological status. The universal could not exist as a 
thing in its own right; there are no universals per se. On the other hand, he wants to give 
to universals a weak sort of ontological status which cannot be reduced entirely to the 
status of particulars, but which does not entail independent existence from particulars. 
Aristotle’s motivation for attributing to universals a weak ontological status (and perhaps 
for coining the word katholou in the first place) appears to be mainly epistemological. He 
wants to allow there to be knowledge of universals, which is potentially knowledge of 
particulars (and not of some “extra” entity), but which is not knowledge of any 
particulars in particular. So although knowledge of the universal is not about a definite 
thing (it is not tied to one particular), the knowledge of particulars is potentially there. 
Therefore, when we talk about universals, we do talk about particulars and not of some 
“extra” entity – in such talk we assert something of each of them, not of some other thing 
in addition to or apart from them.180 Since universal knowledge involves the ability to 
know any of the particulars that fall under the universal, it is comparable to a template 
that can be filled by any of the particulars of a relevant sort. As Tweedale puts it: “The 
universal knowledge is like a check that can be cashed by anyone who can show that 
they meet certain qualifications. Science is made up of such checks” (1988, 513). 
 It is difficult to give a positive account of the precise nature of the distinction that 
holds between particulars and universals. I have appealed to the notion of 
interdependence which can be seen as a middle ground between dualism and strict                                                         
180 See An. Post. A 11 (77a5-9), where Aristotle claims that knowledge and demonstration does not require 
there to be Forms, or things apart from (para) the many, but it requires there to be something that holds of 
(kata) many. See also Tweedale (1987), who argues that Aristotle is committed to “tenuous realism”, i.e., 
he views universals as real entities but lacking numerical oneness. 
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identity. The notion of interdependence (that I take to be at work in Aristotle) is similar 
to Duns Scotus’ notion of formal distinction. Formal distinction is a real distinction (i.e., 
a distinction which exists independently of thought) but it is not a distinction between 
two things (res), one of which can exist even when the other does not. Rather, it is a 
distinction between two aspects of a thing (Scotus calls them “formalities” and 
“realities”, realitas) which are really the same but definitionally independent from one 
another. So, formal distinction enables us to distinguish between aspects (within one 
thing) which are really the same but which need not be such that what is true of one must 
be true of another.181 
 Scotus’ formal distinction appears to be particularly appropriate in the context of 
Aristotle’s philosophy, since it allows us to say (as Aristotle evidently wants to say) that 
the only independently existing things are particular things – but particular things of a 
certain sort, “this somethings”. These particulars are both most real and most knowable, 
but within them we can distinguish between two aspects (that of a “this” and that of a 
“something”) and consider particulars either in respect of their particularity or as falling 
under universals. Indeed, Aristotle seems to be the first philosopher to recognize and to 
exploit the nowadays widely recognized point that the way something is described or 
referred to makes a crucial difference to the truth and falsity of what is said. He starts to 
                                                        
181 Scotus’ formal distinction was fiercely criticized by William Ockham. His criticism turns on the point 
that contradictory predicates or properties cannot be simultaneously true of aspects that are really the same. 
Scotus could escape the criticism by firmly insisting that contradictory predicates cannot belong to aspects 
that are in no way distinct, but they can belong to aspects really the same but formally distinct. 
Nonetheless, Ockham’s criticism raises the question concerning the “robustness” of formal distinction: 
aspects of the same thing must be ontologically robust enough to serve as property bearers but not robust 
enough to be reduced to things in their own right. Translations of the most important texts concerning 
Scotus’ formal distinction and Ockham’s criticism of it can be found in Tweedale (1999).  
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use the “as such” (hêi, qua) locution, which plays a crucial role in understanding his 
views on scientific knowledge.182  
 Aristotle’s commitment to the position that the particular is always a particular of a 
certain sort (e.g. the particular horse is always a horse) might strike us a trivial, but I 
strongly deny that its triviality is unenlightening. It should make us think twice before we 
engage ourselves in the longstanding dispute over the ontological status of Aristotelian 
universals. From Aristotle’s perspective, there does not appear to be any particularly 
deep problem about the ontological status of universals (e.g. his species and genera). On 
his view, what particular horses have in common is their being horses, nothing more or 
nothing less. Nothing less, since Aristotle does not think that particular horses have 
nothing in common except that they are called (or thought of as) horses – they are called 
horses because they are horses. And nothing more, since Aristotle does not think that 
what they have in common is somehow over and above the fact that they are all horses. 
Particular horses are horses in virtue of themselves (one can go on to explain what it is to 
be a horse, but this does not require the introduction of any additional entities). To hunt 
for something beyond the fact that all particular horses are horses is to go to an 
ontological wild goose chase. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
182 As I have argued in Chapter Three, science cannot regard the particular in all its non-repeatable 
particularity and uniqueness (particular qua particular), but it can regard the particular under a definite 
aspect that it shared with other particulars. 
 156 
CONCLUSION 
I have explored Aristotle’s solution to the problem of how what is most real can also be 
most knowable. This problem is generated by two of his philosophical commitments:  (i) 
particulars are most real, and (ii) universals are most knowable (since knowledge is of 
the universal). I have suggested that these would lead to a serious problem only if it is 
assumed that Aristotle, like Plato, is committed to a strong dualism of particulars and 
universals. And since Aristotle’s commentators typically think that these commitments 
generate a serious or perhaps insoluble problem, they attribute to Aristotle a Platonic 
distinction between the particular and the universal. 
 According to my interpretation, Aristotle’s solution to the problem lies in 
minimizing the distinction between the particular and the universal. In order to 
characterize their intimate relationship I have invoked the notion of interdependence, 
arguing that, for Aristotle, particulars and universals are both ontologically and 
epistemologically interdependent. Their close relationship is often overlooked due to the 
traditional interpretation, according to which Aristotle attributes to concrete particulars 
an unqualified ontological priority (thus treating particulars as things that are capable of 
existing independently of the universals predicated of them). I have challenged this 
interpretation by arguing that particulars cannot exist without universals essentially 
predicated of them. The concrete particular is not a bare particular but a particular of a 
certain sort, a “this something” (tode ti), where universals provide the “something” – 
they are embedded in the very being and nature of the particular.  
 Further, I have argued that corresponding to the ontological interdependence there is 
also an epistemological interdependence between particulars and universals. Aristotle 
thinks that particulars are not knowable and definable qua particulars, i.e., they are not 
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knowable in all their particularity. But they are knowable qua particulars of a certain sort 
(qua falling under universals). More precisely, I have argued that Aristotle distinguishes 
between unqualified scientific knowledge, which is of the universal, and qualified 
scientific knowledge, which is of the particular. Although unqualified scientific 
knowledge is of the universal, it does not exclude (but rather implies) knowledge of 
particulars – knowledge of the universal is (as Aristotle puts it) potential knowledge of 
particulars. When this knowledge is “actualized”, we have qualified knowledge of 
particulars. Since particulars (qua a certain sort) can be known in the qualified sense, the 
statements about them are part of scientific knowledge. I have also discussed Aristotle’s 
views on epagôgê (induction), suggesting that knowledge of universals is acquired from 
the perception of particulars. My interpretation suggests that particulars and universals 
are epistemologically interdependent because particulars cannot be scientifically known 
without  universals under which they fall; and universals cannot be scientifically known 
without particulars which fall under them (since our scientific knowledge of universals 
begins with the perception of particulars).  
 I have also dicussed the problem of the status of Aristotle’s forms in the central 
books of the Metaphysics, where form is regarded as a primary substance. This invokes 
the problem of explaining how forms can be both real and most knowable (the so-called 
Zeta Problem). I have discussed four different solutions to the problem of whether forms 
are universal or particular, and I have analyzed in greater detail the view that particular 
forms are instances of universals. In particular, I have suggested that forms are particular 
in the sense of being numerically distinct (each concrete particular has its own 
numerically distinct form) and yet universal in the sense of including only those 
(essential) features that are shared by all particulars of the same sort. My interpretation of 
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Aristotle’s position in the Metapysics is compatible with the idea of interdependence 
between particulars and universals. For Aristotle, a particular (whether a concrete 
particular like Socrates, or the particular form of Socrates) cannot exist without being a 
particular of a certain kind, and a universal cannot exist without being instantiated (or 
“particularized”). 
 In the last chapter, I considered the solution to Aristotle’s problem of katholou that 
emerges from the writings of Alexander of Aphrodisias. His solution lies in a distinction 
between being a universal and being a form and in his “accidentiality thesis” (i.e., the 
idea that being a universal is accidental to the form that can be universal). This 
distinction enables him to account for the definablity of particulars, while attributing 
them ontological priority over universals. Nonetheless, Alexander’s account raises 
several problems (including the problem of the ontological status of universals). 
Aristotle’s account evades these problems, since he does not attribute to forms (and, by 
implication, particulars) any strong ontological independence. There is for Aristotle no 
deep problem of how what is most real can also be most knowable, since for him the 
most real things are “this somethings” which entail within themselves both particularity 
and universality. 
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